In contemporary international politics, much attention focuses on the erosion of Belarus’s sovereignty and its growing dependence on Russia. When extrapolated into the future, this gives rise to negative scenarios, each bleaker than the last. However, these trends are not set in stone. To reverse these trends, it is worth asking the question in reverse: how can this process be halted and the opposite process, restoring sovereignty and strengthening independence, set in motion? One essential component of this broader question is how Belarus can withdraw from the Union State. Without withdrawing, it is hard to speak seriously about restoring sovereignty.

Why is it important to discuss this question today?

It is a matter of imagining the situation in a way that lets us envisage a positive outlook for Belarus. To build a positive future, we must first and foremost imagine it. Shaping the future is one way of influencing it. 

Let us imagine that Belarus’s political situation is changing for the better and a democratic, pro-European government comes to power. At that moment, how many sceptics, critics, and opponents would ask the key question: how should relations with Russia change? Is the dependence critical – ranging from trade and manufacturing to borders and security? Sovereignty is too fragile. At that moment, the government and society could turn to the experience this kind of scenario-building offers.

Denunciation of the founding treaty via a referendum

The Union State’s legal basis is the 1999 Treaty establishing it. The simplest route may be to denounce this Treaty in accordance with the procedure set out therein. Article 67 of the Treaty provides for withdrawal from the Union State. To do this, a referendum will need to be held. 

This raises an important question: how, and under which Constitution, should the referendum be held? If one relies on the current 2022 Constitution, then, under Article 74, only the President may propose a referendum. He may, in turn, consider a proposal from the House of Representatives or 450,000 voters and approve it. 

Thus, a crucial crossroads arises: to initiate the procedure for withdrawal from the Union State, the constitutional uncertainty must be resolved. Either the procedures set out in the 2022 Constitution should be followed, or amendments must be made to Article 74, or the 2022 Constitution must be declared invalid by virtue of the political circumstances under which it was adopted (mass repression and the suppressed revolution of 2020), and either a new Constitution must be adopted, or one of the previously valid versions must be reinstated.

Let us imagine that, somehow, a referendum has been initiated, and a vote is being prepared. Campaigning for withdrawal from the Union State may require significant political effort under far from ideal conditions. Is there any other way out?

Audit and termination of individual treaties

There may well be such a solution. This involves conducting an audit (or, more precisely, a screening) to identify the most vulnerable areas and focus efforts there. The contractual and legal framework of the modern Union State can be broadly divided into two groups: the first comprises treaties that form part of the Republic of Belarus’s international obligations; the second comprises intergovernmental agreements and resolutions of the Supreme State Council, which do not have the force of law.

For example, all programmes under the “Main Directions for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State,” which were adopted for the periods 2021–2023 and 2024–2026, were not formalised as legislative initiatives and do not constitute obligations towards Russia. Within these programmes, various agreements, resolutions, and treaties have already been signed and are in force. Belarus may unilaterally withdraw from some of them.

However, there is another group that will require a more careful approach. Interstate treaties that have undergone ratification and include their own withdrawal mechanism must be subject to a denunciation procedure. Here, it is important to understand which treaties are in question and what terms and conditions they contain. The most sensitive treaties of this kind for Belarus — those that erode sovereignty and require a denunciation procedure — are:

1. The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State dated 13 March 2025.

This treaty is the most complex and extremely dangerous. It carries the risk of Russian interference in domestic political processes, as well as the possible use of Belarusian territory for military aggression against NATO member states. The document is not linked to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State, so a referendum cannot even repeal it.

Withdrawal from this agreement is possible after 10 years, or it will be automatically renewed. Six months’ notice must be given of any denunciation. Thus, the legal opportunity to withdraw from the obligations will arise in 2035.

2. Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the General Principles of Indirect Taxation dated 3 October 2022.

This agreement is one of the most dangerous to sovereignty, as it aligns Belarusian excise duties and VAT with Russian ones. Furthermore, an integrated system has been established to monitor them. One of a people’s inalienable, sovereign rights is the right to set their own taxes. Interference and regulation in this sphere signal the erosion of sovereignty. For example, EU member states have not gone this far.

States can denounce this agreement three years after it enters into force and must give notice of termination six months before the three-year period expires; otherwise, it renews automatically. If the agreement entered into force in 2023, the procedure will be possible from 2026 onwards, taking into account the three-year period.

3. Agreement on the establishment of a single electricity market.

This agreement is risky given the virtual absence of an electricity market in Belarus. Belarus has no diversity of electricity suppliers. In contrast, Russia has such diversity. Giving them access to the Belarusian market would tie the country to Russia’s orbit in a critically important sector.

The agreement can be withdrawn with six months’ notice. However, terminating the agreement does not affect the fulfilment of obligations under contracts concluded by entities within the unified market. Ultimately, the key issue is not so much the denunciation of the agreement as the termination of the contracts signed by specific entities.

4. The Agreement on the Harmonisation of Customs Legislation and Cooperation in the Customs Sphere of 4 March 2022.

The agreement is concluded for a period of five years with automatic renewal. To withdraw from it, the Russian side must be given six months’ notice. Consequently, we can note the possibility of termination in 2027 and every five years thereafter.

The list provided is not exhaustive. If such a scenario arises, it is important to audit the legal and contractual framework governing Belarusian-Russian relations within the Union State. Furthermore, the government should carry out preparatory work to ensure that sectors affected by any treaty subject to denunciation do not suffer — energy, taxation, customs duties, and finance.

The Chinese tactic or quiet sabotage

It may be worth taking a closer look at the third option. For example, Kazakhstan has deliberately held back the development of the EAEU project since 2020. Tokayev did not support the EAEU Development Strategy, which called for strengthening supranational institutions. Such behaviour can be described as a “Chinese tactic”: avoiding sudden shifts to avoid upsetting the balance, while also refraining from deeper involvement. In Belarus’s case, this tactic could be used to halt institutional convergence and bide one’s time until favourable conditions for withdrawal arise — through sabotage of intergovernmental agreements and gradual preparation for denunciation. Moreover, such tactics are nothing new to the Belarusian establishment: they were practised before 2020. Another issue is that, in this case, the situation is more likely to be frozen than resolved: waiting for favourable conditions for withdrawal may drag on or, conversely, unfavourable conditions may arise.

Conclusions:

Withdrawal from the Union State is possible via three routes: a referendum on repealing the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State; denunciation of inter-state treaties and withdrawal from signed agreements; the “Chinese tactic.”

1. The first route is a radical political one.

It is possible in the event of a drastic change in the political regime and geopolitical orientation and involves:

• Initiating and holding a referendum on the termination of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State.
• Early withdrawal from the Treaty on Security Guarantees or upon the expiry of the 10-year term in 2035.

2. The second route is the step-by-step denunciation of individual, particularly sensitive treaties.

This is possible in the event of a bureaucratic transition in favour of nationally oriented leaders and entails:

• Refusal to comply with the most dangerous intergovernmental agreements.
• Preparation of procedures to denounce inter-state treaties upon expiry of their terms (3 to 5 years), as well as upon expiry of electricity supply contracts,
• Termination of the Treaty on Security Guarantees upon expiry of 10 years.

3. The third route — the “Chinese tactic.”

This can be viewed as a path of “soft and gradual separation” from Russia, whilst waiting for a favourable international situation to denounce treaties and hold a referendum. It entails:

• Abandoning further development of the Union State project.
• Withdrawing from the implementation of decisions at the intergovernmental level.
• Establishing a new system of relations with neighbours and Europe.