Zmitser Mitkevich, journalist for the Belsat TV channel, author for the Veridica project. Analyst in national security and defence.

The growing tension in Eastern Europe, in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions, once again raises the question of a strategic security direction for Belarus in the event of democratisation. An alliance between a democratic Belarus and Russia is almost certainly out of the question. That leaves only two options on the table: neutrality or joining a European defence system within NATO.

The perspective on the choice between these options depends heavily on the scale and timeframe in which we consider it. Focusing on different legal, social and political aspects can lead to different answers. I believe it is crucial to consider the experience of recent years and the current context. The very notion of Belarus’s neutrality — enshrined in the Constitution until 2022 — has already led to consequences that we do not yet know how long we will be dealing with. Moreover, this story is still unfolding. And it now appears that our country will be drawn into further escalation by Moscow against NATO states.

A neutrality that never was

Belarus is not a neutral state. And de facto, it has not been since regaining its independence, as Russian military facilities have been stationed on its territory throughout this time. As early as 1992, the Republic of Belarus joined the Collective Security Treaty, which was later transformed into the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

After 2022, it became impossible to speak of the Republic of Belarus as a sovereign actor in the field of national security and defence. As Russia’s war against Ukraine has progressed, we have witnessed not only a deepening dependence of the Lukashenka regime on Moscow, but also an expansion of Belarus’s state involvement in the Kremlin’s aggressive actions — from schemes for circumventing sanctions in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defence to the involvement of enterprises from both the Belarusian military-industrial complex and the public sector in fulfilling Russia’s “State Defence Order.” Moreover, it has been repeatedly noted that several infrastructure elements on the territory of the Republic of Belarus continue to be used by Russia to carry out air attacks on Ukraine.

The role destined for Belarus in an alliance with Russia

The Russian leadership openly declares its desire not only to continue the war against Ukraine, but also to move towards escalation against NATO countries more broadly. The collapse of the European Union and NATO, as well as the establishment of full political control over Europe, is publicly stated by the Kremlin as a medium-term political objective — and it is precisely for its implementation that the use of the territory of the Republic of Belarus, as well as its human and industrial potential, is envisaged. In its strategic planning, the Kremlin is considering how it should build a new world order, competing with China and the United States in this endeavour. In other words, the de facto conquest of Europe is already regarded there as a done deal.

Belarus is an extremely important platform for Russia’s aggressive policy, from which pressure can be exerted on a whole series of European states, as we are already seeing. And going forward, Moscow calculates that the role of Belarusian territory as a base for creating hybrid threats for European countries will most likely only increase. This involves, at a minimum, conducting intelligence activities from Belarusian territory under the cover of smuggling, information operations, facilitating illegal migration, and using Belarusian citizens to carry out sabotage within the territory of EU countries.

Neutrality from Moscow’s perspective

Even in the event of a ceasefire in the hot phase of Russia’s war against Ukraine, but with the Russian Federation remaining in its current form, neutrality for Belarus is impossible. At present, there is no prospect of any radical changes in Russia’s policy, its structure, or in the very essence of its imperial state mentality. Consequently, the Kremlin simply sees no possibility of neutrality for Belarus.

Even if, for a time, the situation were to arise where Belarus could declare neutrality in name only, Moscow would see this as an invitation to re-establish control over Belarusian territory. Various methods might be employed to this end. Moscow’s formal demand for Ukraine’s neutrality makes it clear what the Kremlin understands by “neutral status.” In essence, this is how Russia seeks to establish full control over key spheres of states’ lives, whilst creating the impression of their “neutrality” and “independence” for the international community. This creates yet another tool for the Kremlin’s hybrid operations across the globe, under the cover of “neutral actors.”

The cost of neutrality

Another question regarding hypothetical neutrality is the financial one. To be able to defeat an adversary such as the Russian Federation — and no other threats to the Belarusian state are apparent in the short to medium term — one must possess many things. This includes the full range of weaponry required for a full-scale military campaign, and the corresponding human potential. In other words, the country needs a system of national defence in which, if necessary, every adult citizen literally takes part in defensive measures.

It is worth emphasising here that today, Belarus’s defence and security expenditure is the lowest among the countries of the region. Even in wartime, Belarus spends around 1.6% of its GDP on defence (approximately 1% of GDP until 2022). By comparison, neighbouring Poland — significantly wealthier and larger — has increased its military spending to 4.5% of GDP (from around 2% before the Russo-Ukrainian War). For the warring parties Ukraine and Russia, this indicator currently stands at 40% and 7.5% of GDP, respectively. In absolute terms, Belarus’s defence expenditure today amounts to approximately 1.2% of Russia’s, 2.4% of Ukraine’s, and 4.3% of Poland’s. Even Lithuanian and Latvian defence spending exceeds that of Belarus. Consequently, even a hypothetical significant increase in defence spending in absolute terms would not allow Belarus to approach the level of expenditure necessary to defend itself from Russia. Moreover, it is most likely that Belarus would simply be unable to afford a significant increase in military spending.

What should a democratic Belarus do?

The examples of Moldova, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Georgia, and now Ukraine, all clearly demonstrate that without a strong alliance — at the very least with neighbouring countries — it is simply impossible to successfully defend against Russian aggression without losing territory, people, and part of one’s sovereignty. From this perspective, the aspiration to join a pan-European security system is, for Belarus, simply a matter of state survival.

At the same time, this is also important for Europe as a whole — primarily from a geographical point of view. Depriving the Russian Federation of the strategic balcony from which it projects threats across the entire eastern part of the continent would make defence significantly simpler. This is relevant both during a period of hybrid aggression from the Kremlin and in the event of a possible escalation of the conflict into an outright military dimension — since it would almost halve the length of the border that Europe would have to defend.

Moreover, Belarus has considerable potential in its military-industrial complex. This could allow Belarusian enterprises to be integrated into pan-European supply chains for the benefit of the common security and defence system. This would be beneficial both for the Belarusian economy and for Western countries: the cost of certain types of weaponry would be significantly reduced, and Belarus would have the opportunity to gain access to new markets and technologies.

Conclusions

Any discussion about the possible direction for Belarus in ensuring its future security must take into account the experience of Russia’s current aggressive policy. Whilst the Lukashenka regime actively participates in Moscow’s military adventures, Belarusian democratic forces must, on the contrary, make every effort to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic community and insist on the necessity of including Belarus in a single European security system. Such an aspiration is absolutely logical both from the perspective of the current situation and in terms of strategic planning.