

The Union State for Belarus:

*Challenges to Sovereign Integrity
and Growing Dependence on Russia (2024–2025)*

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INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the need for an accurate assessment of the risk of Belarus losing its sovereignty within the framework of the Union State. The politically sensitive nature of the issue makes it difficult to produce an analysis of Belarus's growing dependence on Russia that is both comprehensive and balanced. Moreover, politically biased narratives that portray the Lukashenka administration as weak vis-à-vis Russia complicate an objective assessment of its strategic behaviour.

The study's contribution to the literature lies in its examination of the extent to which the Lukashenka regime resists Russia's Union State project.

The primary methodology is comparative analysis, drawing on monitoring of the implementation of the 'first integration plan' (2021–2023) and the 'second plan' (2024–2026). It is grounded in the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, which treats the project as a process of institutional development shaped by structural constraints, including competing interests, institutional inertia, and institutional design.

The aim of the study is to assess the extent of sovereignty erosion and the growth of Belarus's dependence on Russia as part of the Union State project. To this end, the study pursues three objectives. First, it evaluates the outcomes of the first phase of 'integration' (2021–2023) and identifies risks that had emerged by 2024 in key areas of state and societal governance. Second, it identifies aspects of the second phase (2024–2026) that may pose risks of Belarus being absorbed by Russia. Third, it assesses the extent of the Belarusian regime's resistance across these aspects.

'Sovereignty' and 'independence' are key categories in this study.

In political commentary and analysis, these concepts are often conflated, which makes it difficult to form a clear and accurate understanding of the ongoing process of increasing dependence and sovereignty erosion in Belarus–Russia relations. To properly assess these developments – including decisions taken by Lukashenka and Putin – it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the two concepts.

'Independence' is generally understood as a condition in which a country exists freely as a state, with its people – or their representatives – exercising self-governance and sovereignty over its territory.

There is currently an active debate over the extent to which Belarus can be considered independent and sovereign. It is not uncommon to see it portrayed as lacking full agency as a subject of international relations. Lukashenka himself has repeatedly given grounds for such assessments. When he claims that Belarusians and Russians are essentially one people¹, does this not call into question Belarusians' right to their own sovereignty?

More importantly, do the Russian authorities regard Belarusians as a distinct people with a sovereign right to exercise power over their own territory and in their relations with neighbouring states? Vladimir Putin's article 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'², which later served to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine, contains references to Belarusians. The well-known quasi-scholarly and politically charged concept of the 'triune Russian people'³ has underpinned the idea of a shared origin of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, and has become a cornerstone of Russia's contemporary historical policy.

Lukashenka's weak stance on the inviolability of Belarusian popular sovereignty, as well as the Kremlin's expansionist position, have created an existential threat to the Republic of Belarus as an independent state.

When we speak of loss of independence, it is important to clarify what this might look like, in both political and economic terms. Politically, this may mean some form of autonomy (where the state retains a degree of self-

1. 'Are Belarusians and Russians One People?' (Belorusy i russkie – odin narod?) Source: SB.BY, 25 August 2025

2. 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians' (Ob istoricheskom edinstve russkikh i ukrainsev) Source: Kremlin.ru, 12 July 2021

3. 'All-Russian nation' (Triedinyy russkiy narod) Source: Wikipedia, 9 October 2025

governance but is under external control), or protectorate status, where the state's de-jure autonomy depends on an external actor for matters of defence and foreign policy. Economically, loss of independence implies a situation in which the state's finances, export markets, technologies, and resources become dependent on a more developed state.

Is there a boundary between independence and sovereignty? Yes, there is. Sovereignty can be understood as a fundamental framework: once it is lost, everything is lost – the right for a state to determine its own future, the right to remain distinct, and, ultimately, the state's authority over itself. By contrast, dependence can still be overcome by developing and diversifying external ties. However, this distinction is clearly visible only in the economic sphere. In the political sphere, loss of independence is effectively irreversible.

1. ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST PHASE OF ‘INTEGRATION’ (2021–2023)

On 4 November 2021, 28 ‘road maps’ were signed as part of the first phase of the implementation of the Union State Treaty. This marked the beginning of a new era in Belarus’s growing dependence on Russia. As scholars have noted⁴, Lukashenka’s willingness to agree to these arrangements was rooted in the Kremlin’s decisive support during the mass protests in Belarus in 2020.

Monitoring of this first phase showed that the Kremlin was intent on creating common, integrated systems of governance in strategically important areas, including finance, transport, customs, taxation, communications, statistics and macro-level socio-economic forecasting, and energy.

Furthermore, plans were announced to create unified markets for gas, oil, and electricity, as well as to develop a common industrial and agricultural policy and a coordinated approach in the social and labour sphere.

To understand which of the road maps were implemented and which were not, it is important to distinguish between Lukashenka’s stated ‘national interests of Belarus’ and the Kremlin’s blatantly expansionist agenda. Of the 28 road maps, several reflected Minsk’s declared ‘national interests’: the creation of a unified gas market; a unified market for oil and petroleum products; a system of phytosanitary and veterinary control to ensure unrestricted access for Belarusian meat and dairy products to the Russian market; access to Russia’s transport system, including domestic rail tariffs; and equal access to public procurement.

By contrast, the Kremlin’s expansionist agenda centred on the creation of integrated automated systems of governance covering finance, transport, customs, taxation, communications, statistics, socio-economic forecasting based on a single methodology, and the electricity sector.

Of the measures implemented in 2021–2023, it is clear that the Russian side acted more assertively and succeeded in advancing almost all of its priorities. Integrated systems were created for indirect taxes, the import and traceability of imported goods (customs), and joint socio-economic forecasting. In the banking sector, a fast payment system based on the Russian rouble was introduced, along with an integrated accounting system.

The Belarusian side, by contrast, largely failed to secure implementation of the road maps that served its own interests. Unified markets for gas, oil, and petroleum products were never created: the necessary legislation was neither drafted nor adopted, and negotiations on these issues were either fruitless or postponed. The Belarusian side’s limited achievements included implementing the road maps on phytosanitary and veterinary control and temporary access to public procurement in Russia. Progress was also made on the question of restructuring Belarus’s external debt to Russia, with repayment being deferred until 2024.

One of the most important issues for the Belarusian side was the cancellation of the Russian tax manoeuvre or compensation for its effects. However, the Russian negotiating team imposed a solution that clearly revealed the Kremlin’s broader intentions: compensation for the tax manoeuvre was bundled together with the introduction of an integrated system for managing indirect taxes. This represented not merely an infringement of Belarus’s national interests, but a genuine threat to its sovereignty.

What exactly did this threat comprise? The creation of such a system meant that Moscow would determine the rates of indirect taxes (excise duties and VAT), monitor how they were collected, receive reporting, and carry out audits. In other words, Belarus lost its sovereign right to decide the rates of excise duties and VAT. The logic of the package deal boils down to oil in exchange for indirect taxes. It would eventually become clear that compensation for the tax manoeuvre was temporary, whereas the integrated system of indirect taxation was permanent.

In the military-political sphere, the period from 2021 to 2023 brought tectonic changes.

4. Roza Turarbekava: “Analysing the current state of Russia-Belarus integration: The adoption and implementation of roadmaps”. [Oxford Belarus Observatory, March 21, 2023](#)

The main factor that tied Belarus to Russia politically was the Lukashenka regime's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. To a large extent, the full-scale invasion became possible because of Lukashenka's fear of a new wave of protests. As scholars have noted⁵, Russia's invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory was preceded by the signing of a new Union State Military Doctrine⁶ on 4 November 2021. The text of the doctrine was not made publicly available until January 2022.

At one closed seminar, a Belarusian expert drew attention to what he described as bargaining between Moscow and Minsk over the timing of the large-scale Union Resolve military exercises in 2022. In his view, Lukashenka had demanded that the exercises begin earlier, in February, because a referendum on the constitution was scheduled for 27 February. Moscow, meanwhile, had insisted on holding the 'exercises' in March. Lukashenka had feared that protests might continue when the referendum was underway. The expert therefore concluded that a corresponding 'package deal' had been reached to assuage Lukashenka's concerns.

In October 2022, Lukashenka announced the deployment of the Regional Forces Group of Belarus and Russia⁷, further reinforcing the perception of Belarusian complicity in the war. The presence of Russian troops and military equipment on Belarusian territory, the intensive shelling of Ukrainian cities, and the direct threat to Kyiv all contributed to Lukashenka being seen as Putin's 'puppet'. At the same time, the anticipated direct involvement of the Belarusian army in the war against Ukraine did not materialise. The subsequent withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment shows that this alliance also had its limits.

In sum, the first phase of Union State 'integration' demonstrated that the 28 road maps largely served Russia's interests, helping it expand its control over strategically important spheres in Belarus. While Lukashenka had his own 'national interests' baked into the plan, it was evidently Russia's expansionist interests being primarily advanced. As a result, the sovereign rights of the Belarusian people as subjects of domestic politics were partially eroded. Lukashenka, for his part, achieved only limited progress in securing Belarus's declared 'national interests'. This can largely be explained by the weakness and dependency of the Lukashenka administration in the aftermath of the 2020 mass protests, and by Lukashenka's fear of their return.

This dependence is most obvious in the military-political sphere. Lukashenka's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine cemented his image as a Kremlin puppet.

5. Turarbekova, Roza: 'Russian Influence in Belarus: Growing Dependence and the Threat of Losing Sovereignty (2020-2024)' (Rossiiskoe vliianie v Belarusi: rastushchaia zavisimost' i ugroza poteri suvereniteta (2020–2024 gg.)) Source: Free Belarus Center, 6 January 2025

6. Resolution No. 5 of 4 November 2021 'On the Military Doctrine of the Union State' (Postanovlenie ot 4 noyabrya 2021 g. No 5 'O Voennoy doktrine Soyuznogo gosudarstva') Source: 4 November 2021

7. 'Lukashenka Invited Russian Troops to Create a "Regional Forces Group"' (Lukashenko priglasiil rossiiskie voiska dlia sozdaniia «regional'noi gruppirovki») Source: BBC, 10 October 2022

2. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND UNION STATE ‘INTEGRATION’ PLAN (2024–2026)

On 29 January 2024, during an official meeting between Putin and Lukashenka, a set of documents was signed under the second integration plan, covering the period 2024–2026. The core document is the Decree ‘On the Main Areas for Implementing the Provisions of the Union Treaty’⁸, which sets out eleven pillars of cooperation, or strategic directions. In addition to the strategic directions already included in the first 28 road maps, new ones were introduced, including ‘Cultural and Humanitarian Sphere’, ‘Education’, ‘Healthcare’, ‘Information Policy’, ‘Youth Policy’, and ‘Formation of a Common Legal Space’.

In monitoring all eleven strategic directions during 2024–2025, I identified ten in which substantial steps towards implementation have been taken. With that said, within these areas a number of road maps were published but never actually developed, including the one on social and labour policy. This supports my earlier conclusion from the first phase: the Union State project fails to address the social problems facing Belarusian society.

From a governance perspective, one of the most concerning strategic directions remains ‘**Coordinated Macroeconomic Policy**’. The move towards joint planning resembles a return to Soviet-era Gosplans. Within this area, the countries signed the Agreement ‘On the Procedure for Drafting Socio-Economic Development Forecasts’ on 19 December 2024 and prepared a forecast for 2025–2027 on that basis. Methodologies for collecting and processing statistical information are also being brought into line. Every two years, a statistical collection entitled ‘Belarus and Russia’ is published.

Another troubling strategic direction is ‘**Common Financial Market**’. Integration in the financial and banking sphere continues to deepen. Agreements have been signed on securities prospectuses (22 December 2024); on cooperation and the exchange of information, including confidential information, in the sphere of financial market supervision and oversight (6 August 2024); and on the mutual recognition of electronic signatures (4 October 2025). These developments, together with the proposed changes in monetary policy, require a dedicated assessment of the risks they pose to Belarus’s financial and monetary sovereignty. However, certain dangers are already clear.

First, taxation should remain a sphere of exclusive national sovereignty. As noted in my analysis of the previous phase, this sphere has already come under threat, since the administration of indirect taxes no longer falls within Belarus’s exclusive national competence. As such, the strategic direction ‘**Coordinated Tax Policy and Cooperation in the Customs Sphere**’ remains a focus of attention. An agreement establishing an integrated system for administering indirect taxes is being implemented in full. A supranational tax committee has been created and is already in operation: its members have been appointed, and its first report was published on 28 May 2025. A review of this report shows that most of the exemptions comprise degrees from Lukashenka granting specific legal entities temporary exemption from VAT or reduced VAT rates. Both the agreement itself and the report make clear which side stands to gain the least from this system.

Another threat to Belarus’s sovereign right to determine the structure of its national tax system is the Kremlin’s desire to bring not only indirect taxes – but also direct taxes – under its remit. However, direct taxes were not included in the second integration plan.

The strategic direction ‘**Common Industrial Policy and Cooperation in Trade**’ is developing fairly rapidly, particularly its industrial component; a corresponding agreement had already been signed during the first phase of integration, on 15 February 2023. To accelerate its implementation, the Supreme State Council adopted the Decree ‘On the Implementation of a Common Industrial Policy’ in 2024. This introduced the concept of a ‘Union State product’. In addition, road maps were developed for microelectronics and machine-tool manufacturing. These are already underway: of the 35 declared product types in microelectronics, 17 have reportedly entered mass production. These programmes are clearly geared towards import substitution and are most likely intended to serve military procurement needs.

8. ‘On the Main Areas for Implementing the Provisions of the Union Treaty for 2024–2026’ (Ob osnovnykh napravleniakh realizatsii polozhenii Dogovora o sozdanii Soiuznogo gosudarstva na 2024–2026 gody) Source: 31 January 2024

Within industrial policy, I treat **aircraft** manufacturing separately. Cooperation is taking place in the production of PD-14 and PD-35 engines for the MS-21 and Su-57. This, too, is geared towards import substitution and participation in Russian military-related projects.

One of the few achievements of the Lukashenka administration has been the Agreement '**On the Mutual Recognition of Bank Guarantees for Public Procurement**'. The Belarusian side had insisted on gaining access to this market. Still, the risks associated with this type of integration require closer assessment.

Agricultural policy has not yet come under strong pressure from the Union State, although my assessment is based primarily on developments in the legislative and regulatory sphere.

A particularly serious threat is posed by the strategic direction '**Unified Energy Markets and the Safety of Economic Facilities Using Nuclear Energy**'. What makes this area dangerous is that Lukashenka's declared 'national interests' function as a 'carrot' that can be traded for concessions on elements of national sovereignty. This is exactly what happened in the case of indirect taxes and temporary compensation for the tax manoeuvre.

In February 2024, it was decided that **the unified gas market** would be launched first, with the unified electricity market to follow. Lukashenka clearly had an interest in a unified gas market. However, the plan later changed: in December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty 'On the Creation of a Unified Electricity Market', which entered into force in December 2025, and the creation of the gas market was postponed, as was the introduction of a unified market for oil and petroleum products, which has now been deferred until 1 January 2027.

The strategic direction '**Safety of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant**' also requires separate consideration. On 29 January 2024, a Memorandum on Deepening Strategic Cooperation was signed that raised the possibility of creating a research nuclear reactor. It is also known that nuclear waste is to be stored on Belarusian territory rather than being removed. This raises several safety concerns: first, how is the storage of spent nuclear fuel to be regulated? Second, what exactly are the implications of the plan to build a research nuclear reactor? Could all this mark the beginning of a national nuclear programme of a non-peaceful nature? It should be noted that Lukashenka himself appears to have a direct interest in developing this area.

Another factor driving dependence is the strategic direction '**Unified Transport System**'. EU and US sanctions against Belarus, together with broader policies of isolation, have redirected Belarusian exports towards Russian seaports. This has deepened Belarus's infrastructural dependence. In 2023, shipments of Belarusian goods to Russian seaports increased by 2.3 times; in the first half of 2024, they rose by a further 22.5%. These shipments mainly comprise petroleum products and potash fertilisers, amounting to 6.3 million tonnes in petroleum products in 2023; 4.3 million tonnes in petroleum products in 2024; and 16 million tonnes in 2025 (for all goods combined, but the majority were petroleum products).

In addition, Belarus's dependence in the transport sphere has been codified through the signing of the Agreement '**On International Road Transport**' on 18 April 2025, which provides for traceability and control across the entire territory of Belarus and Russia. Notably, it was the Belarusian side that delayed the signing of this document.

A distinctive feature of the second plan was the inclusion of fundamentally new strategic directions of 'integration', covering a common information space, the cultural-humanitarian and scientific-technical spheres, youth policy, and the formation of a common legal space.

In pursuit of the creation of a common information space, the following steps have already been taken.

1. An Information Security Concept was drafted and adopted on 22 February 2023. This document deals not only with technological issues but also with ideological ones, including media policy, the coordination of broadcasting, and 'counteracting the destruction of the values system';
2. At Lukashenka's initiative, a Union State media holding was created on 5 November 2024, incorporating a television channel, a radio station, and three regular print publications.

It is clear that this area is ideological in nature. It is aimed at coordinating propaganda narratives and even at creating a single structure for their dissemination.

The strategic direction ‘**Shared Scientific and Technological Space**’ is based on the Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development for 2024–2035. Its key objectives include 1) import substitution, for which the concept of ‘technological sovereignty’ was introduced; 2) a strong focus on military-industrial sectors; and 3) the establishment of a Centre for Nuclear Technologies. As noted above in the discussion of common industrial policy, microelectronics and machine-tool manufacturing have been identified as priority areas. Given its Soviet legacy and the inclusion of certain former-Soviet industrial enterprises, research institutes, and laboratories, this strategic direction appears from the outset to have been heavily oriented towards military purposes. In my view, the danger here lies in the fact that scientific and technological institutions and human resources in Belarus are becoming increasingly integrated with their Russian counterparts. They may subsequently become de-facto advocates of a military, technological, and even political union with Russia, since their main clients are Russian enterprises and corporations.

Within the strategic direction ‘**Cultural and Humanitarian Sphere**’, the greatest danger lies in the coordination of history policy and the intrusion of ideological narratives from Russia. The ideology of the Russian World poses the most serious threat to national identity, including cultural identity. Belarusian experts⁹ have noted an unprecedented level of activity in 2024 by Russian soft-power institutions in Belarus, including Rossotrudnichestvo, Russian Houses, the Gorchakov Fund, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation.

In terms of **history policy**, common curricula and history textbooks¹⁰ are being developed that aim to subsume the history of Belarus into the history of the ‘triune Russian people’. Another important ideological focal point is the interpretation and presentation of the events of the Second World War. The significance of this area is underscored by the establishment and work of the History Commission, headed by Vladimir Medinsky and Igor Sergeenko. According to experts¹¹, there is a danger that important events and figures in Belarusian national history could be reassessed in a negative light. For example, Kastus Kalinouski could be equated with Stepan Bandera within the Russian ideological narrative. At the same time, some signs of sabotage can be observed. For instance, common textbooks have not been introduced into the education system at the programme level, and Dmitry Medvedev’s calls to mark the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth have been ignored.

Young people are of particular interest to Union State ideologues. In October 2025, a draft Youth Policy Strategy was presented, which places emphasis on joint youth festivals and centres for civic-patriotic education. Such centres have already been established and are operating in Brest and Volgograd.

Last but not least is the strategic direction ‘**Common Legal Space for the Union State**’. During the period under review, the Agreement ‘On the Procedure for the Mutual Use of Court Decisions of the Courts of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus’ was signed on 18 December 2024 and entered into force on 28 May 2025. Another step in this area was the creation of joint lists of extremists and extremist resources, initiated by Dmitry Krutoi, Belarus’s ambassador to Russia, on 6 February 2024. This marked the beginning of the legal codification of transnational repression.

Military-political ‘integration’ should be considered separately, but one point must be stressed here: the most dangerous document for the future of an independent Belarus is the signed and ratified Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State¹². It introduces the concept of a common defence space and includes provisions justifying the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Article 2 – which envisages possible intervention in the event of a threat to the constitutional order – was softened in the final version. The original draft had been significantly harsher.

9. Tserashkovich, Pavel: ‘The Ideology of the “Russian World” and Belarusian Public Opinion’ (Ideologiya ‘ruskaga svetu’ i belaruskaya hramadskaya dumka) Source: Free Belarus Center, 24 December 2024

10. ‘Joint Russian–Belarusian History Books Co-Authored by BSU Scholars Were Presented in Moscow’ (Sovmestnye rossiisko-belorusskie knigi po istorii s avtorskim uchastiem uchyonikh BGU prezentovali v Moskve) Source: BSU, 17 April 2024

11. Bernstein, Daria: ‘Professor: The Entire History of Belarus Could be Revised’ (Professor: Vsia istoriia Belarusi mozhet byt’ peresmotrena) Source: DW, 22 February 2024

12. ‘Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the Framework of the Union State’ (Dogovor mezhdru Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Belarus o garantiakh bezopasnosti v ramkakh Soiuznogo gosudarstva) Source: 6 December 2024

CONCLUSIONS

1. A number of 'strategic directions' were set out in the second phase of integration (2024–2026) based on 28 road maps laid out in the first phase (2021–2023). Analysis shows that integration continues to deepen consistently and fairly intensively, and dependence has accelerated. This applies to several strategically important areas of state governance and the wider economy, including joint macroeconomic planning, convergence in the financial and banking sphere, indirect taxation, common industrial policy, the creation of a unified energy market, and a unified transport system. Developments in the taxation, industrial, and energy sectors pose particular risks to sovereignty.
2. Integration has a distinctly militarised character. It is advancing most intensively in areas linked to the military-industrial complex or military-strategic cooperation. This covers import substitution in microelectronics, aircraft manufacturing, and nuclear research.
3. Russian diplomacy is known for 'package deals'. These have been applied not only in an 'oil for taxes' formula, but also in a new version: 'gas for a unified electricity market'. In the latter case, the danger is clear: it threatens to destroy the autonomy of Belarus's electricity system.
4. It is important to note that there has been no movement at all on resolving social and labour issues. This reveals the true purpose of the Union State project: absorption, militarisation, and the securing of Russia's 'strategic advantage' vis-à-vis Europe.
5. The new 'strategic directions' introduced in the second plan — like a common information policy, a shared scientific and technological space, a shared cultural and humanitarian space, youth policy, and the formation of a common legal space — pose dangers to Belarusian society as a national community capable of independent self-identification. This is evident in the coordination and creation of common ideological narratives with Russian propagandists, in historical policy, in the merging of scientific and technological spheres, and in the aggressive ideology of the Russian World.
6. There are signs of resistance, including in important areas such as taxation and monetary policy. There may also be resistance in the sphere of military-political integration. Signs of sabotage are visible in the stalled promotion of the ideology of the Russian World. Common textbooks have not been introduced, and certain initiatives coming from senior Russian officials have been ignored.
7. Although Belarus's growing dependence on Russia is accelerating, the process still appears reversible, and restoration of sovereignty can still be achieved. Promising signs include the Lukashenka administration's refusal to allow direct taxes at this stage, as well as the softened provisions of the Treaty on Security Guarantees.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Reopen more border crossings**, especially given the deepening of transport isolation and the decline in passenger flows towards Europe. To accommodate the securitisation policies pursued by neighbouring EU states, this issue could be prioritised for specific groups, including young people, workers in sectors where there are labour shortages, and participants in academic and educational exchange programmes.
2. **Increase scholarship programmes and transition to electronic visa formats**. This would help mitigate the influence of the Russian World and reinforce a European orientation.
3. **Monitor changes in the legislative and regulatory framework of the Republic of Belarus**. Stakeholders should identify institutions, agencies, and communities that support the preservation of national independence – including regional elites in border areas and bureaucrats within specific ministries.
4. **Make the IAEA aware of Lukashenka’s intention to establish a Nuclear Research Centre**. Nuclear safety experts should provide a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of launching a national nuclear programme.
5. **Conduct a strategic assessment of the situation and arrange consultations on reducing transport isolation**.
6. **Support educational and cultural initiatives aimed at creating content in the Belarusian language**. Also, foster open dialogue on historical memory with Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.

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