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Poland has long been one of the primary targets of Belarusian state propaganda, which accuses Warsaw of so-called “imperial ambitions” and of trying to take control of Belarus by destabilizing the “legitimate” authority of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Naturally, this narrative does not reflect the actual nature of Polish policy. Still, even among the Belarusian political diaspora, there seems to be some confusion about Poland’s actions. That is why it’s worth taking a closer look at the real motives behind Warsaw’s approach to Belarus.
The Priority: Sovereignty
For decades, one key principle has guided the thinking of Poland’s political and intellectual elites regarding Belarus: the need to support an independent Belarusian state — as a sovereign entity distinct from Russia. From Poland’s point of view, the security of its eastern borders can only be ensured if three truly sovereign states exist in the region: Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.
While Lithuania has long since become a member of the EU and NATO, and Ukraine has repeatedly affirmed its pro-European orientation, Belarus, from the very start of its statehood, has remained under the threat of full subordination to the Kremlin’s interests. That’s why, since the early 1990s, Polish diplomacy has consistently supported Belarusian independence through both political statements and concrete proposals for cooperation.
This support for Belarusian statehood remained unchanged despite Lukashenka’s authoritarianism. The approach was based on a realistic calculation: Lukashenka might still be capable of maintaining at least partial autonomy from an increasingly assertive Russia, which seeks to restore its influence over the post-Soviet space. For that reason, Poland attempted to keep channels of dialogue open with the regime in areas where such engagement could help strengthen Belarus’s international agency. At the same time, Warsaw maintained a principled stance in criticizing election fraud, political repression, persecution of civil society, independent media, and the Polish minority.
As a result, by the early 2000s, Polish–Belarusian relations came to exhibit a pattern that to some seemed contradictory or even paradoxical. Despite political tensions and diplomatic crises, economic ties remained strong: trade volume and freight transport were steadily growing, and Polish investment in Belarus, especially in the private sector, continued to expand.
There were also periods of dialogue, especially when relations between Minsk and the West showed signs of thawing. In such moments, Warsaw aimed to offer more ambitious cooperation programs. Notably, it was on Poland’s initiative that the EU’s Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 — with Belarus included in the framework.
In 2020, with strong Polish support, a long-negotiated visa agreement was finalized to lower the cost of Schengen visas for Belarusian citizens, from €80 to €35.That same year, Polish oil companies participated in a landmark project to deliver American crude oil to Belarusian refineries. Symbolically, the second and ultimately final shipment arrived in the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda on August 9, 2020, the day of Belarus’s presidential election that triggered the country’s subsequent political crisis.
The Need to Rethink the Paradigm
The regime’s harsh response to the mass post-election protests prompted the European Union, including Poland, to react decisively. In addition to political condemnation, sanctions were introduced. Minsk’s subsequent hostile actions including the forced landing of a Ryanair plane orchestrated by Belarusian security services, the provocation of a migration crisis, and ultimately its involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, led to even tougher restrictions, including a full embargo on key Belarusian export goods.
It is worth noting that Polish diplomacy played an active role in shaping the EU’s overall position on Belarus and is generally considered a co-creator of the Union’s Eastern policy. Poland’s significant influence in this area, naturally unacceptable to an authoritarian regime, lends greater realism to Brussels’ actions, as it reflects the complex and conflict-ridden situation on the Belarus–EU border, which has now also become the front line of a hybrid war.
Minsk’s actions meant not only the collapse of what had been relatively active bilateral cooperation, but also the need to reassess the entire strategic concept of relations with Belarus. Lukashenka — who not long ago was perceived as a guarantor of the country’s independence — turned within a few months into its greatest threat.
An equally significant factor blocking the possibility of cooperation was the political system’s clear evolution toward totalitarianism, marked by an unprecedented level of repression and the largest number of political prisoners in the country’s history. Lukashenka has repeatedly made it clear that the events of 2020 left him deeply traumatized and that he has no intention of reengaging in any meaningful dialogue with the West — unless it comes with full recognition of his rule.
Polish-Belarusian relations further deteriorated due to a series of hostile actions by Minsk at the bilateral level. Since 2021, the official political course has taken a sharply anti-Polish turn: without any legitimate reason, Andrzej Poczobut, one of the leaders of the Polish minority in Belarus, was arrested and later sentenced to eight years in prison. The Polish community lost most of its schools and classrooms with instruction in the Polish language. In state propaganda, Poland became the main target of a hostile campaign. Additionally, in western Belarus, several Polish military cemeteries were destroyed, all of this occurring (and still ongoing) amid prolonged migration tensions.
These issues have sparked heated debate within Poland. Competing political parties have blamed each other for mistakes and oversights made during different periods in office. Despite such domestic disputes, Poland’s stance on Minsk has remained consistent and coherent.
Under current circumstances, Warsaw has adopted a clear and seemingly well-grounded position of critical patience toward Minsk. At the same time, Polish political elites have not abandoned the idea of an independent Belarus: preserving Belarusian statehood on the European map is regarded in Poland as a self-evident necessity. This conviction has only grown stronger against the backdrop of Russia’s aggressive policies toward the West and its ongoing war in Ukraine. As a result, Poland formed a broad political consensus years ago among major parties regarding the importance of supporting Belarusian democratic initiatives and civil society.
However, that does not mean that all citizens share this openness. According to public opinion surveys conducted in 2023, the Belarusian regime’s support for Russia’s aggression in 2022 contributed to a rise in negative attitudes toward Belarusians among Poles in general.
Prospects for Good Neighborliness
In recent years, Minsk has repeatedly received clear signals about Warsaw’s expectations. The normalization of bilateral relations could only become possible under a few basic conditions: first and foremost, the release of Andrzej Poczobut and an end to the artificially created migration crisis, which is being orchestrated by the Belarusian authorities with active support from Russia.
Unfortunately, as practice shows, even these minimal demands remain unmet. This is due to Belarus’s subordination to Russian interests. Minsk’s actions have become part of Russia’s hybrid war against the West, and any proposals from the regime to “restore dialogue” are now seen as elements of disinformation.
From the Polish perspective, realistic skepticism currently prevails. There is a clear understanding that Lukashenka is unlikely to be a viable party in any talks about a “new beginning” in relations. The true partners for the Polish authorities remain, above all, the democratic forces grouped around Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Despite their imperfections, they share values common to civilized Europe and prioritize their country’s independence above all.
It cannot be ruled out that within the Belarusian state system, there are individuals who think responsibly about the country’s future. Their willingness to engage in dialogue may emerge at a moment of crisis for the regime, for example, in the event of the sudden death of the dictator or a major internal political shift.
Thus, the chances for genuine good neighborliness between Poland and Belarus are not yet lost. The restoration of normal relations requires only strategic patience and adequate partners on both sides of the border, which should be seen not as a frontline in a hybrid war, but as an open bridge between nations.
