Victoria Leukavets, Centre for Baltic and East European SПtudies, Södertörn University

For more than three decades, Sweden has been one of the most consistent supporters of democracy, human rights and civil society in Belarus. Since the 2020 presidential election and the subsequent repression, Swedish engagement has expanded to include political support for Belarusian democratic forces, independent media, research and policy dialogue.

After the Swedish parliamentary elections on 13 September 2026, the main question is not whether Sweden will continue to support democratic Belarus, but how it will organise that support. A change of government is unlikely to alter Sweden’s overall position, but it could affect key institutions, especially the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and the wider support architecture built over the past three decades.

Sweden’s Long-standing Support for Belarus

Among the Nordic and Baltic countries, Sweden occupies a unique position in its engagement with Belarus. Since the early years of Belarusian independence in 1991, successive Swedish governments have combined a principled defence of democracy and human rights with long-term investments in civil society, independent education and democratic institutions. 

The events of 2020 fundamentally transformed both the scale and the character of Swedish engagement. Following the fraudulent presidential election and the unprecedented repression that followed, Sweden quickly rejected the official election results, supported European Union sanctions against the Lukashenka regime and established close contacts with the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine further reinforced Belarus’s significance in Swedish foreign policy. As Belarus became increasingly integrated into Russia’s military and security structures, developments in Minsk ceased to be viewed solely through the prism of democracy and human rights, but also through the prism of regional security and the stability of the Baltic Sea region. Following Sweden’s accession to NATO in 2024, this strategic dimension became even more pronounced.

What distinguishes Sweden, however, is not simply its political position towards Belarus but the breadth of actors involved in implementing it. Government institutions, development agencies, political foundations, universities, think tanks and civil society organisations each perform different but complementary functions. This institutional diversity has created one of Europe’s most comprehensive support systems for the Belarusian democratic movement.

The Swedish Government Policy

The Swedish government has provided the political framework for this broader network. Regardless of political affiliation, successive governments have maintained a consistent policy of supporting democracy, respecting human rights, and showing solidarity with Belarusian civil society. Sweden has remained among the strongest advocates of sanctions against the Lukashenka regime while consistently distinguishing between the Belarusian authorities and Belarusian society.

A key step was creating a dedicated diplomatic position responsible for Belarus and the Eastern Partnership in 2023. Christina Johannesson became Sweden’s first Ambassador and Special Envoy for the Eastern Partnership and Belarus, signalling that Stockholm regarded Belarus as requiring sustained diplomatic attention. Her successor, Patrik Svensson, has continued this work in 2025, coordinating Sweden’s regional engagement while maintaining regular dialogue with Belarusian democratic representatives and European partners.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has complemented these diplomatic efforts by supporting conferences in 2024 and 2026, policy dialogues and international meetings devoted to Belarus. Organised in cooperation with Swedish research institutions, these initiatives have brought together policymakers, academics and representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement, helping to ensure that Belarus remains on the European political agenda.

Investing in Belarusian Society

If the Ministry for Foreign Affairs provides the political direction, Sweden has built its long-term influence through investments in Belarusian society itself. The principal instrument for this work has been the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which for many years has financed democratic development, independent expertise, higher education and civil society rather than cooperating directly with the Belarusian state.

Following the 2020 crackdown, Sida adapted quickly to the realities of exile. Assistance increasingly focused on organisations operating from neighbouring countries. Rather than funding isolated projects, Swedish assistance has sought to preserve institutions and professional communities that can contribute to a future democratic Belarus.

Among the most important beneficiaries has been BEROC, whose research has become an indispensable source of independent analysis of the Belarusian economy. Sweden has also long supported the European Humanities University in Vilnius, enabling thousands of Belarusian students to continue receiving independent higher education after the university was forced to leave Minsk.

Civil society cooperation has similarly relied on long-term partnerships. Through organisations such as ForumCiv, Swedish assistance has strengthened local initiatives, human rights organisations and civic activism while maintaining sufficient flexibility to operate under increasingly restrictive political conditions. 

Complementing Sida’s work is the Swedish Institute. Through scholarship programs, leadership initiatives and academic exchanges, the Institute has invested in people rather than projects. Belarusian students, researchers, journalists and young professionals have participated in Swedish Institute programs for many years, creating extensive professional networks that continue to facilitate cooperation. 

This combination of financial assistance, educational cooperation and institutional partnerships has become one of Sweden’s defining strengths. Rather than responding only to immediate crises, Sweden has consistently invested in preserving Belarusian society’s professional, intellectual, and organisational capacity. That approach has enabled many Belarusian institutions not simply to survive in exile, but to continue developing expertise, educating new generations of leaders and preparing for a democratic future.

Since taking office in 2022, the centre-right government has introduced significant reforms to Sweden’s development policy, reducing aid budgets and placing greater emphasis on foreign policy, security and national interests. Sida was at the centre of this debate, with some governing parties arguing that its mandate should be substantially reduced or reorganised. For Belarusian organisations, the consequences of such reforms extend well beyond a single funding agency. They affect the broader institutional network that has sustained Belarusian democracy in exile for more than two decades.

Political Foundations, Think-Tanks and Universities

While the government sets political priorities and Sida provides much of the financial support, a network of political foundations has helped sustain Belarusian democratic actors and keep Belarus visible in Swedish public debate. Although affiliated with different political parties, they have generally shared a similar commitment to democratic development in Eastern Europe. The Olof Palme International Centre, closely associated with Sweden’s Social Democratic movement, has long supported political parties, independent trade unions and democratic participation in Belarus. The Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC) has focused on leadership development, political education and organisational support for liberal political parties, youth organisations and civil society initiatives. Their active role was reflected in the Belarusian authorities’ decision to designate SILC an “extremist organisation” on the 23rd of April 2026. The Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, affiliated with Sweden’s Moderate Party, has concentrated on democratic governance, political leadership and parliamentary cooperation.  The Hepatica Foundation, affiliated with the Sweden Democrats, has also contributed to Sweden’s support for democratic Belarus. 

Sweden’s universities and policy institutes have also contributed significantly. As repression has made independent research inside Belarus increasingly difficult, Swedish institutions have become essential platforms for preserving expertise, supporting Belarusian scholars and informing policymaking.

The Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs has a mandate to work on Belarus through its policy briefs, expert commentaries and conferences. At Södertörn University’s Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Belarus has become an important area of research, particularly since 2020. Research projects, conferences, workshops and visiting scholar programs have helped preserve independent Belarusian scholarship while strengthening academic cooperation between Swedish and Belarusian researchers. The Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University has likewise incorporated Belarus into its research and teaching on Eastern Europe, while Belarus has also assumed growing importance at the Swedish Defence University, reflecting Sweden’s changing security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the country’s accession to NATO. 

Collectively, these institutions perform functions that extend far beyond academic research. They help ensure that Belarus remains part of Sweden’s foreign policy conversation even when global attention shifts elsewhere.

The 2026 Elections: What Could Change?

Against this backdrop, the parliamentary elections of 13 September 2026 should not be understood as a referendum on Sweden’s support for Belarus. Broad political consensus exists on the fundamental objectives of Swedish policy: support for Ukraine, sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenka regime, and continued engagement with Belarusian democratic forces. These positions are unlikely to change regardless of which coalition forms the next government.

The more important question concerns how Sweden delivers that support. The current centre-right government has sought to redefine development cooperation as an instrument of foreign and security policy. This has meant lower aid budgets, stronger emphasis on Swedish strategic interests and an ongoing debate about Sida’s future role. Critics argue these reforms risk weakening the institutional foundations of Sweden’s long-term democracy assistance, while supporters contend aid should align more closely with contemporary geopolitical realities.

A centre-left government will probably pursue a different course. Although fiscal constraints would remain, it would likely restore greater emphasis on development cooperation, strengthen Sida’s institutional role, and place renewed priority on civil society, higher education, and international partnerships. For Belarusian organisations, this would provide greater stability, even if it did not result in substantially higher funding levels.

Conclusion

Sweden’s importance for Belarus cannot be measured simply by the size of its development assistance. Its greatest contribution has been building a dense network of institutions that support Belarusian society through diplomacy, education, research, political cooperation, and civil society partnerships. Over time, this has created one of Europe’s most comprehensive systems of engagement with Belarus.

The 2026 parliamentary elections are unlikely to redefine Sweden’s policy towards Belarus. Their significance lies in determining how that policy will be implemented and whether the institutions that have sustained Belarusian democratic forces over the past three decades will continue to receive adequate political and financial support. As Belarus becomes increasingly dependent on Russia while independent actors remain in exile, preserving this institutional architecture will matter greatly. Sweden’s long-term contribution to Belarus will ultimately depend not on a single election result but on its continued willingness to invest in the institutions that have made its engagement distinctive.