The global geopolitical shift presents not only challenges for Belarus, but also new opportunities.
In a world where international politics is once again revolving around great-power rivalry, the importance of border regions — including Belarus — may grow, not only as spaces of decline, but also as zones of competition, engagement, and influence.
The Rules Are Changing
Since the rise of Donald Trump, the United States, previously a leading promoter of liberal values on the global stage, has retreated from this strategy. Trump’s political circle leans more toward the worldview of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, which asserts that major powers make the rules — they take key political and economic decisions — while less powerful states are forced to adapt.
At the heart of this new global order lies strategic competition between the United States and China. Russia, which lags both in economic and technological terms and in its overall global influence, has deliberately taken on the role of a destabilizing force, primarily in Europe, where it launched the largest war since World War II.
In this new “era of spheres of influence,” the liberal democracies of the European Union are increasingly setting aside idealistic principles in favor of realpolitik. European countries are cautiously trying to balance their own values with foreign policy interests.
Europe as a Geopolitical Actor
One example of this is the EU’s effort to build a strategic partnership with Turkey to support Ukraine and manage migration flows. To achieve this, the EU softened its criticism of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule. On the one hand, the EU called for the release of opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu from detention; on the other hand, the issue was not central to Brussels–Ankara relations and did not hinder the deepening of cooperation.
A similar shift is evident in relations with African countries: declarations on human rights have given way to pragmatic dialogue aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the region through large infrastructure investments.
The United Kingdom’s new National Security Strategy also reflects this shift. It emphasizes the pursuit of strategic interests, even at the cost of reduced public criticism of countries where fundamental rights and freedoms are violated — for example, regarding press freedom in Hungary.
This evolution does not represent a full rejection of liberal values. Rather, it is an attempt to adapt to a new reality in which the rules are again set by great powers, and influence requires political flexibility. Likewise, Europe’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy should not be misinterpreted as an anti-American stance or an admission of previous dependence on the U.S.
It is, instead, a bid to preserve and strengthen Europe’s own agency amid a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
The European Union is already demonstrating the potential to become an independent geopolitical player on par with the United States and China. Several developments point to this trajectory. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU responded with remarkable speed and unity. Despite internal divisions, member states agreed on sweeping sanctions against Russia, launched macro-financial and military aid programs for Ukraine, and opened the door for Ukraine to obtain EU candidate status. This stands as an example of a prompt and coordinated foreign policy response—especially in contrast to past crises, when the EU was often criticized for sluggishness and fragmentation.
Over the past two years, the EU has also managed to formulate a coherent policy toward China, despite the divergent interests of its member states. Germany relies heavily on export ties with China, while France prioritizes strategic autonomy, and Eastern European countries generally remain cautious of Beijing. In this political mosaic, the EU introduced the concept of de-risking—reducing economic dependency on China without resorting to full decoupling, the radical severing of bilateral economic ties, as promoted by the United States. Recent steps include tighter rules on foreign investment screening, which allow the EU to evaluate and, if needed, restrict Chinese investments in strategically sensitive sectors.
In other words, the EU is gradually learning to act in a more consolidated fashion—even on issues where full consensus is lacking. This is a key milestone on the path to becoming a full-fledged geopolitical actor.
What Holds Europe Back?
However, two systemic challenges stand in the EU’s way:
- the erosion of economic competitiveness
- the rise of far-right and populist political forces.
The first undermines the EU’s global standing, while the second threatens internal cohesion and the political will for bold, unified strategies.
Over the past two decades, the EU’s share of global GDP has declined from 20% to 15%. As former European Central Bank President and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi noted in a special report commissioned by the European Commission, this trend poses a strategic vulnerability beyond just economic concerns. China, for example, perceives the EU as a bloc in gradual decline.
Reversing this trajectory will require decisive and sustained efforts: completing the formation of a single internal economic space—such as the Capital Markets Union; easing regulatory burdens; and increasing investment in digital transformation and the green economy. In parallel, a new industrial policy is needed—one capable of reinforcing technological self-sufficiency and stimulating production.
The EU’s second systemic challenge—the rapid growth of far-right and populist political forces—is driven by a combination of factors: stagnant living standards, economic malaise, anxiety over migration, and frustration with the green agenda, increasingly seen as burdensome and imposed from above.
A steady socio-political demand has emerged in Europe for a tougher, sovereignty-oriented approach — both in domestic and foreign policy. This means that the EU’s climate agenda will likely be softened, while its migration policy, on the contrary, will become increasingly strict. A number of European countries are already turning toward the so-called “Danish model,” which emphasizes deterrence of migration, tight border control, and restrictions on the rights of newcomers.
Following a series of crises — the migration wave, Brexit, the pandemic, and the war in Ukraine — the political will among EU member states to adopt a new overarching treaty has significantly weakened. The EU’s foundational texts — the Lisbon and Maastricht Treaties — required extensive political mobilization for adoption and ratification. Today, any attempt to revisit them raises fears of failed referendums, potential blocking by individual member states, and the threat of internal fragmentation.
As a result, the European Union increasingly seeks to solve internal and foreign policy challenges not through the creation of new institutions, but by maximizing the use of existing rules and mechanisms — despite their known limitations and inconsistencies. This leads to solutions that are slow, fragmented, and lacking in ambition. Yet this process aligns with the current logic of EU governance: gradual steps over bold declarations.
New Models of European Integration?
This current institutional stagnation may lead to a temporary pause in the EU’s enlargement process. Some member states fear that admitting new countries could result in functional paralysis of EU institutions. Others are concerned about the potential financial strain on the common EU budget — for example, the need to redistribute funds from structural programs and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In France — and likely in the Netherlands — accession of any new country would require a national referendum.
At the same time, the EU faces the difficult task of balancing the aspirations of Eastern European states (notably Ukraine and Moldova) with those of the Western Balkans — countries like Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have long awaited clearer integration prospects from Brussels.
Governance quality in candidate countries remains a persistent concern. Despite its heroic resistance in the war, Ukraine displays certain authoritarian governance tendencies. Reforms in Montenegro look successful on paper, but the country still struggles with high levels of corruption.
As a result, full enlargement has taken on a more symbolic character — used more for political rhetoric than as a tool of strategic planning. One potential solution currently under discussion in Brussels is the concept of “associate membership” — allowing countries to participate in the EU’s political and economic frameworks without gaining full voting rights.
Europe Arms Up
Against the backdrop of geopolitical instability and the war in Ukraine, Europe is experiencing an unprecedented surge in defense spending. In 2024, the combined military budgets of EU countries surpassed €300 billion for the first time — and the trend continues to accelerate. For instance, in Germany — where strict caps on defense budgets had long been in place — Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced plans to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2029. Poland has already increased its defense budget to 4% of GDP. France and Italy are ramping up investment in their defense industries, including ammunition and air defense systems. Belgium and the Netherlands are directing resources toward cyber defense, while the Baltic states are expanding NATO military infrastructure.
An additional boost to European defense policy came from the NATO summit held in The Hague in June 2025, where a new set of targets was outlined. Member states are expected to allocate 3% of GDP to “hard” defense (military equipment and capabilities), and another 1.5% to “soft” defense — strengthening societal resilience against hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and energy insecurity.
In parallel with rising defense expenditures, there is a noticeable shift in the balance of power within the EU: Central European countries are gaining influence. Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are now among the main drivers of decision-making — from supplying weapons to Ukraine to shaping sanctions policy. Their experience of proximity to Russia, historical memory, and political will have granted them enhanced moral and strategic authority. This is reflected not only at the bilateral level but also within EU structures, where ministers, diplomats, and policy experts from the region increasingly play a decisive role in formulating collective positions — shaping a new political equilibrium within the Union.
Will There Be a Place for Belarus in Europe?
The return to the logic of spheres of influence and the growing geopolitical agency of Europe present Belarus with a dual set of challenges and opportunities.
On the one hand, the emphasis on realpolitik, coupled with the chronic lack of time and resources in European capitals — where leaders are simultaneously addressing support for Ukraine, strengthening continental security, and managing internal challenges — may push issues of democracy and human rights in Belarus down the agenda. This carries the risk of reduced pressure on the regime and diminishing attention to political prisoners and ongoing repression.
On the other hand, in this new geopolitical logic, Belarus gains strategic importance as part of the frontier zone between the West and Russia. For a Europe seeking greater autonomy in global affairs and investing in its own security, Belarus is not just a problem of Russian influence but also an element of its broader strategy.
This does not imply deep engagement, but rather a long-term approach — supporting civil society, independent media, education, civic initiatives, and the diaspora as agents of soft power. Europe is increasingly looking beyond the frontlines and into the “gray zones,” where influence is exercised without military means. And as long as Belarus remains on the map of perceived threats, it will remain part of Europe’s strategic outlook.
This is why it matters that Belarus is already part of the conversation about Europe’s future. The idea of “associate membership,” which is gaining traction in Brussels, could become a realistic scenario for a future Belarus if the country begins to move toward change.
This would mean participation in the single market, access to EU programs and resources, integration into the energy, digital, and transport frameworks — without voting rights, but with economic and political linkage and institutional presence.
The EU’s recent decisions to grant candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia prove that even under the conditions of war or authoritarian legacy, it is possible to become part of Europe’s architecture through flexible and adaptive integration mechanisms.
Neither an internal authoritarian regime nor Russian influence can override Belarus’s geographic, cultural, and historical proximity to Europe. Belarus remains part of the European space. Even if EU policy is not directly aimed at Belarus, it still affects the country. Decisions taken in Brussels, Warsaw, Vilnius, and Berlin continue to shape Belarus’s strategic horizon.
But these horizons do not open by themselves — they must be claimed: by staying attuned to Europe’s evolving political dynamic, maintaining solidarity and political will, and adhering to the values that underpin the European choice.
Europe is not an abstraction, but a real alternative — one that is just within reach.
