

Trust in an Era of Change: The Electoral History of Belarus (2001–2025)

Alena Shkurova



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INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years, Belarus has undergone a unique political trajectory, in which the change of election campaigns was accompanied not only by the transformation of the authoritarian regime, but also by a profound change in the structure of mass consciousness and forms of civic subjectivity. Since the early 2000s, when elections remained the leading mechanism of political mobilization and a symbolic channel for expressing alternatives, society has gradually transitioned from polarized authoritarianism to a state of mass resignation, and then to an unprecedented explosion of civic activism in 2020. However, the subsequent violence, repression, and social disintegration led to the birth of a qualitatively new state of mass consciousness — political fatalism. Monitoring data over a 25-year period allows us to trace this dynamic at the level of empirically recorded changes. They demonstrate that the evolution of electoral behavior and political assessments in Belarus cannot be described in the usual categories of “support” and “opposition”. Starting from 2010, not only the level of trust in institutions and expectations of change has been decreasing, but also the very ability of citizens to perceive themselves as subjects of the political process. The traumatic experience of 2020-2021 destroys the remnants of political agency, after which a new configuration is formed in 2022-2025: a combination of emotional burnout, adaptive loyalty and political fatalism.

Based on the research data archive of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, we are creating the first-ever system of electoral data for Belarus (2001-2025), which will allow researchers and experts to see the full picture of the dynamics of trust and political participation.

Our report is an attempt at a comprehensive reconstruction of the electoral history of independent Belarus in the first quarter of the 21st century. The study covers the period from the approval of the authoritarian model (2001) to the stage of its “technocratic conservation” and ritualization (2025).

The uniqueness of our work lies in the methodology of data collection. To construct continuous time series, disparate archival data from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (2001-2022) and the results of modern independent online research (Chatham House, iSANS, 2023-2025) were combined. This allowed us to see what is usually hidden behind the official statistics of the Central Election Commission: the real dynamics of public trust, fear, and political hopes. The key focus of the study is not so much on voting figures as on the transformation of the social contract. How did society move from the polarized struggle of the early 2000s to the “post-Crimean consensus” of 2015, then to the revolutionary explosion of 2020, and finally to the state of “political fatalism” of 2025? This text analyzes how the nature of elections has changed in the perception of Belarusians: from an instrument of influence to an administrative ritual devoid of political content.

The purpose of the study is to identify and analyze long-term changes in the attitudes, expectations, value orientations and perception of the political process by the population, as well as to identify factors that lead to the transformation of electoral behavior and the formation of political fatalism.

Research objectives

1. To reconstruct the trajectory of changes in mass political consciousness based on monitoring data for 2001-2025.
2. To analyze the impact of political crises (2010, 2020, 2022) on changing the perception of the political process and individual subjectivity.
3. To compare the features of electoral behavior in different periods — from the polarized authoritarianism of the 2000s to the fatalistic adaptation of the 2020s, to identify transitional stages.
4. Assess the impact of the collective trauma of 2020-2021 on the destruction of political agency and changes in perceptions of the future, trust, and security.
5. Identify the emergence of new lines of social division, not based on support or opposition to the regime, but on differences in types of adaptation.
6. Identify the mechanisms of the formation of political fatalism as the dominant model of mass consciousness in 2022-2025.

The report analyzes the results of monitoring studies of the population of Belarus for the period 2001-2025 and conducts a comprehensive reconstruction of changes in the structure of mass attitudes. Special attention is paid to the transition from models of participation and polarization to a state of political

fatalism, as well as the emergence of a new type of social division — between internally burned-out and technocratically embedded groups. This approach makes it possible not only to explain the peculiarities of citizens' behavior in post-protest Belarus, but also to rethink the place of elections, trust, expectations, and institutional security in authoritarian political systems that have experienced deep collective trauma.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The project methodology is based on the integration and unification of disparate databases of electoral research in Belarus for 2001-2025, followed by statistical and comparative analysis of time series, factors and turning points in electoral participation and the level of trust in institutions.

Source data of the project:

1. Archive of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus:
 - 1.1. Electoral study 2001
 - 1.2. Research on the results of the referendum 2004
 - 1.3. Electoral study 2006
 - 1.4. Pre-election study 2015
 - 1.5. Electoral study 2020
 - 1.6. Research on the eve of the referendum 2022
2. Data from the national survey conducted by IISEPS on the results of the 2010 elections.¹
3. Data from the 2025 Chatham House pre-election survey².
4. Data from 4 waves of iSANS surveys (2023-2025) covering socio-political and economic issues.

Data from **the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus** – representative studies based on face-to-face interviews conducted among the adult population of Belarus. A representative random national territorial sample was used with quota verification at the final stage (Standard size from 1500 to 2000 respondents). Measurements were carried out in all regions of Belarus, observing proportional representation according to the main socio-demographic characteristics of the general population (gender, age, education). The sample population is representative of the seven regions of the republic (six regions and the city of Minsk) and areas of residence

Standard distribution of respondents by gender, age, and region of residence

TYPE	CHARACTERISTIC	%
before 2019		
Gender	Male	45,8
	Female	54,2
Age	18-24	16,1
	25-34	20,8
	35-44	16,4
	45-54	16,9
	55-65	15,1
	65 +	14,8

1. "National Poll, December 21–31, 2010", IISEPS, 5 November 2025

2. "Perceptions of the Election Campaign and the Situation in Belarus", Chatham House, 5 November 2025

TYPE	CHARACTERISTIC	%
Region	Brest region	14,6
	Vitsebsk region	13,3
	Gomel region	15,3
	Grodno region	11,3
	Minsk	18,7
	Minsk region	15,1
	Mogeilev region	11,7
Type of settlement	City	74,0
	Village	26,0

TYPE	CHARACTERISTIC	%
after 2019		
Gender	Male	44,9
	Female	55,1
Age	18-24	7,6
	25-34	17,1
	35-44	18,8
	45-54	19,3
	55-65	16,6
	65+	20,5
Region	Brest region	14,1
	Vitsebsk region	12,3
	Gomel region	14,2
	Grodno region	10,9
	Minsk	21,7
	Minsk region	15,7
	Mogeilev region	11,1
Type of settlement	City	77,6
	Village	22,4

The results of the IISEPS survey are published on the organization's website and used to illustrate electoral events in 2010 due to the lack of archival data. According to the authors, a standard republican quota sample of 1,511 respondents was used for the research, representative by gender, age, and region of residence.

Since 2020, the conduct of sociological surveys by researchers from abroad in Belarus has been significantly limited. The electoral situation in 2025 is presented based on the analysis of data from a Chatham House study conducted from December 2024 to January 2025 using 3 methods: online CAWI survey (quota sample of 833 respondents, corresponding to the structure of the urban population of Belarus over 18 years of age and adjusted for gender,

age, city size and level of education; in-depth interviews with Belarusians of different ages and political views, CATI telephone survey (random representative sample of 400 respondents).

iSANS data (2023–2025) — an online survey of urban residents aged 18–65, conducted using a standardized questionnaire designed to measure perceptions of the economic situation, political attitudes, and social expectations. The survey was conducted from September 5 to 23, 2025, on two online panels. The sample corresponds to the structure of urban residents of Belarus aged 18 to 65 and is adjusted for gender, age, and region of residence (volume — 1,496 respondents, drop-off rate — 14.2%). The survey was conducted using computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI). According to quantitative research conducted in Belarus at the end of 2022, 92% of urban residents aged 18 to 65 use the Internet.

Study limitations

The analysis of research data covering the period from 2001 to 2025 faces a number of limitations due to theoretical, methodological and methodical differences in the organization and conduct of fieldwork. These differences may affect the compatibility of results obtained in different years and require a cautious approach when interpreting long-term trends.

The report presents generalized characteristics of electoral and political processes, considered through the prism of socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. Special attention is paid to the dynamics of political results in their temporal context — this allows us to identify not only quantitative changes, but also qualitative shifts in voter preferences and behavior.


Based on a comprehensive analysis of empirical data and theoretical generalizations, a classification of stages of electoral dynamics has been developed. This classification reflects key periods of transformation of the political situation, distinguished by the criteria of stability, crises and transition processes. The main trends in the development of the political situation are identified by comparing data from different years, as well as taking into account external and internal factors that influence electoral behavior.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS 2004-2025³

Trust in institutes

Analysis of trust indicators in key state institutions allows us to form an idea of the dynamics of attitudes towards the authorities in Belarus. 2006 was characterized by high levels of trust in institutions. The 2010s were characterized by a slight decline. Trust was restored on the eve of the 2015 elections, which is likely a consequence of the Ukrainian Maidan and Russia's occupation of Crimea. We can state a decline in trust in key institutions in 2016-2019, which became one of the reasons for the 2020 protests. The crisis of legitimacy is observed until the second half of 2022, when trust is restored against the backdrop of fear of war. It is important to understand that when talking about trust in state institutions in Belarus, one should not perceive "trust" in the Western sense. The Belarusian context of trust is institutional fear combined with adaptation in the absence of alternatives. The state is the only source of stability, in conditions of isolation there are no other authorities, there is burnout and acceptance of the power vertical as an inevitable fact.

Do you trust? (coefficient)




3. To ensure comparability with the iSANS online research, the urban population aged 18-65 was selected from the NAS IS data (2004-2022)

Assessments of the political situation

Assessments of the political situation in the country allow us to clearly record:

1. Parallels between assessments of the political situation in the post-crisis 2011 and pre-crisis 2018.
2. Collapse of trust and security in 2020, when 79% of respondents indicated the tension of the political situation in the country.
3. A significant increase in satisfaction with the political situation in the country in 2022, when the focus of criticism of state institutions and the political situation in the country transformed into fear of war and gratitude for non-participation in military operations. Fear became the basis for stabilizing the domestic political situation.

How do you assess the political situation in the country? (%)



Economic ratings


Economic satisfaction is one of the central indicators of government approval, but in Belarus it has its own specifics.

Assessments of the socio-economic situation in the country well capture a number of changes:

1. 2006 is characterized by a low level of negative assessments of the socio-economic situation, which may explain the high level of trust in state institutions.
2. From 2011 to 2018, there was an increase in negative assessments of the economic situation, and therefore the consolidation of loyalty in 2015 took place on non-economic grounds.
3. The political crisis of 2020 had a strong impact on dissatisfaction with the economic situation, significantly reducing the level of economic expectations.

4. Against the background of low economic expectations, since 2022, there has been an increase in satisfaction with the socio-economic situation. This is a compensatory illusion of normalization in conditions of political helplessness or the replacement of political attitudes with material comfort. When there are economic improvements, loyalty grows, when there are no actual economic improvements, people start saying something like: “Everything is fine with us,” because it makes it easier to live and numb the future. Deterioration is accepted as the “new norm,” and the absence of a crisis as “improvement”.

How do you assess the socio-economic situation in the country? (%)



Throughout the analyzed period, the self-assessment of the material situation of the population remained in the zone of “average normality” — a stable perception of their status as “not bad, but not good either.” However, in 2018 and 2020, noticeable declines were recorded: respondents more often noted a deterioration in their financial situation, an increase in anxiety and uncertainty. After 2022, a gradual improvement in the assessments was observed, but it does not always correlate with objective economic indicators.

The self-identification of the population in terms of social status remains stable: the majority still considers themselves to be “middle class.” At the same time, it is not so much the real situation that changes, but the language of its description. Such an identity performs a protective function: by calling themselves “middle class,” people try to relieve internal anxiety, create the illusion of belonging to a stable group. This is a manifestation of “learned indifference” — an adaptive strategy that allows you to reduce cognitive dissonance in conditions of instability.


“Average assessment” — an indicator of the absence of expectations. Stable “average” assessments of the economic situation do not reflect real stability, but signal the absence of clearly expressed expectations — both positive and negative.

At the same time, the dynamics of change has its own characteristics.

In 2022, the growth of positive assessments was associated not so much with real improvement as with “normalization of coercion”: the population adapted to the shock of 2020-2022 and got used to new realities. Against this background,

even the absence of further deterioration was perceived as “stabilization”. Starting from 2023, the positive dynamics of assessments becomes more sustainable. This is no longer just adaptation to the crisis, but a gradual formation of a sense of economic stability: people are beginning to notice small improvements, which is reflected in the growth of optimism, although its reasons remain more psychological than economic.

How do you assess your family’s financial situation?




For a long time (since 2015), the population’s forecasts have demonstrated persistent fatalism, with negative assessments prevailing over positive ones: even in 2023, when the situation begins to level out and economic and social indicators improve. This indicates a deeply rooted structure of internalized helplessness — a state in which people cease to believe in the possibility of real change.

Most respondents are characterized by the belief that the current state of affairs will remain unchanged, regardless of external circumstances. This may be due to a number of factors.

- Firstly, many years of crises and unfulfilled hopes have led to the fact that the population has become accustomed to perceiving any changes as temporary or insignificant, which is associated with a certain cognitive adaptation strategy.
- Secondly, a protective mechanism is formed: pessimistic forecasts allow you to reduce the level of anxiety — if you do not expect anything good, then disappointments will be less painful.
- Thirdly, the lack of deep trust in political and economic institutions reinforces the feeling that any positive changes will either not be sustainable or will not affect broad segments of society.

Thus, even in the presence of objective improvements, fatalistic expectations remain the dominant model of perception of the future, reflecting not only the current state of society, but also its historical experience.

How, in your opinion, will the socio-economic situation in Belarus change in a year?/in the next few years? (%)



Summary

In 2006, high levels of loyalty to state institutions were linked to expectations of continued economic growth in Belarus. The political situation was often seen as calm:

- Amid the economic crisis of 2008, trust in state institutions declined before the 2010 elections, which mediated the protests.
- In 2015, despite low economic performance, and amid fears of a “Ukrainian scenario” and Russian aggression, the Belarusian authorities managed to consolidate society around the existing system.
- The accumulation of protest sentiments against the current government, as well as economic dissatisfaction, took place in 2016-2019. The unsuccessful “Covid” policy and open neglect of the “election” procedure intensified the protest sentiments of 2020.
- The acute crisis of the legitimacy of the current government continued until 2022. Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 made it possible to freeze the crisis and form a new form of relations between the government and society. Fear of the possibility of war, as well as the low level of post-crisis expectations, allowed the authorities to restore trust in state institutions and increase nominal economic satisfaction.

2020 remains a historical breaking point. 2025 is a psychological repair, not political stabilization. The population is not radicalized, but depersonalized. Trust in institutions grows against the background of a lack of alternatives, not from conviction. Personal expectations remain higher than expectations for the country, pragmatic orientation is a factor of loyalty. There is a polarization between the technocratically loyal and adaptive, on the one hand, and the burned-out and avoidant, on the other.

ELECTIONS 2001

Context

On September 9, 2001, the presidential elections were held — the second after the adoption of the new Constitution of 1996, which significantly expanded the powers of Alexander Lukashenko.

A. Lukashenko took part in the elections as the incumbent president. He already controlled the main media, the administrative apparatus and the election commissions. Lukashenko's main opponent was Vladimir Goncharik — the only candidate from the opposition. Goncharik was supported by the Federation of Trade Unions, some democratic parties and independent media. The third candidate was Sergei Gaidukevich, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, who acted as a systemic opponent without a real opposition position.

According to official data, the turnout in the elections was 83.9%. The following figures were announced as the official results of the elections⁴:

- for Lukashenko –75.7%,
- for Goncharik — 15.7%,
- for Gaidukevich — 2.5%⁵.

The opposition, international observers (OSCE, PACE) and independent organizations recognized the Elections as unfair and unfree. They noted massive violations, pressure on observers, control over early voting and lack of equal access to the media⁶.

Research results⁷

2001 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national sample of 763 respondents. Due to the age of the archival data, there is no accurate information on the structure of the sample population.

Does anything in Belarus depend on an individual person now? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes	27,4	31,4	23,9	31,4	22,1	23,3	27,9	30,3	31,3
No	50,3	50,5	50,1	55,4	56,5	59,4	47,6	39,3	37,4
Not sure	22,4	18,1	26,0	13,2	21,4	17,3	24,5	30,3	31,3

4. "Results of the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus on September 9, 2001", Central Election Commission of Belarus., 5 November 2025

5. Detailed breakdown of electoral data see Anex 1

6. "Elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus on September 9, 2001: Final Report", Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission. Warsaw, 2001. 38 pp. — P. 3.

7. 2001 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national sample of 763 respondents. Due to the age of the archival data, there is no accurate information on the structure of the sample population

At the same time, we observe a high self-reporting of respondents about participation in the elections — 86% answered that they took part in the elections (the most active voters turned out to be older people: the older the group, the more it participates in the elections). This coincides with official data on turnout; on the other hand, the coincidence of these figures may be due to a socially desirable attitude — unwillingness to admit to not participating in the elections due to pressure. Moreover, this indicates the erosion of political meaning and the ritualization of the electoral process — nothing depends on voting, but people take part in a cyclical and traditional event.

Most voters participated in the elections on the day of the elections, almost every fifth (18%) — early, these are mainly older people. The role of the election campaign can be called relatively low, judging by the stability of electoral orientations. Almost half (48%) of voters made a decision to participate in advance, only every fifth — after registering candidates or studying programs, and even fewer — in the last week or on election day. The decision to vote long before the official start of the campaign may well be the effect of mobilization through state media and paternalistic expectations.

When did you decide that you would definitely participate in the elections? (%)

Long before candidate registration	48,3
After candidate registration	12,8
When I got to know the programs	8,5
In the last week before the elections	11,1
On election day	7,5
No answer	11,8

In 2001, about 45% of Belarusians supported the theses of the current president's election program.

Do you support the course outlined in the election program of the President of the Republic of Belarus? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Yes	45,3	42,6	47,6	24,8	37,4	44,4	43,5	58,4	72,7
No	15,1	18,4	12,3	25,6	16,0	13,5	20,4	7,9	2,0
Not sure	39,6	39,0	40,1	49,6	46,6	42,1	36,1	33,7	25,3

Here, the gray area is striking — almost the same number of respondents were unable to give an answer, especially among the youth, who also express support for the program to the smallest extent.

These indicators are correlated with self-reported data on support for Lukashenko (45%), which give a noticeably lower level compared to official data. Young people were much more likely to support the opposition candidate, the older generation — the incumbent president. Women are a socio-demographic group traditionally more loyal to the current government.

*Electoral portrait of Lukashenko's supporters:
– they are mostly women, people of mostly older age (over 55 years old)*

Could you please tell me how you voted? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Lukashenko	45,0	40,2	49,1	23,1	42,0	49,6	36,1	52,8	75,8
Goncharik	11,1	12,7	9,8	21,5	10,7	8,3	13,6	7,9	2,0
Gaidukevich	1,3	1,5	1,0	1,7	0,8	1,5	2,0	1,1	0,0
No one	12,9	13,0	12,9	15,7	18,3	13,5	14,3	6,7	5,1
No answer	29,7	32,6	27,2	38,0	28,2	27,1	34,0	31,5	17,2

Thus, given the percentage of those who did not answer the questions about their electoral choice, it can be indirectly assumed that the official results were inflated, and the opposition candidate could have received a higher share of the vote.

Lukashenko's high rating in 2001 is not so much a result of his electoral attractiveness as a derivative of the lack of choice, the absence of other worthy candidates. About half of the voters in 2001 simply did not see an alternative to Lukashenko (48%); only 21% of Belarusians considered him as a worthy representative of the Belarusian people.

What played a decisive role in the Presidential candidate's Elections? (%)

	TOTAL	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
He is the most worthy representative of the Belarusian people	21,0	8,3	10,7	16,5	15,0	36,0	51,5
Of the three candidates, he is the most acceptable candidate.	47,9	47,9	52,7	51,9	51,0	42,7	36,4
The person I would have voted for dropped out of the presidential race.	6,3	8,3	6,1	9,8	6,1	3,4	2,0
I didn't care, I voted randomly	3,3	5,0	3,1	3,0	6,1	1,1	0,0
I didn't vote for anyone	6,7	8,3	9,2	6,8	7,5	5,6	1,0
I didn't go to elections	5,8	7,4	8,4	5,3	4,8	3,4	5,1
Other	1,9	5,0	1,5	0,8	2,0	1,1	1,0
No answer	7,1	9,9	8,4	6,0	7,5	6,7	3,0

The lack of an electoral alternative is partly determined by the work of the media, which cover the election race and promote the programs of political players. However, this is not the case in Belarus, where censorship prevails and the media literacy of the audience is low. As a result, in 2001, more than 40% of Belarusians were unable to assess the work of the media during the election campaign, almost 30% were dissatisfied with their work. The influence of propaganda is felt by older age groups, among whom the level of loyalty is noticeably higher — both to the media and to the authorities.

How would you assess the work of Belarusian television and radio during the election campaign? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Positive	29,7	27,5	31,6	19,0	20,6	24,8	27,2	40,4	55,6
Negative	27,1	31,4	23,4	34,7	38,9	29,3	31,3	16,9	2,0
Don't know	40,6	38,7	42,2	43,8	38,2	44,4	37,4	41,6	38,4
No answer	2,6	2,4	2,8	2,5	2,3	1,5	4,1	1,1	4,0

When it comes to violations during the election campaign, most respondents did not personally encounter them (only 4% of respondents spoke about such violations). However, almost every fifth respondent supported the opposition's opinion that the elections were unfair – for an authoritarian environment, this is a significant share. Among young people, it is close to a third, while the older generation denies the unfairness of the elections. This is a natural result of low political alternative and the effect of propaganda.

The opposition claims that the elections were unfair. Do you consider such claims justified? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Yes	18,9	22,7	15,7	28,1	25,2	18,8	22,4	9,0	3,0
No	47,1	43,2	50,4	34,7	38,2	50,4	40,8	56,2	70,7
Not sure	32,2	32,3	32,1	36,4	35,1	30,1	34,7	32,6	22,2
No answer	1,8	1,8	1,8	0,8	1,5	0,8	2,0	2,2	4,0

Political apathy also manifests itself in the perception of the political situation: two-thirds of Belarusians did not see any changes after the elections, almost one in five could not answer the question. With generally insignificant indicators, young people more often noticed a deterioration in the situation, older people – improvements. This is a typical paternalistic consensus: “stability is better than change”. Stability is interpreted as a positive value that strengthens the regime's legitimacy.

Summary

- The survey demonstrates electoral stability in conditions of authoritarian consolidation: the presence of a stable core of support for Lukashenko (about 40-45%) is combined with the passive loyalty of the rest.
- Political subjectivity is at a low level, half of the population does not believe in the possibility of personal influence.
- The political campaign is conducted in conditions of information inequality with the monopoly of state media, most voters are not familiar with the programs of alternative candidates.
- Young people are much more critical, more often seek alternatives and turn towards democratic sentiments, but their share is small and politically demobilized.
- At the same time, there is a hidden opposition in society: the radical discrepancy between self-reported and official voting demonstrates fear, distrust and probable falsification of the results.

REFERENDUM 2004

Context

The republican referendum on October 17, 2004, was held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections. In fact, it was a referendum on the abolition of the constitutional limit on two presidential terms, which allowed Lukashenko to nominate his candidacy for the presidency in 2006 and beyond.

The main question of the referendum was formulated as follows: "Do you allow the first President of the Republic of Belarus, Lukashenko A.R., to participate as a candidate for the President of the Republic of Belarus in the presidential elections and do you accept part one of Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus in the following wording: "The President is elected for a five-year term directly by the people of the Republic of Belarus on the basis of universal, free, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot?"

According to official figures, the turnout at the referendum was 90.3%, with 79.4% of voters voting "Yes".⁸

The referendum was held under tight control over the media, suppression of independent organizations, and lack of access for the opposition to television. On the eve of the referendum, the authorities actively used administrative resources and pressure on public sector employees, students, and the military. The opposition (represented by the Five Plus coalition) led a "No!" campaign, but faced arrests of activists and confiscation of campaign materials.

OSCE observers recognized the electoral process as not meeting democratic standards.⁹

Research results¹⁰

Research results show a fairly high self-reported turnout, although slightly lower than official data (82% versus 90.3%). The most active voters were villagers and the older generation; young people (18-24) took a noticeably lower part in the vote.

Did you vote in the Referendum on October 17, 2004? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Yes, voted on the day of the Referendum	66,0	63,1	68,4	52,4	64,0	57,3	72,1	70,2	78,3
Yes, voted early	16,4	15,4	17,2	17,4	10,9	19,2	14,5	20,6	17,2
No, did not participate	12,7	15,3	10,5	25,1	16,6	16,1	9,1	8,4	2,0
Do not want to answer	5,0	6,3	3,9	5,1	8,4	7,5	4,3	0,8	2,5

8. "Republican referendum on October 17, 2004", CEC of Belarus., 5 November 2005

9. Parliamentary elections of October 17, 2004: Final report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission // Bureau of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Republic of Belarus. — Warsaw, 2004. — 31 p. — P. 2

10. 2004 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national quota sample of 1901 respondents

Did you vote in the Referendum on October 17, 2004? (%)

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes, voted on the day of the Referendum	66,0	64,2	68,7	61,4	68,9	61,0	65,6	75,1	65,4	67,1
Yes, voted early	16,4	22,1	18,2	23,7	18,7	9,3	15,1	7,6	12,9	24,3
No, did not participate	12,7	10,2	7,6	11,2	5,7	21,8	14,7	14,5	15,3	6,8
Do not want to answer	5,0	3,5	5,5	3,7	6,8	7,9	4,6	2,9	6,4	1,8

In the preparation of the referendum, administrative resources were clearly used. In particular, this is visible in the high share of early voting. In rural areas (also in the south of Belarus – in the Brest and Gomel regions), the share of early voting was more than 20%. In practice, early voting is a tool of controlled voting, when voters formally “reported” on their loyalty.

Respondents’ own assessments of the voting results strongly differ from official data. According to official data, 79.4% voted “Yes”, while according to the survey results, only 56.9%. At the same time, the proportion of refusals to answer amounted to almost a third of respondents (29.1%). Here, the effect of self-censorship and political fear becomes visible, when people avoid directly admitting their disagreement with the positions of the authorities.

ELECTIONS 2006

Context

On March 19, 2006, the next Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus took place. These Elections were held after the 2004 constitutional referendum, which abolished the two-term limit for the presidency and allowed Lukashenko to run again.

The main candidates were: Alexander Lukashenko – the incumbent head of the country since 1994, Alexander Milinkevich – the only candidate from the democratic opposition, supported by the “For Freedom” coalition, Alexander Kazulin – the former rector of the Belarusian State University, a moderate opposition candidate, Sergei Gaidukevich – a representative of the systemic “loyal” opposition.

According to official data, the turnout in the elections was 92.6%. The following figures were announced as the official election results¹¹:

- for Lukashenko – 83,0%
- for Milinkevich – 6,1%
- for Gaidukevich – 3,5%
- for Kazulin – 2,2%

The entire campaign was under state control: the opposition was not given airtime, and Milinkevich was prevented from holding rallies. After the elections, thousands of protests began on Kastychnitskaya Square in Minsk, called “Ploschaya”, which were dispersed, and many activists were arrested. The OSCE recognized the Elections as not meeting international standards¹².

Research results¹³

On the issue of participation in the elections, the survey data coincide with official data – 92% of respondents declared their participation in the presidential elections. It should be noted that the share of voters was higher the older they were: 16% of young people did not vote, and 3% of people aged 65 and over.

Almost a third (32%) of respondents participated in early voting, which is a high figure. Early voting was more likely to be preferred by women, people aged 55 and over, villagers and residents of the Gomel region.

It was early voting in 2006 that became the main source of accusations of mass fraud.

11. “Announcement about the results of the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus”, CEC of Belarus, 5 November 2005

12. “Interim Report No. 1 February 8-24, 2006”, Bureau of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Mission to observe the Presidential Elections of Belarus, 2006. – 2006. – 8 p.

13. 2006 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national quota sample of 2,348 respondents.

The Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus were held in March. Did you take part in them? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes, accepted and voted early (March 14-18)	32,4	28,5	35,7	26,4	29,4	29,9	34,4	38,5	37,3
Yes, accepted and voted on Election Day, March 19	59,5	62,6	57,0	58,0	60,0	63,3	58,6	56,0	59,5
No, did not participate	8,0	8,9	7,3	15,6	10,5	6,8	7,0	5,5	3,3

Self-reported data on voting results traditionally differ from official figures: 62.6% expressed support for the incumbent president (the official figure is 83.0%).

Milinkevich's candidacy was supported more by young people (11%) and Minsk residents (14%).

Electoral portrait of Lukashenko's supporters:

- traditionally, these are mostly women, people of mostly older age (especially over 55), villagers and residents of Grodno, Vitebsk and Mogilev regions.

Could you please tell me how you voted? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
For Gaidukevich S.	1,1	1,1	1,0	0,8	1,9	1,2	0,8	1,2	0,6
For Kazulin A.	0,8	1,3	0,5	0,7	1,6	0,9	1,1	0,3	0,0
For Lukashenko A.	62,6	55,9	68,0	42,5	50,5	59,3	61,1	75,9	87,9
For Milinkevich A.	6,0	8,0	4,4	10,8	6,8	6,3	6,2	3,9	2,2
Against everyone	3,4	3,8	3,0	5,7	4,3	3,6	4,1	1,8	0,4
I don't want to answer	26,1	29,8	23,1	39,6	34,9	28,6	26,6	16,8	8,9

In addition to the declared figures about their electoral Elections, it is worth paying attention to the increase in fear and hidden opposition: every fifth respondent (and young people in particular) refused to answer the question, which indicates distrust in the system and adaptation to authoritarian conditions.

The thesis of distrust in the system is confirmed by the following fact: only 50% of respondents trust the election results. For the official figure of 83% of those who voted for Lukashenko, this is a very low level of legitimization. The regions — Mogilev and Gomel regions, as well as rural areas — are more inclined to trust, Minsk and young people — less.

How much do you think you can trust the results of the presidential election? (%)

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
I think the election results are accurate and can be trusted	51,3	56,5	54,3	62,9	42,5	32,6	46,5	67,6	46,5	61,7
There were some violations	24,7	28,4	23,3	20,7	36,9	25,3	22,7	16,7	25,7	22,4
There were significant violations	11,4	6,1	5,6	7,3	10,8	26,2	14,8	4,8	13,0	7,8
Not sure	12,7	8,9	16,8	9,1	9,9	15,9	16,0	10,9	14,7	8,2

Summary

- The strengthening of authoritarian stability led to the fact that 2006 became the culmination of the institutionalization of Lukashenko's personal power: after the removal of term limits and the defeat of the opposition, the Belarusian political system finally took shape as non-competitive.
- A key indicator of administrative control is mass early voting. A third of respondents voted in advance, often under pressure from employers, which created opportunities for manipulation and explains the discrepancy between self-reported and official results.
- There is a bifurcation of public consciousness: while the majority demonstrates external loyalty and a desire to distance themselves from politics (declaration of confidence, readiness to support the government), a significant part either evades answers to direct questions or expresses doubts.
- This provokes regional and age differences: young people and residents of Minsk become centers of moderate opposition, older people and provincial regions turn into the regime's support. This is a split that will become a stable pattern of Belarusian politics for decades.
- 2006 can be called a symbolic transition to "post-alternative" politics: after the elections, the institutionalized opposition virtually disappeared, its leaders were marginalized or repressed, and political life was reduced to an imitation of political participation.
- The 2006 electoral study demonstrates a high level of external mobilization with low sincerity of involvement, a clear effect of fear and self-censorship in responses, a gap between official and real support for the authorities. This demonstrates the beginning of the political stagnation that dominated Belarusian society until the events of 2020.

ELECTIONS 2010

Context

The 2010 presidential election saw the first appearance of a wide range of alternative candidates. Their campaigns created a novelty effect, increased interest in politics, and generated expectations of genuine political competition. The presence of independent media and the spread of electronic media increased the informative content of the electoral process, and the possibility of watching television debates created the effect of pre-election struggle (television debates were watched by two-thirds of the population).

According to official data, the turnout in the elections was 90.65%. The following figures were announced as the official election results¹⁴.

- for Lukashenko — 79.7%
- for Sannikov — 2.4%
- for Kostusev — 2.0%
- for Romanchuk — 2.0%
- for Nyaklyayev — 1.8%
- for Tsereshchenko — 1.2%
- for Statkevich — 1.1%
- for Rymasheuski — 1.1%
- for Mikhalevich — 1.0%
- for Uss — 0.4%

The announcement of the results sparked thousands of protests, which were violently dispersed, and criminal cases were opened against opposition political leaders.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) did not recognize the Elections of the President of Belarus as legitimate¹⁵.

Research results¹⁶

According to the survey, in 2010, society is polarized between attitudes towards stability (49.7%) and aspirations for change (41.2%).

At the same time, there is no fatalism in society yet. Society feels that changes are possible and there is a competition of meanings. At the same time, society is tired of monotonous election campaigns, and the lack of a bright opposition candidate also affects moods. However, this does not affect the high structural, rather than situational, voting: almost every second respondent already knew in advance how he would vote. There is a very low level of recognition of pressure — almost 90%. Only every fifth voted early, and only 3.2% of them did so under pressure. The system looks soft, coercion does not feel like violence.

Self-reported data on election results are traditionally much lower than the official ones: the incumbent president is gaining only 51.1% (i.e. there is an advantage, but it is not overwhelming).

14. "FINAL INFORMATION on the results of the election of the President of the Republic of Belarus", CEC of Belarus 5 November 2025

15. "OSCE did not recognize the election of the President of Belarus", OSCE, 5 November 2025

16. "2010 NISEPI survey, republican quota sample of 1511 respondents. See: National survey of December 21-31, 2010", NISEPI, 5 November 2025

Who did you vote for in the presidential election on December 19? (%)

For A. Lukashenko	51,1
For U. Nyaklyayev	8,3
For A. Sannikov	6,1
For V. Rymasheuski	3,7
For Y. Romanchuk	3,2
For A. Mikhalevich	2,7
For M. Statkevich	1,7
For H. Kostusev	1,6
For V. Tsiarshchenko	0,6
For D. Uss	0,5
Against all	5,1
Did not want to answer this question	3,8
Did not participate in the vote	11,6

In total, alternative candidates gain 28.4%, i.e. there is a growing mass of dissatisfied people. These are the most competitive Elections in the history of the regime after 2001.

Skepticism about the elections is high: 29.4% consider them to be rigged, and the share of those who do not consider them free and equal is even higher.

Trust in elections (%)

	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Do you think the Belarusian presidential elections of December 19, 2010 were free and fair?	54.4	32.3	13.3
In your opinion, were all candidates given equal opportunities during the elections?	48.6	39.9	11.5

Summary

- Political Context 2010 in Belarus is characterized by post-crisis optimism and relative economic stability: the country is emerging from the global crisis more easily than many others, the authorities are actively using social benefits, increasing salaries, and the “social contract” is working. This has slightly increased trust in the regime.
- 2010 is a relatively turning point in the history of Belarus, after which faith in Elections as a tool disappears, and the violence of December 19 destroys the illusion of “soft authoritarianism”. Mass depoliticization begins, and after the “silent protests” and the crisis of 2011-2012, people go into survival mode.

- The regime becomes more rigid: it puts pressure on parties, closes NGOs, and puts universities under control. Society is closing in on itself, a demarcation line is forming between loyal supporters of the regime and those inclined to pragmatic resignation: politics is dangerous — we do not get involved in it.
- This is the last moment in the history of Belarus when Elections remained at least to some extent a political field of competition. The end of the model of polarized authoritarianism leads to the model of a “frozen society”: protest is destroyed, political competition is destroyed, and the era of controlled rituals begins.

ELECTIONS 2015

Context

October 11, 2015 — the first major elections after the crisis in Ukraine (2014) and the increase in regional instability: there was a strong desire in society for “stability and security”. The pressure on the economy caused by the consequences of the global crisis and the fall in energy prices led to expectations of a deterioration in incomes along with the fear of instability. The state media space maintained a monopoly (television still dominates), the opposition’s access to airtime was limited.

The main candidates in those elections were: Alexander Lukashenko — the current head of state, Tatyana Karatkevich — an activist of the “Tell the Truth!” campaign, Sergei Gaidukevich — chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, Nikolai Ulakhovich — supreme ataman of the Belarusian Cossacks.

According to official data, the turnout in the elections was 87.2%. The following figures were announced as the official election results¹⁷:

- for Lukashenko — 83,5%
- for Karatkevich — 4,4%
- for Gaidukevich — 3,2%
- for Ulakhovich — 1,7%

The OSCE Mission noted significant violations of both the current legislation and the electoral process, as well as limited access of voters to candidates’ programs and information about Elections¹⁸.

Research results¹⁹

A public opinion poll in 2015 demonstrates a stable, but partially hidden dominance of pro-regime sentiments: the majority of respondents assessed the president’s activities positively (positively or rather positively — 61%). Nevertheless, every fifth person expressed negative assessments, and almost as many found it difficult to answer this question (18%).

Assessments of the success of the current government’s activities also appear relatively positive. When asked what is more in the president’s activities, achievements or failures, 42% said achievements. Only 5% spoke of failures, and about the same number of both — 34%. Another 19% did not answer this question.

In 2015, the majority of respondents really approved of the course chosen by the authorities. Even among young people, negative assessments did not exceed 25%, and in some regions, overall positive assessments reached more than 70%. The most critical sentiments were demonstrated in the Vitebsk region and in the capital.

All this indicates the predominance of a positive assessment of the government’s successes, with a significant share of uncertain and moderately critical responses. The population is inclined to recognize the regime’s achievements (especially in matters of order and security). At the same time, a significant “gray zone” shows that support is not unconditional — it is often pragmatic: stability is more important than change.

17. “The Belarusian CEC has summarized the final results of the presidential elections”, INTERFAX.RU, 5 November 2015

18. “Presidential elections on October 11, 2015. Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission”, Bureau of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. — Warsaw, 2016. — 43 p.

19. 2015 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national quota sample of 1,706 respondents.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that under the leadership of the current Head of State, Belarus is generally developing in the right direction? (%)

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Strongly agree	25,3	44,6	4,0	44,4	22,5	10,2	32,9	17,9	21,5	36,4
Rather agree	41,1	38,3	33,3	37,0	44,8	46,7	43,4	43,0	42,3	37,5
Rather disagree	14,6	9,0	38,6	7,3	5,6	18,1	11,7	10,9	16,1	10,4
Disagree	3,5	1,2	3,9	2,5	4,3	6,3	3,1	2,5	3,6	3,1
Not sure	15,5	7,0	20,2	8,8	22,8	18,7	9,0	25,7	16,5	12,6

More than 95% of all categories of the population knew about the upcoming Elections. About 80% of voters expressed their readiness to participate in the elections. Young people expressed the greatest doubts about the prospects of their participation, but in general, the survey data correlate with official data on high turnout.

About half of the respondents planned to participate in the elections on election day, about 40% took an uncertain position. 8.8% expressed their readiness to participate in early voting. It should be noted that early voting was generally well received by Belarusians: 49% of Belarusians had a positive or rather positive attitude towards it.

This means that the institutional practice of early voting in 2015 was perceived by a significant part of society as acceptable and convenient. In the electoral architecture of the regime, early voting is a convenient mechanism for administrative mobilization. A positive attitude towards it facilitates its use in practice.

As the main motivation for participating in the elections, people noted "civic duty" (more than 50%) and the desire to express their opinion (27%). The share of those who do not see much point in the elections, but plan to participate in them (19%), as well as those who refused to answer (19%), is also noticeable.

The key problem of elections in Belarus often becomes the issue of coverage of the presidential campaign. Despite the high declared level of electoral activity, every third respondent noted a lack of interest in the election campaign and only every fourth is specifically interested in this topic. The consumption of electoral information is mostly random and situational.

The obvious dominant in information resources is television, followed by the Internet and print media.

Here, the gap in media consumption strategies of young people and older age groups becomes clearly visible. For the latter, television was and is the dominant one, while for young people, the Internet is the priority source of information. The Internet provides a fulcrum for alternative opinions, especially among urban and young voters.

What information sources about the upcoming elections do you prefer? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Television	72,8	69,8	75,3	48,5	63,0	76,2	75,2	84,7	89,9
Internet	28,0	29,3	27,0	50,3	44,7	32,2	24,2	10,1	3,8

Print media (newspapers, magazines)	27,1	27,0	27,2	13,2	19,4	23,8	33,8	38,2	35,2
Advertising, visual agitation	21,2	21,8	20,6	28,8	20,8	20,0	23,4	21,7	12,5
Conversations with work colleagues, friends, acquaintances, relatives	12,1	11,5	12,7	11,3	14,2	13,0	13,4	10,7	9,4
Radio	18,3	18,8	17,9	7,9	12,9	13,5	18,4	22,2	36,8
Other	0,7	0,9	0,5	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,5	2,5	0,2
I do not receive information	3,0	2,6	3,3	4,4	4,4	3,0	2,7	1,4	1,9

The key task of the 2015 pre-election survey was to predict the results of the presidential campaign. It is important here that self-reported intentions to vote “for” Lukashenko are significantly lower than the official result (45% versus the official 83%), and the high percentage of the “gray zone” (I don’t want to answer and it’s hard to answer) indicates significant self-censorship of respondents and their hidden uncertainty.

If the Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus were held tomorrow, who would you vote for? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
S. Gaidukevich	0,7	1,2	0,3	1,6	0,5	0,8	1,2	0,2	0,0
S. Kalyakin	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
T. Karatkevich	0,9	0,8	1,0	1,7	0,8	0,6	0,9	1,2	0,3
A. Lyabedzka	0,3	0,5	0,1	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,3	0,5
A. Lukashenko	45,4	38,0	51,7	34,5	33,6	40,7	46,5	48,9	71,5
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,8	1,0	0,7	0,7	1,2	0,9	0,7	1,3	0,2
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,4	0,6	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,3
M. Ulakhovich	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0
Not sure	33,0	37,8	28,9	41,7	39,5	39,0	32,3	24,5	19,0
I would not like to answer this question	18,5	20,2	17,1	18,9	23,8	16,9	18,1	23,6	8,1

Electoral portrait of Lukashenko's supporters:

- traditionally, these are mostly women, people of mostly older age (especially over 45, and especially over 65), villagers and residents of the Brest and Minsk regions.

The key paradox of the study is that self-reported support for Lukashenko (45%) is significantly lower than the expected/official result (83%).

At the same time, the vast majority (83%) are convinced that Lukashenko will win.

Who do you think will be elected President of the Republic of Belarus in the upcoming elections? (%)

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
S. Gaidukevich	0,3	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,0	1,0
S. Kalyakin	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
T. Karatkevich	0,4	2,1	0,4	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,6
A. Lyabedzka	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
A. Lukashenko	82,8	87,9	87,3	71,3	97,9	83,0	82,1	72,4	84,0	79,5
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,2	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,7	0,3	0,0	4,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	2,5
M. Ulakhovich	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,3
Not sure	15,4	8,2	11,5	24,3	2,1	16,3	17,3	26,5	15,3	15,9

This combination reflects several phenomena at once:

- social desirability/fear — some respondents prefer not to reveal their real position;
- manipulated election environment — administered turnout, early voting and possible fraud explain the discrepancy;
- real but partial core of support — about 40–50% of sincere support and a significant “silent” mass that can be mobilized administratively.

The level of trust in the potential election results in 2015 was moderate, but more than half of respondents were willing to believe future data — about 60%. Here again, the “gray zone” draws attention: every fifth person found it difficult to answer the question of whether the data of the upcoming elections could be trusted (in some regions their share is approaching 30%).

The answers to the question about the right of alternative candidates to challenge the election results indicate that the share of voters who trust the legal means of protecting alternative candidates coincides with the number of supporters of the current government. And despite the low level of protest sentiment, every fourth person saw no point in trying to influence the election results.

Do you think that losing candidates have the right to challenge the election results if they disagree with them? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes, but only in the manner prescribed by law	45,9	45,7	46,0	37,3	50,6	50,0	50,8	48,0	36,0
Yes, including at mass rallies, up to the review of the result	3,1	4,0	2,4	5,1	3,0	2,8	3,7	3,0	1,4
No, it makes no sense	24,1	25,9	22,6	30,2	26,0	22,5	21,1	20,3	24,9
No, it disrupts the order in the country	12,3	12,3	12,2	10,7	10,5	12,0	12,3	14,0	14,5
Other	0,8	0,7	0,9	0,5	0,7	0,0	0,4	2,3	0,7
Not sure	13,8	11,4	15,9	16,4	9,1	12,7	11,7	12,3	22,5

Trust becomes instrumental — people are ready to admit the results, even if they suspect violations.

Another point worth paying attention to is the question “If your life is getting worse — who is to blame?”.

The most common reason given by respondents is the global financial crisis (48.7%), followed by the government (36.9%), in third place is the option “we ourselves (the population) are to blame” (21.6%), then the president (18.8%) and local authorities (17.2%). Economic problems in 2015 were mainly interpreted as external (crisis), which made it easier for the regime to absolve itself of responsibility. This reduced political pressure on the central government (part of the electorate is ready to explain the decline in living standards by external causes).

Older population groups (over 55 years old) demonstrate a higher level of support and trust in the government; Young people (18–34) are more critical, more likely to go into the “gray zone.” In rural areas, there is higher support for the person in power and institutional readiness (for example, for early voting), while in cities, there is a higher share of doubts and opposition-minded voters.

Summary

- As in previous cycles, support for the government is stronger in a number of regions (e.g., Brest, Gomel, Minsk regions show higher positivity), while Minsk and some regions (Vitebsk, Mogilev regions) have a higher share of those who are doubtful and opposed.
- 2015 demonstrates the same bipolar pattern that we observed in 2001–2006: rural areas / older generation / public sector workers against urban population / youth / highly qualified specialists. It remains stable and is reproduced through information channels and social structure.
- The level of sincere declared support in the conditions of an anonymous survey and the estimated (as well as official) election results reflect either administrative mobilization and fraud, or a broad willingness of society to “get closer” to the pro-government position in public behavior. The large “gray zone” demonstrates that many do not want to reveal their real position (fear, distrust of anonymity, preference for private dissent).
- As a result, the combination of moderate sincere support, high institutional control, and self-censorship forms a model of “managed legitimacy,” where the regime is supported and administratively mobilized, but is not deprived of the latent potential of discontent — a “latent resource” for future mobilization, if an organized alternative and external triggers appear.

ELECTIONS 2020

Context

2020 was marked by the largest political crisis in the history of independent Belarus. The accompanying factors were the government's denial of COVID, the increase in mortality and the lack of public support, which led to a decline in trust in the state. This was accompanied by economic deterioration: stagnation of incomes, a drop in GDP, and growing public dissatisfaction. The result was the formation of a new generation of political subjectivity: the growth of horizontal networks, the formation of protest sentiments in the regions, the emergence of the phenomenon of "female leadership", the unification of the electorate on a moral basis.

The 2020 elections were held on August 9, according to official data, 84.3% of the total number of voters took part in them. The following figures were announced as their official results²⁰:

- for Lukashenko A.G. — 80.1%
- for Tsikhanouskaya S.G. — 10.1%
- for Konopatskaya A.A. — 1.7%
- for A.U. Dmitriev — 1.2%
- for Cherachnya S.V. — 1.1%

Due to the authorities' violation of official procedures, the OSCE did not observe the election process²¹.

The Council of the EU declared the presidential elections of 9 August not free and fair. Reliable reports indicate that the election process did not comply with the laws of Belarus and its international obligations. A. Lukashenko lacks democratic legitimacy. In this regard, the EU supports the legitimate demands of the Belarusian people for new, free and fair presidential elections in accordance with international standards and under the supervision of the OSCE/ODIHR²².

Research results²³

The study's data on the election results radically contradict the officially announced figures.

According to self-reported data, a third of voters (33%) voted for the alternative candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, while Alexander Lukashenko received the support of only one in four Belarusians (21%).

The fact of a significant refusal to answer this question is noteworthy, but it hardly indicates support for the current government, but rather a fear of expressing a real position. The most characteristic thing is that the traditional regions of support for the current government have significantly changed their positions.

20. "Announcement about the results of the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus in 2020", CEC of Belarus, 5 November 2025

21. "ODIHR will not deploy election observation mission to Belarus due to lack of invitation", OSCE, 5 November 2025

22. "Conclusions of the Council of the EU regarding Belarus dated October 12, 2020", Council of the EU, 5 November 2025

23. 2020 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national quota sample of 1,415 respondents

If you took part in the presidential election on August 9, which candidate did you vote for? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Dzmitryev A.	1,3	1,3	1,3	1,0	1,6	2,5	1,9	0,4	0,3
Konapatskaya A.	0,5	0,1	0,9	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,6
Lukashenka A.	20,9	14,6	26,0	5,6	6,5	11,9	16,5	26,0	46,6
Tsikhanouskaya S.	33,3	37,7	29,6	52,4	45,4	39,0	35,7	22,9	17,2
Cherechen S.	0,4	0,0	0,7	0,5	0,3	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,6
Against all	6,6	6,9	6,3	4,9	7,0	5,1	8,6	8,1	5,0
I did not vote	11,3	13,9	9,3	11,9	14,0	14,4	8,3	9,4	10,5
I do not want to answer this question	25,7	25,5	25,9	23,1	24,6	26,4	27,7	32,8	19,1

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Dzmitryev A.	1,3	0,0	0,8	4,2	2,0	1,4	0,9	0,0	1,3	1,2
Konapatskaya A.	0,5	0,0	1,2	0,0	1,2	0,4	0,7	0,0	0,5	0,5
Lukashenka A.	20,9	25,2	19,4	18,3	25,7	14,1	21,8	26,8	19,2	27,1
Tsikhanouskaya S.	33,3	30,6	42,1	28,2	34,2	35,4	35,4	21,3	33,6	32,0
Cherechen S.	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,0	0,4	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,2
Against all	6,6	6,3	5,0	9,5	4,5	9,0	4,7	6,5	6,9	5,3
I did not vote	11,3	15,9	8,4	8,8	7,7	15,7	9,6	11,0	12,2	8,1
I do not want to answer this question	25,7	21,5	22,5	31,1	24,2	23,2	27,0	34,3	25,8	25,5

Moreover, for the first time, support for an alternative position in rural areas has become comparable to the opinion of the urban population. This is a dramatic breakdown of the traditional authoritarian model, where the current president has always had about 50% support in self-reports of the population.

The breakdown of the previous system is also evidenced by assessments of the organization of the electoral process. About a third of the respondents were unable to assess the organizational aspects of the election campaign, which is again more likely due to caution in defining their position. But the majority of respondents who decided to voice their opinion expressed critical positions. Moreover, even among the traditional groups of support for the current government: women, older people, and residents of rural areas.

Loyal groups ceased to be monoliths.

*In 2020, Lukashenko's electoral base shrank, but the core remained traditional:
– these are mostly women, people of mostly older age (over 65), villagers and residents of the Mogilev region.*

How do you rate the following: (%)

	1: BAD	2	3	4	5: EXCELLENT	NOT SURE	AVERAGE
Organization of the electoral process at the stage of forming initiative groups and collecting signatures for the nomination of candidates	16,9	10,5	18,3	15,6	6,6	32,1	13,6
Organization of the electoral process at the stage of forming election commissions	18,2	10,8	16,0	13,0	6,0	36,0	12,8
Organization of the work of election commissions directly at polling stations	20,8	10,1	15,1	15,2	8,8	30,0	14,0
Work of election commissions and the CEC on vote counting	34,8	10,2	8,8	8,6	4,6	32,9	13,4

The 2020 election system is perceived not just as dishonest, but as completely discredited.

2020 was marked by unprecedented repression: most attention is focused on the post-August events, although the pre-election situation looked no less radical.

Again, for the first time in the entire history of authoritarianism in Belarus, the authorities abandoned the appearance of legitimization and did not take the necessary actions for the OSCE mission to observe the elections.

2020 was a watershed year, when the loyalty of 2015 turned into open protest, and the hidden split into mass mobilization precisely because the Belarusian repressive system in 2020 reached a scale that goes beyond electoral pressure. It has completely transformed into a violent regime that uses coercion as part of the political process.

It is obvious that the situation of the 2020 elections has caused a protest response: during the survey, many respondents were not afraid to admit the fact that they faced repression by the authorities. Every fourth person drew attention to the use of force when dispersing demonstrations, almost every third witnessed the forcible dispersal of rallies, and every fifth person faced detentions.

It is worth noting that for the first time in the history of electoral research in Belarus, 20.5% of the population indicated that they faced coercion to vote early.

The territorial picture of the election situation has changed: protest sentiments were reported in regions that traditionally support the authorities (for example, in Brest and Grodno regions).

Have you encountered any of the above? (%)

	YES	NO	I DON'T WANT TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION
Forced to sign for one of the presidential candidates when he was nominated	15,1	70,0	14,9
Forced to vote early	20,5	63,7	15,7
Threats at work and school, in case of participation in unauthorized rallies or expressing one's opinion in any other way	18,3	64,4	17,2
Detentions, arrests for political reasons	21,7	62,2	16,1
Witnessed the forcible dispersal of street rallies, demonstrations	27,8	55,8	16,4
Use of force by law enforcement agencies during dispersal, detention, arrest	24,9	57,5	17,6

Summary

The 2020 post-election poll documents a total political crisis.

- In 2020, the regime faced an unprecedented rejection of loyalty from society.
- Society massively left the “fear zone,” the split between society and the state became open.
- The state lost control of legitimacy, but responded with repression of an unprecedented scale.
- If the 2010–2015 Elections showed a slow erosion of legitimacy, 2020 was the moment when this erosion became irreversible.
- The system lost moral and political support and is still replacing it with repression.

REFERENDUM 2022

Context

The republican referendum on February 27, 2022 was the culmination of three processes that determined the situation at that time.

– the consequences of the 2020–2021 protests, which resulted in tens of thousands of detentions, hundreds of political prisoners, the destruction of independent media, the liquidation of all NGOs and parties, and the introduction of total fear. Political subjectivity was systematically destroyed.

– a sharp increase in dependence on Russia: the regime lost its autonomy after 2020, and it became its main guarantor – the rhetoric of an “external threat” began to dominate the political discourse.

– three days before the referendum, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, Belarus provided its territory for this. This caused public shock, the effect of a “state of siege”, a sharp increase in uncertainty and fear, and the collapse of external information channels.

The referendum was held in an atmosphere of war and repression, which made it not an act of choice, but a ritual of demonstration of control.

The main question of the referendum: “Do you accept the amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus?” According to official data, 78.6% of the total number of voters took part in the referendum.

According to official data, the turnout in the elections was 78.6%. The following figures were announced as their official results²⁴:

- 82.9% of citizens who took part in the vote voted “for” the adoption of a decision on the issue put to the referendum.
- 12.8% of citizens who took part in the vote voted “against”.

It is obvious that neither the preparation nor the results of the referendum received international support and became another reason for the official authorities to express claims to the OSCE²⁵.

Research results²⁶

Research results demonstrate a strong depoliticization of society.

In 2020, almost no one participates in anything except voting, but protest sentiments are noticeable, then in 2022 any participation has become dangerous, and unauthorized participation is impossible. Young people generally ignore political participation. This is a destroyed civil field.

24. “Message of the Central Commission on the results of the republican referendum on February 27, 2022”, CEC of Belarus, 5 November 2025

25. “Referendum 2022: Final report”, Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Human Rights Center “Viasna”, 5 November 2025

26. 2020 study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, representative national quota sample of 1,474 respondents

In what form do you participate in the political life of the country? (%)

	2020	2022	GROWTH
Participation in the Presidential elections	85,2	74,4	-10,8
Participation in the elections to the Parliament	34,5	30,2	-4,2
Participation in the elections to the local Councils of Deputies	35,0	35,4	0,4
Participation in the activities of public organizations, movements, foundations	1,6	1,9	0,2
Participation in the activities of political parties	0,3	0,6	0,3
Participation in the work of local self-government bodies	0,6	0,9	0,3
Participation in the work of trade union organizations	6,2	7,1	0,9
Participation in public discussion of draft laws and other important state decisions	0,5	0,4	0,0
Preparation and conduct of the election campaign (collection of signatures, agitation, work in the election commission, etc.)	1,6	1,7	0,1
Volunteering, participation in initiative groups	2,6	1,6	-0,9
Signing appeals, petitions to government and administrative bodies	6,8	1,2	-5,5
Participation in sanctioned rallies and demonstrations	11,0	3,2	-7,7
Participation in unauthorized rallies, pickets, strikes	6,4	1,8	-4,6
Other	0,5	0,1	-0,5
I do not participate in the political life of the country	13,6	24,5	10,9

The most telling is the question of the need for changes to the current Constitution. About 40% of the population indicated their expediency, and more than 40% went into the gray zone.

This applies to absolutely all social contingents. Such an indicator makes obvious the lack of awareness, fear of speaking out, the realization that “opinions make no sense”, the complete devaluation of politics as a sphere of choice.

In your opinion, are changes to the current Constitution of the Republic of Belarus necessary? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-29	30-34	45-64	65+
Yes	17,3	18,1	16,7	19,2	19,7	17,8	11,7
Probably yes	22,8	24,3	21,7	21,2	21,6	25,3	21,5
Probably no	7,6	8,4	6,9	7,6	7,9	7,5	7,0
No	8,9	9,7	8,2	7,9	10,8	7,7	8,7
Not sure	43,4	39,5	46,6	44,0	40,0	41,8	51,2

Similarly, more than 40% are unable to decide what changes are needed in the current Constitution.

Obviously, people are wary of the lack of social guarantees, do not feel safe, feel limited rights and freedoms — ensuring exactly such guarantees is considered expedient by voters. People do not understand the essence of the reform, are not interested, do not see themselves as subjects of political choice.

What changes are needed in the current Constitution? (%)

Consolidation of national traditions and existing contributions	12,2
Preservation of basic social guarantees (for health care, social security in old age, work, education, etc.)	41,8
Expanding civil rights and freedoms of citizens	26,7
Party building and increasing the role of parties in the socio-political life of the country	4,5
Redistribution of powers between the main branches of government	11,8
Expanding the rights of local self-government bodies	5,8
Strengthening guarantees of the security of people and the state	28,6
Liberalization of state policy and public life	8,9
Abolition of the death penalty	14,7
Other	2,9
Not sure	42,1

About a third of the population supports the Referendum, every fifth one does not, and more than a third of respondents could not determine their position. Every tenth person in the country does not know about it at all. The older generation understands the meaning of this event even less than the young. People do not believe that their opinion makes sense and avoid evaluations.

How do you feel about holding a referendum in the country on amending the current Constitution of the Republic of Belarus? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-29	30-34	45-64	65+
I support	12,2	12,8	11,8	9,5	9,9	12,9	16,2
Probably support	19,3	20,7	18,1	17,9	19,6	23,1	13,0
Probably not to support	9,9	10,8	9,3	8,2	11,6	10,7	7,3
I don't support	11,2	12,9	9,8	9,6	14,0	11,0	8,4
I don't know anything about it	12,5	10,4	14,1	15,1	13,2	11,6	11,1
Not sure	34,9	32,4	37,0	39,8	31,8	30,6	44,1

We have almost identical data regarding the assessment of the prospects of participation in the referendum: more than a third are undecided, about 40% are ready to participate — and it is not a fact that these are those who are following their convictions, and not because of fear, habit or administrative pressure. Every fourth person does not want to participate.

Do you plan to take part in the referendum on amending the current Constitution of the Republic of Belarus? (%)

Yes	17,9
Probably yes	23,0
Probably no	8,8
No	16,0
Not sure	34,3

An attempt to assess the prospects and results of the referendum causes total misunderstanding: more than half of the country is unable to formulate its opinion on this matter.

Approximately the same number (less than 20%) expect any improvements or believe that the situation will not change. This is a rather unique indicator, which indicates political stupor, learned helplessness and a state of collective trauma after 2020–2021.

How will the situation in the country change after the referendum? (%)

Significant positive changes will occur	9,0
Minor improvements will occur	10,9
No effect	17,4
The situation will significantly worsen	6,5
The situation will slightly worsen	1,8
Not sure	54,3

Summary

Thus, by February 2022, society is demoralized: the significant size of the “gray zone” in 2022 is not so much a lack of information and apathy as politically internalized helplessness. People do not understand why a referendum is needed, do not believe that it matters, do not see that their participation will change anything — this is the destruction of political subjectivity.

A referendum is not a choice, but an administrative procedure and a state ritual, another formality, which is not clear why it is needed. Social fears overlap political ones, there is no support or protest, the main desire is “may it not get worse.”

ELECTIONS 2025

Context

The 2025 Presidential Elections were held in conditions of increased isolation of Belarus on the international arena after the start of a full-scale war in Ukraine.

Voting was held for the first time without foreign polling stations and in conditions of prolonged repression in the country. In addition, the Elections were held for the first time in accordance with the requirements of the new Constitution adopted in 2022. In particular, more stringent requirements for candidates for the post of president – on length of residence, citizenship, restrictions for persons with foreign citizenship/residence permit, etc.

The main candidates in those elections were: Alexander Lukashenko – the current head of state; Sergei Gaidukevich – chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus; Anna Konopatskaya – Belarusian politician, businesswoman, lawyer; Sergei Syrankou – First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus; Alexander Khizhnyak – chairman of the Republican Party of Labor and Justice.

According to official data, the voter turnout was 85.7%. The following figures were announced as the official election results²⁷:

- for Lukashenko – 86.7%
- for Syrankou – 3.2%
- for Gaidukevich – 2.0%
- for Konopatskaya – 1.9%
- for Khizhnyak – 1.7%

Even before the elections – on 9 January 2025 – the ODIHR published a statement expressing regret that the Belarusian authorities had not invited OSCE observers to the presidential elections.

The OSCE statement noted that this was the third time since the presidential elections in August 2020 that the ODIHR had been unable to observe elections in Belarus due to the lack of a timely invitation²⁸.

Research results²⁹

More than 75% assess the upcoming Elections as an important political event, while more than a third do not follow the election campaign at all. Even among the traditionally more involved older generation, every fourth person is not interested in it.

Indirect assessments of the perception of the electoral process from the side of their own social environment are generally blurred. City dwellers consider Elections important as a ritual, but not as a political event, political interest is low, emotions are weak, hopes are absent. This is a classic syndrome of “authoritarian politicization without content”: externally – the declared significance of importance, internally – a feeling of emptiness.

Systemic depoliticization persists, but without the previous fear: people simply do not consider Elections as a field where something is determined.

27. “Report on the results of the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus”, CEC of Belarus, 5 November 2025

28. “No election observation mission in Belarus due to lack of invitation, in breach of OSCE commitments”, ODIHR, 5 November 2025

29. “Perception of the election campaign and the situation in Belarus”, ChatamHouse, 5 November 2025

How important or unimportant do you consider the upcoming presidential elections to be for the country? (%)

Not at all important	10,9
Rather not important	4,9
Not sure	8,0
Rather important	21,1
Very important	55,1

At the same time, more than a third of the population was not interested in information about the elections. The key paradox of the data obtained is that, despite the lack of interest in the elections, more than 70% planned to participate in them, and a third were going to vote early.

Will you vote in the upcoming presidential elections in January 2025? (%)

Definitely not	11,4
Probably not	6,9
Not sure	9,3
Probably will	22,5
Definitely will	49,9

And in explaining the motivation for participation, the situation returns us to the formalism of 2015: Elections are simply a civic duty.

Why will you vote? (% of those who planned to vote)

This is a civic duty	29,5
Important for the country, affects the future	17,5
Support Lukashenko	7,6
For stability, tranquility, peace	7,1
Make a choice, cast your vote	6,3
To exercise your right	6,2
Because every vote is important	5,1
It is important, necessary, I want (without clarification)	5,7
Always vote	2,0
Other	9,2
Not sure	3,7

The motivation for non-participation is no less interesting: more than half of the respondents consider the result to be predetermined, the rest do not have the opportunity or simply do not want to for various reasons.

Why will you not vote? (% of those who did not plan to vote)

The result is predetermined, there is no point	53,0
No way	18,8
Do not want to (without specifying)	14,6
Do not vote at all	5,0
No good candidates	2,6
Other	3,5
Not sure	2,5

Participation in elections is automatism and a learned norm “you have to go”, it is not a political act, but a passive adaptation in the absence of real alternatives.

There is no longer any protest, there is total demotivation. This can be called political fatalism, by which we understand the state of society in which citizens are convinced that political processes are completely beyond their control, cannot be changed and unfold according to a predetermined scenario. Here, people do not necessarily feel fear or aggression — they feel the futility of their own efforts and transform their behavior strategy into a form of adaptive survival.

Almost a third of voters agree to one degree or another with the thesis about the predetermination of the election results, every fifth goes into the gray zone. For the first time in the entire history of research in Belarus, more people agree with this statement among older people than among young people.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: “The results of the 2025 presidential election in Belarus are predetermined, little depends on the voters”? (%)

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-29	30-34	45-64	65+
Strongly disagree	29,8	28,8	30,5	34,6	29,2	28,3	31,1
Probably disagree	17,1	14,0	19,5	16,3	19,5	15,1	19,4
Not sure	22,5	17,3	26,5	36,1	19,8	22,1	10,7
Probably agree	13,5	17,2	10,6	7,3	12,8	14,2	23,9
Strongly agree	17,2	22,6	12,8	5,8	18,7	20,4	14,8

The urban population demonstrates cognitive duality: people simultaneously understand that Elections is unfair, but declare officially loyal assessments when the questions are of a “format” nature.

The answer to the question about the assessments of the situation in the event of the preservation of the current regime for more than 15 years is very characteristic: we have a classic 40-50% support of the electorate. And this thesis

is confirmed by the answer to the question about the main ideas of the election campaign of the current president, to which less than 40% of respondents were able to answer.

Imagine the situation: six years later, after the 2030 presidential election, Alexander Lukashenko remains the President of Belarus. (%)

Very bad	14,7
Rather bad	10,5
Not sure	26,5
Rather good	17,6
Very good	30,7

One of the objectives of the study was to assess the emotions experienced by urban residents in relation to the elections. Although we do not aim to analyze them in detail here, this is one of the main indicators of the state of urban Belarus in 2025: the dominant emotion is the absence of emotions.

We are dealing with emotional desensitization – complete rejection and emotional emptiness as a result of political burnout.

A preliminary structural model of urban political passivity can be presented in the form of four types:

- adaptive participation (approximately 45-55%) – they go to Elections out of habit, are ready to vote, but without understanding the meaning, ritually give positive answers;
- distant apathy (25-30%) – is based on maximum avoidance of conflict with a complete lack of interest and emotional emptiness;
- quiet skepticism (10-15%) – conscious rejection in the absence of protest, hidden distrust and political avoidance;
- hidden loyalty (5-10%) – support for stability and the regime, but rather out of habit, for reasons of security or bureaucratic embeddedness.

Summary

- The 2025 study of the urban population of Belarus shows the complete transformation of elections into an administrative ritual and the final depoliticization of the population.
- Urban residents do not believe in Elections, but they do not protest either: they are emotionally excluded. People live in a mode of personal survival and emotional economy – this is a repressed trauma, learned helplessness, emotional separation.
- In conditions when hundreds of people have left the country, the opposition, independent media and NGOs have been destroyed, the majority of politically active residents are under pressure, we are dealing with a new, institutionally entrenched stage of authoritarian evolution. This does not mean the absence of a split, but its transition to a new phase: not between the government and the opposition, but between the internally burned out and rejected and the technocratically loyal.
- Moreover, even loyalty is very conditional, since we are dealing with a state of mass consciousness in which society loses the idea of its own political subjectivity and perceives the political order as unchangeable and predetermined, which leads to ritual, adaptive participation and emotional detachment. In the existing conditions of political fatalism, political participation completely turns into a ritual, emotional depreciation and numbness appear, the norms of participation remain, but without content, people switch to individual survival strategies – the very idea of politics disappears, replaced by the expectation that “nothing depends on us and it will always be so”.
- The main features of the 2025 elections: a “new constitutional system” has been announced, but without political competition, alternative candidates are either absent or their role is technical. The task of the elections is normalization, demonstration of order, a return to ritual. In fact, we are dealing with a situation from 10 years ago.

ELECTORAL SITUATIONS (2001-2025). DIAGRAM

PERIOD	KEY TRENDS IN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR	FACTORS OF INFLUENCE
2001-2006 (Formation of authoritarian stability)	High self-reported turnout (86-92%); support for Lukashenko in self-reports 45-63% (lower than the official 75-83%); increase in early voting (18-32%); half of the population does not believe in influencing events; polarization by age (young people are more critical, older people are more loyal); low trust in the media and the process (30-50% dissatisfied).	Administrative control (propaganda, pressure on state employees); lack of alternatives; economic stability as a basis for loyalty; repression after protests (2006); influence of state media; paternalism and fear of change.
2010-2015 (Conservation of Loyalty and Erosion of Trust)	Turnout 80-87% (self-reporting close to official); support for Lukashenko ~45% in intentions (officially 83%); growth of the "gray zone" (18-20% cannot answer); pragmatic interest in the elections (civic duty ~50%); skepticism about the results (trust ~60%); transition to the Internet among young people; apathy as the norm.	Economic crises (declining incomes, regional instability); increased censorship and monopoly of state media; administrative mobilization (early voting as a convenient tool); lack of real opposition; external threats (Ukraine 2014) increased the emphasis on stability.
2020 (Crisis of legitimacy and mobilization)	Self-reported support for Lukashenko 21%, opposition (Tsikhanouskaya) 33%; turnout is high, but 20% note coercion to early; low trust in the process (most criticize the organization); mass protest activity; rupture of loyal groups (even the village and the elderly are critical); open recognition of repression (25-30% witness violence).	Mass fraud and repression; COVID-19 pandemic as a catalyst for distrust; growth of online mobilization; external isolation (rejection of OSCE observers); moral exhaustion of the regime; social explosion of accumulated division (city/village, generations).
2022 (Depoliticization and fatalism)	Low interest in the referendum; "gray zone" 40-50% (difficult to answer); ritualistic participation (40% plan, but without meaning); lack of emotional involvement; refusal from political activity (youth ignore); skepticism towards change (most do not see the point in reform).	War in Ukraine (shock, fear, "state of siege"); post-2020 repressions (arrests, destruction of NGOs/ parties); total control and censorship; loss of subjectivity (learned helplessness); external dependence on Russia; trauma from the 2020-2021 protests.

PERIOD	KEY TRENDS IN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR	FACTORS OF INFLUENCE
2025 (Normalization of fatalism and ritualization)	Planned turnout ~70%, but low interest (a third does not follow the campaign); motivation – "civic duty" without emotions; predetermination of results (a third agree); emotional burnout (lack of emotions dominates); conditional loyalty (40-50% support for stability, but no understanding of ideas); growing apathy among all groups.	Prolonged repression and emigration of activists; war in Ukraine and isolation (absence of foreign polling stations, OSCE observers); new Constitution as a formality; economic adaptation (compensatory illusion of normality); loss of faith in change; technocratic loyalty vs. burnout.
General trends (2001–2025)	Gradual transition from polarization to apathy and fatalism; gap between self-reports and official results (Lukashenko's support is overstated by 20-40%); growth of the "gray zone" (self-censorship); ritualization of participation; demographic split (youth/city critical, older people/village more loyal, but weakening after 2020); decline in trust in institutions (from 50% in 2006 to collapse in 2020).	Repression and fear (increased after 2020); propaganda and censorship (domination of state media, transition to the Internet); economic factors (stability as a basis for loyalty, crises as a catalyst for distrust); external events (wars, sanctions, dependence on the Russian Federation); administrative manipulations (early voting, lack of alternatives); trauma and learned helplessness as a long-term effect.

CONCLUSIONS

2001–2006 is a key period in the institutionalization of the authoritarian regime.

In 2001, the first presidential elections took place after the crisis of the 1990s, and the government was legitimized on a wave of nostalgia for stability. The 2004 referendum abolished the presidential term limit, destroying the balance of power. The third presidential mandate in 2006 consolidated a personalist model that suppressed protest mobilization.

At the same time, in 2001, half of the population believed that nothing depended on an individual person, people participated in elections ritually, in search of “stability”, and political subjectivity was minimal. By 2004, public fatalism was forming: the majority perceived the government as unchangeable. Society is divided into a loyal majority and a silent minority: this becomes noticeable in the high percentage of refusals to answer questions. By the mid-2000s, apathy becomes a mass mechanism of loyalty: “let it be, if only it weren’t worse.” There is a normalization of undemocratic practices — manipulation of early voting, pressure on workers, the dominance of propaganda. Legitimacy is formed through fatigue and fear, not trust and participation.

By now, there are already two political worlds in Belarusian society that live in parallel:

- Loyalist Belarus (“stability”, “peace”, “absence of oligarchs”), which supports paternalism and state control, trusts television and the government and is represented primarily by residents of rural areas, the elderly, and civil servants.
- Alternative Belarus (“changes”, “dignity”, “freedom”), which supports civic activism and individual responsibility, distances itself from official information and is represented by the urban population, youth, and highly educated contingents.

This split did not turn into open political confrontation due to fear. But it became a deep cultural and identification factor: the split did not destroy the regime, but created latent tension in the country.

This split manifested itself at three levels:

1. Social — between generations, city and countryside, state employees and the private sector.
2. Cultural — between orientation towards stability and freedom.
3. Psychological — between internal disagreement and external loyalty.

By 2015, the cycle of authoritarian stability formation was closed. The split becomes the norm, built into the political culture. The regime is strengthened to the point that it moves from the stage of formation to the stage of almost complete institutionalization and routine. Political participation is ritualized, support for the current government becomes functional, not ideological. Legitimacy is built on fear and the lack of alternatives. Self-censorship is growing — a sign of fear, distrust and hidden tension.

The erosion of support is increasing: instead of loyalty comes apathy. Here, research data is particularly indicative: for the first time, the regime is not experiencing an increase, but a decrease in trust in self-reports. This means that the system is beginning to reach the limit of sustainability, support for the government is stabilizing at a mechanical level. In addition, the possibilities of alternative media consumption and the growing role of the Internet are added.

A frozen conflict, invisible from the outside but structurally deep, leads to a crisis when in 2020:

Fear disappears and a mass sense of injustice appears.

An unprecedented mobilization is taking place (including as a result of the government’s inability to confront the pandemic), which could not have been predicted by official data, but which is very clearly visible in the post-2015 conditions. All the hidden lines of division of 2001–2015 become apparent, street and mass. The regime loses political, moral and electoral legitimacy — retaining power is possible only through repression. Thus, all election periods are not separate epochs of the political history of Belarus, but a single process of accumulating division, which ended in a political explosion. 2020 is not a political anomaly, but becomes the logical finale of the entire history of the formation of violent autocracy.

The 2022 referendum is a transition point from “intimidation” authoritarianism to political fatalism, which by 2025 had become dominant. At this time, Belarus is a society in which people are afraid to speak out, do not believe

in the meaning of politics, avoid assessments, do not see the future and perceive the referendum as a meaningless routine. This is the moment of birth of mass political fatalism, which determines all further development until 2025. In 2025, in conditions when hundreds of thousands of people have left the country, the opposition, independent media and NGOs have been destroyed, and the majority of politically active residents are under pressure, we are dealing with a new, institutionally entrenched stage of authoritarian evolution. This does not mean the absence of a split, but its transition to a new phase: not between the government and the opposition, but between the internally burned out and rejected (deprived), on the one hand, and the technocratically loyal, on the other.

Moreover, even loyalty is very conditional, since we are dealing with a state of mass consciousness in which society loses the idea of its own political subjectivity and perceives the political order as unchangeable and predetermined, which leads to ritualistic, adaptive participation and emotional rejection. In the existing conditions of political fatalism, political participation completely turns into a ritual, emotional depreciation and numbness appear. The norms of participation remain, but without content, people switch to individual survival strategies. The very idea of politics disappears, replaced by the expectation that “nothing depends on us and it will always be so”.

As a result, we can distinguish four regimes of political participation and, accordingly, four political states of society, which are determined by the evolution of electoral behavior in Belarus since 2001.

The first stage (2001-2006) is the regime of polarized loyalty — the political discourse functions in the logic of “government versus opposition”, the latter has a visible infrastructure: parties, media, election observation. Political campaigns are quite fierce, but the selectivity of the government is still on the agenda. Accordingly, the population is interested in the elections, there is polarization along the lines of supporters and opponents of the government, people feel the hope that their vote changes something. This is a period of classic authoritarian competition — without democracy, but with elements of competition and mobilization.

The second stage (2010-2015) — the regime of conservation and resignation — after the pacification of the 2010 protests, fear increased, economic instability and crises led to the formation of a pragmatic attitude in society “let it be worse”. Interest in elections falls, people vote out of habit, “out of a sense of duty”, and not out of hope for change. Economic motivation comes to the fore. But there is still a political sense of reality — the realization that Elections could have mattered if the system were different.

The third stage (2020-2021) — the explosion of political subjectivity and its subsequent breakdown — disbelief in official results provoked the emergence of millions of people involved and returned the idea of the possibility of influence, destroying the previous “social contract”. But then came the regime’s response: mass repressions, criminalization of any unauthorized activity, complete destruction of all opposition infrastructures and destruction of public political space. This period became a political trauma for the nation, the culmination of hope and its collapse and defined a gap that became the main source of transformation of political consciousness.

The fourth stage (2022-2025) — the regime of political fatalism — after the complete collapse of political expectations, the very idea of elections disappears, against the backdrop of war, fear becomes the norm, and political activity is ritualized in the absence of meaning. The result was 2025, which finally normalized fatalism: Elections are a completely mechanical process, people do not participate emotionally, again motivation is a “sense of duty” in the absence of interest and understanding of meaning.

Elections have ceased to be even a symbolic instrument of choice and have become a ritual practice of maintaining the mechanism of power. The split remains, but it is no longer political — between real political subjects such as the government and the opposition, but psychosocial — between those who demonstrate technocratic loyalty (the administrative core) and those who are simply emotionally burned out and devastated (the majority).

In public opinion, the described processes are reflected through the phenomenon of the “spiral of silence”: one of the main trends is the growth of the “gray zone” — the share of respondents who refuse to answer questions or choose socially approved answers out of fear. Already in 2001, real support for the government according to polls was significantly lower than the official results. By 2025, fear has transformed: people either avoid participating in polls or declare loyalty to protect themselves from themselves. This creates the illusion of “consolidation”, which is actually a form of adaptive survival.

Belarus has reached the state of a “frozen society”: it is in a state of deep trauma and atomization. The political field has been cleared, alternatives are absent not only in the ballots, but also in the public discourse within the country. However, under the outer layer of “stability” and “fatalism” lies a fundamental problem: the legitimacy of the government rests solely on the power resource and the absence of a visible alternative, and not on trust or “popular love”, as was the case in the early 2000s.

ANEX

Table 2001.01 Did you participate in the elections? (%)

	TOTAL	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Yes	85,6	82,6	80,2	86,5	86,4	88,8	90,9
No	13,6	17,4	19,1	11,3	12,9	11,2	8,1
No answer	0,8	0,0	0,8	2,3	0,7	0,0	1,0

Table 2001.02 If you participated in the elections, when did you vote? (%)

	TOTAL	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
Voted early	18,3	14,0	13,7	21,8	17,0	20,2	25,3
Voted on September 9	63,8	66,9	65,6	62,4	65,3	59,6	60,6
No answer	17,9	19,0	20,6	15,8	17,7	20,2	14,1

Table 2001.03 Could you tell me whose election program you liked the most? (%)

	LIKED	DISLIKED	NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE PROGRAM	NO ANSWER
Lukashenko	44,3	15,7	24,6	15,4
Goncharik	13,3	27,1	34,0	25,6
Gaidukevich	4,3	28,2	39,0	28,5

Table 2001.04 Were there any violations against you personally during the election campaign (including voting day)?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65+
No	88,2	87,3	88,9	81,8	87,0	91,0	84,4	94,4	93,9
Yes	4,4	4,2	4,6	7,4	3,8	3,0	7,5	1,1	2,0
No answer	7,4	8,5	6,4	10,7	9,2	6,0	8,2	4,5	4,0

Table 2006.01 The Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus were held in March. Did you participate in them?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes, accepted and voted early (March 14-18)	32,4	28,5	35,7	26,4	29,4	29,9	34,4	38,5	37,3
Yes, accepted and voted on Election Day, March 19	59,5	62,6	57,0	58,0	60,0	63,3	58,6	56,0	59,5
No, did not participate	8,0	8,9	7,3	15,6	10,5	6,8	7,0	5,5	3,3

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes, accepted and voted early (March 14-18)	32,4	23,9	30,1	44,7	37,5	18,4	37,1	38,8	29,9	38,1
Yes, accepted and voted on Election Day, March 19	59,5	69,8	62,6	49,5	57,8	67,8	55,2	51,6	61,0	56,2
No, did not participate	8,0	6,2	7,3	5,8	4,7	13,8	7,7	9,5	9,1	5,8

Table 2006.02 Could you please tell me how you voted?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
For Gaidukevich S.	1,1	1,1	1,0	0,8	1,9	1,2	0,8	1,2	0,6
For Kazulin A.	0,8	1,3	0,5	0,7	1,6	0,9	1,1	0,3	0,0
For Lukashenko A.	62,6	55,9	68,0	42,5	50,5	59,3	61,1	75,9	87,9
For Milinkevich A.	6,0	8,0	4,4	10,8	6,8	6,3	6,2	3,9	2,2
Against everyone	3,4	3,8	3,0	5,7	4,3	3,6	4,1	1,8	0,4
I don't want to answer	26,1	29,8	23,1	39,6	34,9	28,6	26,6	16,8	8,9

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
For Gaidukevich S.	1,1	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,4	1,9	3,4	0,4	1,0	1,3
For Kazulin A.	0,8	0,2	0,3	0,3	1,1	1,5	2,3	0,0	0,8	0,9
For Lukashenko A.	62,6	69,7	70,9	69,0	71,2	40,3	54,0	70,2	57,3	74,2
For Milinkevich A.	6,0	6,2	2,1	4,2	3,9	14,2	6,2	2,6	7,2	3,5
Against everyone	3,4	4,0	2,7	3,1	2,5	5,3	3,2	2,0	3,9	2,1
I don't want to answer	26,1	19,6	23,6	23,1	20,9	36,8	30,8	24,9	29,8	18,0

Table 2006. How much do you think you can trust the results of the presidential election?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
I think the election results are accurate and can be trusted	51,3	47,1	54,7	39,3	41,6	43,5	45,9	60,6	78,7
Some violations	24,7	25,1	24,3	27,9	27,4	29,1	28,2	22,9	12,3
Major violations	11,4	14,7	8,6	19,4	16,0	11,6	11,0	7,0	3,1
Not sure	12,7	13,1	12,4	13,5	15,0	15,9	14,9	9,5	5,9

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
I think the election results are accurate and can be trusted	51,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,4	1,9	3,4	0,4	1,0	1,3
Some violations	24,7	0,2	0,3	0,3	1,1	1,5	2,3	0,0	0,8	0,9
Major violations	11,4	69,7	70,9	69,0	71,2	40,3	54,0	70,2	57,3	74,2
Not sure	12,7	6,2	2,1	4,2	3,9	14,2	6,2	2,6	7,2	3,5

Table 2015.01 Do the activities of the current President correspond to the interests of people like you?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes	25,2	20,7	29,0	17,6	18,3	20,0	20,8	28,9	48,2
Probably yes	36,1	34,5	37,4	36,7	31,4	31,8	43,2	39,1	35,6
Probably no	14,3	18,3	10,9	15,5	21,2	20,1	14,3	8,3	4,0
No	6,3	8,2	4,8	6,8	8,9	6,8	4,8	6,2	3,8
Not sure	18,1	18,3	17,9	23,4	20,2	21,3	16,9	17,5	8,5

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes	25,2	41,2	5,2	37,7	26,6	12,2	33,7	20,0	22,3	33,5
Probably yes	36,1	34,9	20,3	46,1	35,1	38,6	37,8	37,3	37,3	32,8
Probably no	14,3	10,8	30,1	4,2	12,0	16,9	13,7	12,7	13,8	15,6
No	6,3	4,9	8,5	1,5	3,7	11,2	6,8	6,2	7,0	4,4
Not sure	18,1	8,3	35,8	10,5	22,7	21,1	8,1	23,8	19,6	13,8

Table 2015.02 Overall, have there been more achievements or failures in the current President's activities?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Achievements	42,1	36,9	46,5	35,8	34,9	35,3	41,3	45,0	62,9
Failures	4,7	5,9	3,7	7,0	5,2	4,0	4,5	3,8	3,6
About equally of both	34,1	36,2	32,2	30,2	36,8	42,1	36,9	34,0	22,1
Not sure	19,2	21,1	17,6	26,9	23,1	18,6	17,3	17,2	11,4

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Achievements	42,1	56,2	15,0	58,3	55,8	27,9	41,2	44,5	40,2	47,5
Failures	4,7	1,5	9,3	1,6	4,0	9,2	2,3	3,9	5,5	2,4
About equally of both	34,1	26,9	44,0	22,8	27,5	40,9	40,3	33,8	35,0	31,5
Not sure	19,2	15,4	31,7	17,4	12,7	22,0	16,2	17,8	19,4	18,6

Table 2015.03 To what extent do you agree with the statement that under the leadership of the current Head of State, Belarus is generally developing in the right direction?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Strongly agree	25,3	21,8	28,3	15,0	16,8	22,2	24,7	29,8	45,8
Probably agree	41,1	39,6	42,3	46,4	39,4	40,5	44,0	39,2	37,4
Probably disagree	14,6	17,0	12,6	19,3	19,4	17,2	14,0	11,5	5,1
Disagree	3,5	5,2	2,1	4,8	4,5	4,6	2,3	2,9	1,6
Not sure	15,5	16,5	14,6	14,5	19,9	15,5	15,0	16,7	10,0

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VIL-LAGE
Strongly agree	25,3	44,6	4,0	44,4	22,5	10,2	32,9	17,9	21,5	36,4
Probably agree	41,1	38,3	33,3	37,0	44,8	46,7	43,4	43,0	42,3	37,5
Probably disagree	14,6	9,0	38,6	7,3	5,6	18,1	11,7	10,9	16,1	10,4
Disagree	3,5	1,2	3,9	2,5	4,3	6,3	3,1	2,5	3,6	3,1
Not sure	15,5	7,0	20,2	8,8	22,8	18,7	9,0	25,7	16,5	12,6

Table 2015.04 Did you know that the Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus will be held on October 11, 2015?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes, I know	95,5	94,6	96,3	95,1	94,6	95,7	97,5	95,1	95,4
I heard something about it	3,4	4,2	2,7	3,9	5,4	2,7	1,8	3,1	3,0
No, I don't know or don't want to answer	1,1	1,2	0,9	1,0	0,0	1,6	0,6	1,8	1,5

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes, I know	95,5	98,6	93,7	94,2	98,6	94,3	94,4	96,1	96,1	93,8
I heard something about it	3,4	1,4	5,4	3,6	0,0	3,7	5,1	3,9	2,9	4,8
No, I don't know or don't want to answer	1,1	0,0	0,8	2,2	1,4	2,0	0,5	0,0	0,9	1,4

Table 2015.05 Do you plan to participate in the upcoming presidential elections (voting)?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes	64,0	59,7	67,7	47,6	57,4	63,6	69,2	72,6	74,4
Probably yes	18,0	18,2	17,9	23,3	18,8	18,7	19,1	15,2	13,0
Probably no	3,6	4,7	2,6	5,9	5,3	3,3	3,0	1,9	1,9
No	4,4	5,5	3,5	7,2	6,6	4,7	1,9	3,6	2,2
I don't know yet	7,7	9,0	6,7	11,3	9,4	9,0	4,9	6,0	5,7
I would rather not answer this question	2,2	2,9	1,6	4,7	2,5	0,8	1,8	0,8	2,8

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes	64,0	82,2	59,9	67,1	63,8	47,9	68,5	62,5	62,3	69,1
Probably yes	18,0	5,0	24,0	19,7	18,5	18,2	19,4	22,9	18,3	17,3
Probably no	3,6	2,5	3,5	2,2	3,0	6,8	3,5	2,3	3,9	2,7
No	4,4	1,8	1,3	2,0	2,1	12,4	3,3	5,2	5,1	2,5
I don't know yet	7,7	4,9	9,8	4,8	12,6	11,8	3,9	6,6	8,4	5,9
I would rather not answer this question	2,2	3,5	1,5	4,2	0,0	2,9	1,4	0,6	2,1	2,4

Table 2015.06 When are you going to vote?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
On Election Day	51,2	47,6	54,2	44,1	44,5	46,7	58,1	55,9	59,3
Early	8,8	8,0	9,5	3,9	8,7	9,5	8,9	13,2	8,2
Not decided yet	18,4	19,0	18,0	20,5	18,8	22,1	17,2	15,2	16,6
Not sure	21,6	25,4	18,3	31,6	27,9	21,7	15,9	15,6	15,9

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
On Election Day	51,2	49,0	47,3	45,1	62,0	55,5	55,4	43,6	51,7	49,6
Early	8,8	14,8	8,7	9,8	4,7	1,5	11,9	12,0	7,6	12,3
Not decided yet	18,4	21,0	25,4	23,8	13,6	5,3	17,5	27,2	18,0	19,5
Not sure	21,6	15,2	18,6	21,3	19,7	37,7	15,3	17,3	22,6	18,6

Table 2015.07 How do you feel about early voting?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Positive	31,3	31,3	28,9	33,2	26,8	27,0	29,8	28,7	36,2
Rather positive	17,2	17,2	14,6	19,4	12,2	16,8	16,0	21,1	18,4
Indifferent	30,1	30,1	32,2	28,4	37,1	33,6	33,3	26,6	25,2
Rather negative	6,1	6,1	6,4	5,9	7,1	6,0	6,4	6,8	6,7
Negative	8,4	8,4	10,9	6,2	10,4	9,5	8,1	8,4	6,4
Not sure	6,9	7,0	6,8	6,4	7,1	6,4	8,6	7,1	5,7

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Positive	31,3	43,5	15,5	32,4	43,5	18,8	34,5	36,3	28,7	38,4
Rather positive	17,2	13,2	16,5	23,9	9,1	16,4	18,4	21,9	18,1	14,6
Indifferent	30,1	22,8	38,9	29,1	31,1	31,0	28,9	29,8	29,5	31,7
Rather negative	6,1	5,6	9,1	2,9	5,1	9,7	6,1	2,8	6,9	4,1
Negative	8,4	9,7	3,7	5,8	10,2	17,4	7,3	0,6	9,5	5,1
Not sure	6,9	5,1	16,3	5,9	1,0	6,6	4,9	8,5	7,2	6,0

Table 2015.08 Please tell me why you are going to participate in the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
No answer	18,5	22,4	15,2	29,0	24,2	17,7	12,1	14,2	13,1
To express my opinion, attitude to the situation in the country	27,1	27,8	26,5	30,0	24,0	32,4	27,9	28,9	19,3
This is everyone's civic duty	52,4	49,2	55,0	42,4	46,6	46,7	62,0	56,3	61,1
To express my distrust of the current government	0,7	0,5	0,8	1,0	0,6	0,5	0,8	0,2	1,0
Because most of my relatives and friends will participate in the elections.	2,9	3,0	2,7	2,0	2,6	3,2	3,2	2,4	3,6
Because Elections provide a real opportunity to participate in the life of the country, in the management of state affairs.	12,1	11,7	12,5	8,2	9,6	15,1	13,6	15,4	11,0
There are no special reasons, but I will go to vote anyway	11,7	10,6	12,7	12,6	13,2	11,3	9,9	8,3	15,1
Other	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,9	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,3	0,8
There are no special reasons, but I will go to vote anyway	19,0	23,9	14,9	29,4	25,1	19,7	13,3	13,2	12,9

Table 2015.08 Please tell me why you are going to participate in the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus?

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
No answer	18,5	12,8	16,5	13,6	17,7	34,8	13,6	14,9	20,1	13,8
To express my opinion, attitude to the situation in the country	27,1	25,0	30,1	30,1	17,3	21,3	31,8	35,0	29,6	20,0
This is everyone's civic duty	52,4	61,5	45,5	60,9	38,9	47,3	57,6	51,9	50,2	58,4
To express my distrust of the current government	0,7	0,3	1,0	0,9	0,0	1,0	0,5	0,8	0,8	0,2
Because most of my relatives and friends will participate in the elections.	2,9	0,8	5,4	2,4	4,5	0,0	5,7	2,3	2,9	2,8
Because Elections provide a real opportunity to participate in the life of the country, in the management of state affairs.	12,1	16,0	6,7	17,9	19,1	3,7	16,6	7,1	11,2	14,9
There are no special reasons, but I will go to vote anyway	11,7	11,9	9,4	8,7	32,2	4,5	14,8	5,8	10,4	15,3
Other	0,4	0,3	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,9	0,6	0,0	0,5	0,0
There are no special reasons, but I will go to vote anyway	19,0	13,4	16,4	14,7	17,7	34,6	14,1	17,3	20,4	14,9

Table 2015.09 To what extent are you interested in the upcoming Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Interested	30,3	26,5	33,4	25,7	22,2	26,8	32,9	34,2	42,0
Mostly interested	30,4	31,0	29,9	25,7	30,0	28,4	30,8	33,3	34,3
Mostly not interested	22,6	25,3	20,3	26,0	27,1	28,5	20,4	18,6	13,3
Not interested	13,4	13,4	13,5	17,5	16,8	13,2	13,4	10,8	8,3
Not sure	3,3	3,8	2,9	5,1	3,8	3,1	2,5	3,2	2,0

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Interested	30,3	19,4	36,8	17,4	17,4	40,1	29,3	29,0	33,9	50,5
Mostly interested	30,4	18,8	46,1	20,7	23,9	34,9	37,0	30,4	30,5	30,5
Mostly not interested	22,6	43,2	10,4	28,5	30,8	17,6	15,3	23,0	21,5	12,4
Not interested	13,4	15,6	4,5	31,6	24,0	7,4	6,2	13,9	12,0	5,2
Not sure	3,3	1,4	2,9	2,2	1,9	3,9	0,0	12,2	3,7	2,1

Table 2015.10 How do you primarily receive information about the upcoming presidential elections?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
I am specifically interested in this topic	26,4	25,0	27,6	18,5	21,0	25,0	30,6	28,6	35,7
I am randomly receiving information on this topic	67,2	69,7	65,0	75,9	72,2	69,2	62,9	63,3	58,7
Other	3,1	2,3	3,7	1,7	3,1	3,1	3,5	4,7	2,2
Not sure	3,4	2,9	3,7	3,9	3,8	2,7	3,0	3,4	3,5

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
I am specifically interested in this topic	26,4	42,3	28,4	23,2	15,8	17,7	35,4	21,1	25,9	27,9
I am randomly receiving information on this topic	67,2	49,6	66,7	72,2	80,1	73,6	62,7	65,9	67,8	65,5
Other	3,1	4,3	3,8	1,8	0,0	5,1	1,3	4,5	3,5	1,9
Not sure	3,4	3,7	1,1	2,8	4,1	3,6	0,7	8,5	2,9	4,7

Table 2015.11 What information sources about the upcoming elections do you prefer?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Television	72,8	69,8	75,3	48,5	63,0	76,2	75,2	84,7	89,9
Radio	18,3	18,8	17,9	7,9	12,9	13,5	18,4	22,2	36,8
Print media (newspapers, magazines)	27,1	27,0	27,2	13,2	19,4	23,8	33,8	38,2	35,2
Internet	28,0	29,3	27,0	50,3	44,7	32,2	24,2	10,1	3,8
Advertising, visual agitation	21,2	21,8	20,6	28,8	20,8	20,0	23,4	21,7	12,5
Conversations with work colleagues, friends, acquaintances, relatives	12,1	11,5	12,7	11,3	14,2	13,0	13,4	10,7	9,4
Other	0,7	0,9	0,5	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,5	2,5	0,2
I do not receive information	3,0	2,6	3,3	4,4	4,4	3,0	2,7	1,4	1,9

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Television	72,8	82,3	62,9	69,1	91,2	60,3	74,2	77,3	71,3	77,2
Radio	18,3	26,3	29,8	19,6	16,8	11,9	17,0	7,2	16,9	22,5
Print media (newspapers, magazines)	27,1	33,9	33,6	32,1	23,3	14,2	28,2	27,6	26,2	29,6
Internet	28,0	25,1	31,2	26,8	13,3	36,9	26,4	31,9	29,7	23,4
Advertising, visual agitation	21,2	12,9	31,8	22,5	39,2	11,5	17,2	20,9	24,0	13,2
Conversations with work colleagues, friends, acquaintances, relatives	12,1	11,1	16,9	11,4	14,4	12,0	11,7	7,4	11,2	14,7
Other	0,7	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,3	1,5	0,0	2,4	0,9	0,0
I do not receive information	3,0	0,3	1,8	0,4	3,2	8,8	3,6	0,9	3,6	1,2

Table 2015.12 If the Presidential Elections of the Republic of Belarus were held tomorrow, who would you vote for?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
S. Gaidukevich	0,7	1,2	0,3	1,6	0,5	0,8	1,2	0,2	0,0
S. Kalyakin	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
T. Karatkevich	0,9	0,8	1,0	1,7	0,8	0,6	0,9	1,2	0,3
A. Lyabedzka	0,3	0,5	0,1	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,3	0,5
A. Lukashenko	45,4	38,0	51,7	34,5	33,6	40,7	46,5	48,9	71,5
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,8	1,0	0,7	0,7	1,2	0,9	0,7	1,3	0,2
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,4	0,6	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,3
M. Ulakhovich	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0
Not sure	33,0	37,8	28,9	41,7	39,5	39,0	32,3	24,5	19,0
I would not like to answer this question	18,5	20,2	17,1	18,9	23,8	16,9	18,1	23,6	8,1

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
S. Gaidukevich	0,7	0,0	2,3	0,2	0,0	0,3	0,9	1,3	0,7	0,5
S. Kalyakin	0,1	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,1	0,0
T. Karatkevich	0,9	0,3	0,7	0,7	0,9	1,6	0,4	1,5	1,1	0,4
A. Lyabedzka	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,3	1,7	0,2	0,7
A. Lukashenko	45,4	65,6	30,5	51,7	51,6	30,9	54,3	34,5	43,5	50,9
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,8	0,0	1,6	0,7	0,0	0,5	0,8	2,7	0,9	0,7
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,3	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,2
M. Ulakhovich	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0
Not sure	33,0	22,1	38,0	20,4	34,0	52,1	27,7	32,3	35,4	26,1
I would not like to answer this question	18,5	12,0	26,1	26,3	13,4	13,5	15,3	24,9	17,8	20,4

Table 2015.13 Who do you think will be elected President of the Republic of Belarus in the upcoming elections?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
S. Gaidukevich	0,3	0,4	0,2	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,6
S. Kalyakin	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
T. Karatkevich	0,4	0,7	0,2	0,6	0,7	0,8	0,5	0,0	0,0
A. Lyabedzka	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
A. Lukashenko	82,8	80,5	84,8	80,0	80,6	82,8	85,6	81,6	86,8
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,4	0,0
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,7	0,9	0,5	0,4	0,0	0,9	0,0	1,5	1,5
M. Ulakhovich	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0
Not sure	15,4	17,2	14,0	18,0	18,1	15,1	13,3	16,6	11,2

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
S. Gaidukevich	0,3	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,0	1,0
S. Kalyakin	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
T. Karatkevich	0,4	2,1	0,4	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,6
A. Lyabedzka	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
A. Lukashenko	82,8	87,9	87,3	71,3	97,9	83,0	82,1	72,4	84,0	79,5
Zh. Romanovskaya	0,2	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0
V. Tsiareshchanka	0,7	0,3	0,0	4,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	2,5
M. Ulakhovich	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,3
Not sure	15,4	8,2	11,5	24,3	2,1	16,3	17,3	26,5	15,3	15,9

Table 2015.14 Do you think the results of the upcoming presidential election can be trusted?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes	32,5	29,8	34,7	26,1	26,4	29,3	29,1	37,6	48,3
Probably yes	30,0	31,1	29,2	30,1	30,0	30,8	34,1	28,1	26,7
Probably no	10,8	11,8	9,9	13,1	13,1	11,1	11,3	11,5	3,9
No	5,4	7,1	3,8	6,0	7,0	6,1	5,1	4,4	3,2
Not sure	21,3	20,2	22,3	24,6	23,6	22,7	20,5	18,4	17,8

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes	32,5	46,9	12,1	47,4	32,3	18,4	38,4	33,1	28,3	44,5
Probably yes	30,0	25,2	26,5	35,2	23,1	30,5	35,2	32,6	30,2	29,5
Probably no	10,8	7,2	26,5	3,9	13,0	11,6	8,8	5,4	11,7	8,3
No	5,4	5,0	6,2	2,4	5,1	9,5	4,2	3,8	5,4	5,3
Not sure	21,3	15,7	28,7	11,0	26,5	29,9	13,4	25,0	24,5	12,4

Table 2015.15 Do you think that losing candidates have the right to challenge the election results if they disagree with them?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Yes, but only in the manner prescribed by law	45,9	45,7	46,0	37,3	50,6	50,0	50,8	48,0	36,0
Yes, including at mass rallies, up to the review of the result	3,1	4,0	2,4	5,1	3,0	2,8	3,7	3,0	1,4
No, it makes no sense	24,1	25,9	22,6	30,2	26,0	22,5	21,1	20,3	24,9
No, it disrupts the order in the country	12,3	12,3	12,2	10,7	10,5	12,0	12,3	14,0	14,5
Other	0,8	0,7	0,9	0,5	0,7	0,0	0,4	2,3	0,7
Not sure	13,8	11,4	15,9	16,4	9,1	12,7	11,7	12,3	22,5

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Yes, but only in the manner prescribed by law	45,9	48,0	54,8	48,8	36,5	43,2	50,8	36,4	45,1	48,0
Yes, including at mass rallies, up to the review of the result	3,1	2,9	5,2	2,9	0,3	4,0	2,4	3,6	2,9	3,7
No, it makes no sense	24,1	26,8	26,1	12,8	16,9	28,3	22,9	35,3	25,3	20,7
No, it disrupts the order in the country	12,3	16,4	2,9	26,4	12,9	3,4	17,0	6,8	11,8	13,6
Other	0,8	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	3,8	0,0	0,3	1,0	0,2
Not sure	13,8	5,8	10,8	9,0	33,4	17,4	7,0	17,7	13,8	13,9

Table 2015.16. If your life is getting worse, who (what) do you think is primarily to blame?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Government	36,9	37,2	36,5	43,5	39,3	32,9	37,9	41,7	25,5
President	18,8	21,1	16,8	25,1	18,4	19,9	20,1	18,3	11,1
Local government	17,2	17,3	17,2	15,6	17,2	17,3	18,2	21,5	13,3
National Bank	4,9	4,2	5,6	7,5	3,7	4,0	6,2	5,5	3,0
The opposition	1,8	2,2	1,5	1,7	0,6	1,2	2,9	2,2	2,8
World financial crisis	48,7	48,0	49,3	47,7	44,7	53,4	59,1	44,2	42,1
Heads of enterprises	7,9	8,9	7,0	8,9	8,5	7,1	9,4	7,6	5,6
Entrepreneurs	0,4	0,2	0,6	1,1	0,2	0,0	0,3	0,7	0,5
It's our fault (the population)	21,6	21,9	21,3	25,5	24,6	23,0	17,8	21,5	16,4
The second	2,7	2,8	2,6	2,5	2,8	2,0	2,7	3,8	2,4
No one is to blame	7,1	5,2	8,7	6,5	7,1	7,1	2,8	7,4	12,1

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Government	36,9	23,0	79,6	31,2	23,6	41,8	22,3	35,0	39,2	30,1
President	18,8	8,4	50,9	16,3	10,4	22,5	8,3	13,8	19,7	16,3
Local government	17,2	12,6	55,0	10,3	8,0	8,8	13,1	12,2	16,7	18,8
National Bank	4,9	5,0	4,2	5,1	5,0	4,7	3,7	7,6	6,4	0,6
The opposition	1,8	0,8	0,6	4,1	0,0	1,4	1,9	3,4	1,6	2,6
World financial crisis	48,7	49,9	37,3	49,1	26,4	50,6	58,8	55,1	52,1	38,6
Heads of enterprises	7,9	13,1	10,9	8,3	5,0	2,9	6,4	8,2	7,4	9,2
Entrepreneurs	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,9	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,5
It's our fault (the population)	21,6	27,6	10,0	22,2	6,6	34,3	19,6	18,9	21,3	22,5
The second	2,7	4,7	1,2	1,7	0,0	4,0	2,9	2,5	2,8	2,3
No one is to blame	7,1	3,2	5,3	7,3	23,3	5,4	6,4	8,1	6,3	9,3

Table 2020. 01 When you took part in the presidential elections on August 9, which candidate did you vote for?

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	65 +
Dzmitryev Andrei	1,3	1,3	1,3	1,0	1,6	2,5	1,9	0,4	0,3
Konapatskaya Anna	0,5	0,1	0,9	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,6
Lukashenka Alexander	20,9	14,6	26,0	5,6	6,5	11,9	16,5	26,0	46,6
Tsikhanouskaya Svetlana	33,3	37,7	29,6	52,4	45,4	39,0	35,7	22,9	17,2
Cherachen Sergey	0,4	0,0	0,7	0,5	0,3	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,6
Against all	6,6	6,9	6,3	4,9	7,0	5,1	8,6	8,1	5,0
I did not vote	11,3	13,9	9,3	11,9	14,0	14,4	8,3	9,4	10,5
I do not want to answer this question	25,7	25,5	25,9	23,1	24,6	26,4	27,7	32,8	19,1

	TOTAL	BREST REG.	VITEB. REG.	GOM. REG.	GROD. REG.	MINSK	MINSK REG.	MOGIL. REG.	CITY	VILLAGE
Dzmitryev Andrei	1,3	0,0	0,8	4,2	2,0	1,4	0,9	0,0	1,2	1,3
Konapatskaya Anna	0,5	0,0	1,2	0,0	1,2	0,4	0,7	0,0	0,5	0,5
Lukashenka Alexander	20,9	25,2	19,4	18,3	25,7	14,1	21,8	26,8	27,1	19,2
Tsikhanouskaya Svetlana	33,3	30,6	42,1	28,2	34,2	35,4	35,4	21,3	32,0	33,6
Cherachen Sergey	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,0	0,4	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,4
Against all	6,6	6,3	5,0	9,5	4,5	9,0	4,7	6,5	5,3	6,9
I did not vote	11,3	15,9	8,4	8,8	7,7	15,7	9,6	11,0	8,1	12,2
I do not want to answer this question	25,7	21,5	22,5	31,1	24,2	23,2	27,0	34,3	25,5	25,8

AUTHOR



Alena Shkurova

Belarusian sociologist, Doctor of Sociological Sciences. Born in Minsk, currently working in Poland. She is a specialist in the theory and methodology of sociological research, as well as in the field of research in the sociology of religion, sociology of law, media space, diasporas, and hard-to-reach population groups.