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The conflict between Russia and the West—particularly the Russian-Ukrainian war—continues to shape Belarusian politics. How protracted will this confrontation be, and how will the war in Ukraine end? Is another round of dialogue between the West and Lukashenka hopeless—or should we wait it out? The editor of the Ideas Bank speaks with Maksim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

R.A.: While preparing for this, I watched a few of your interviews. They all start with the interviewer admitting you were right—you publicly said in advance that Russia would launch a full-scale war against Ukraine.

M.S.: I only give interviews to media that start exactly like that (laughs).

R.A.: Out of curiosity, I looked back at our messages from December 2021. At the time, we were discussing whether there would be a war, and I’ll give you credit—you had a much clearer understanding of why Russia, the Kremlin, or Putin needed this war.

M.S.: Russia and the Russian elite didn’t need it at all. Putin simply said so, and he’s treated like a natural disaster. There’s no point in telling a flood, “don’t flood.” If your basement is filling with water, you’ll be stacking sandbags, not reasoning with the storm. That’s more or less how Russian society and the elite perceive Putin.

Everyone has grown so accustomed to following orders without question that even such a mad decision—which no one but him liked—simply passed without resistance. And why did Putin need it? There are three levels of motivation here.

First, his obvious personal obsession with Ukraine which has intensified over the last twenty-five years. He’s spent all these years trying to “solve the Ukrainian problem,” and his actions only made things worse. So he decided he wanted to settle it once and for all.

Second, the Kremlin has no plans or strategies for anything else, so Putin treats war as a one-size-fits-all solution. If Ukraine is defeated, all other problems will solve themselves. As crazy as this idea is, it’s not entirely divorced from reality. If Russia defeats Ukraine, then, for example, the question of obedience across the post-Soviet space would resolve itself automatically. If even Ukraine—despite all the Western support—ends up crushed, what could Kazakhstan, Armenia, or Belarus possibly hope for?

M.S.:
Moreover, this war exacerbates contradictions between China and the United States and ties China more closely to Russia and its anti-American course. It portrays the West as hypocritical in the eyes of the “Global South,” pushing those countries toward a more West-skeptical stance.

This dynamic works domestically as well. For a long time, the authorities wondered how to make business patriotic. The moment Western sanctions were imposed—so suffocating it left no breathing room—everyone suddenly became a patriot.

Wanted to bring back a sense of honor to the Russian elite, to make them fear for their careers and be personally accountable? There you go: ministers are shooting themselves before arrest, Timur Ivanov gets thirteen years in prison despite his seemingly endless billions, and Shoigu is trembling that he might be next.

Wanted to reorient trade toward Asia? There it is, it reoriented itself—thanks to sanctions, diversification, and the break from dependence on Europe, which has happened at record speed.

In other words, war solves Vladimir Putin’s problems—or at least, that’s how he sees it. Of course, on the one hand, this is intellectual laziness—he simply doesn’t want to think through other problems. But on the other hand, if you look at things selectively, it’s easy to find enough signs in reality to confirm that problems are, in fact, being solved. For example, Putin simply blocks out the loss of Syria—that’s something best not to think about.

R.A.: And the third level?

M.S.: Third—legacy. I don’t think he consciously thinks of it this way, but the war undoubtedly preserves his legacy. After all, you can’t return to normal life, even if hostilities stop. There are these annexed territories, sanctions, and new citizens who—at least for the rest of the world—are not considered Russian citizens at all. How do you undo all of that? It’s so complicated that the only option left is to preserve it all for the next generation of leadership. Along with the ideas, an entire elite class gets preserved—one that has grabbed everything it can and is now grooming its children to inherit. Overall, it’s a comfortable climate: the war is heroic, veterans are marching, pioneers are back.

So, there are three layers of motivation. But these are Vladimir Putin’s layers—not Russia’s as a whole.

R.A.: Sounds like there’s no reason to stop. Let the veterans keep marching forever.

M.S.: I wouldn’t rule out Putin taking a pause for a few years at some point. But full subjugation of Ukraine remains his top priority. Until he gets what he wants, he won’t stop. And once he does, then we’ll likely see something like Transnistria or a corridor to Kaliningrad next.

M.S.:
I wouldn’t call it a perpetual war—it may be endless escalations. One moment, things explode; then they settle down and give you a breather. And then it flares up again, at a new level of escalation. But ultimately, it’s like hopping across ice floes: to maintain the status quo, we constantly have to raise the level of escalation.

R.A.: A march on the Suwałki Corridor—why not?

M.S.: I don’t see why not. In fact, I can already imagine how to frame it so it appears inevitable. As if, “Russia has no choice.” “Look what’s happening—Kaliningrad is being isolated, Lithuania is behaving disgracefully, Estonia is inspecting tankers, they’re arming up. If they keep this up, they’ll conquer Kaliningrad in a few years unless we strike first. We must seize the initiative—otherwise, we risk losing Kaliningrad.”

Especially when the U.S. is showing less and less interest in what’s happening in Europe.

After Ukraine, the next escalation is inevitable—and it’s likely to happen in Europe. Not just possible—inevitable.

R.A.: If we’re talking about the Suwałki Corridor, then we probably have to bring up Belarus. Again—through us?

M.S.: I don’t know exactly how the Suwałki Corridor scenario would play out—or even if it would be that corridor specifically. There are too many unknowns, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Ukraine certainly has many problems, but a decisive Russian victory is not yet in sight. And as long as the “Ukrainian problem” remains unresolved from Putin’s perspective, there’s no bandwidth for corridors.

But if Belarus suddenly becomes necessary, what role would it play? The same role it played in 2022. Russia will do what it wants, and Belarus will say it had no other choice. Realistically, what room for maneuver does the Belarusian leadership have? Regardless of who’s in power at the time.

R.A.: Say no?

M.S.: And how would they say no? Throw themselves under Russian tanks? Of course not. All they can do is join in and try to dodge the worst consequences. Essentially, it’s the same thing we’ve already seen. I see no lever that would give them a real choice.

R.A.: If the West decided to create some kind of lever and pull Lukashenko out from under Putin, what might that look like?

M.S.: Why pull Lukashenka out from under Putin in the first place? What would that ultimately achieve? Endless attempts to drag him away from Putin have gone on for decades. Maybe instead of launching another round of futile efforts, it’s worth stopping to ask: what exactly do you want to accomplish? And once you figure that out, you might find alternative ways to achieve the same goal.

A few possible goals come to mind, and perhaps it’s worth establishing a hierarchy between them.

Of course, we’d like to see Belarus become an independent, democratic, European country—not Russia’s military foothold, but a new EU member. Something like Slovakia on Europe’s eastern frontier. The key question is: what matters most in this vision? Independence from Russia? Democracy? Economic sovereignty? Once you’ve decided on your priorities, you can think about which tools to use.

If your goal is to weaken Russia, then maybe there’s no need to pry Belarus away—instead, push it deeper in so it becomes a deadweight drain for Russian subsidies.

If your aim is to avoid Russian Iskanders on Poland’s border, then maybe it makes more sense to talk not to Lukashenka, but to Putin. Instead of propping up Lukashenko just enough for him to give up the Iskanders, you might negotiate directly with Putin: we’ll pull missile systems from Romania, you pull yours from Belarus.

R.A.: So you’re against another round with  Lukashenka?

M.S.: Securing the release of political prisoners is unquestionably good, right, and worthwhile. But beyond that, it’s a helpless and hopeless idea. So he eases up on repression a bit, we ease up on pressure, things start to stir again, then he flips out and cracks down, we impose sanctions again, he jails new political prisoners… You can’t keep walking in circles like that forever. Each time it ends worse than the last. That’s if your goal is a democratic Belarus. But if your goal is to preserve Belarus’s national identity project, then maybe  Lukashenka  is worth tolerating—or even helping.

In any case, it’s clear we can’t have it all at once: a Belarus independent from Russia, with a market economy, without  Lukashenka, democratic, in the EU, and without Russian weapons. You have to pick one priority and build policy and instruments around it. Not try to get everything by lifting sanctions in exchange for a slightly lighter touch on repression.

That doesn’t mean the fight for political prisoners isn’t necessary—it’s a good goal in its own right. But we shouldn’t lose sight of the main objective. Why are we trying to pry  Lukashenka away from Putin in the first place? Maybe our goals could be reached by bypassing Lukashenko altogether.

By the way, here’s another key issue with “pulling Belarus away”: the West keeps trying to do it without taking any real risks. We want to protect human rights in Belarus using, at most, a few sanctions, and mainly just press releases.

If you’re dealing with a regime like this and aren’t even willing to show a modest demonstration of force, then why be surprised when it keeps dragging you around in circles decade after decade? If you draw red lines and issue dramatic warnings backed only by hollow threats—like selling potash to China instead of Lithuania—what are you expecting?

 Lukashenka doesn’t care where the potash goes. What he cares about is power. And if you want to negotiate with him effectively, you’ll need to risk something more than just cheap potash.

R.A.: Such as?

M.S.: Being willing to use force. Because people like that only understand the language of force. Why is it so easy for Putin to talk to him? Whatever they talk about, Putin always gets what he wants. Because it’s clear what happens if you seriously disobey. As long as the West shows no willingness to operate at that level of risk, there’s no reason to be surprised when it’s ignored.

If Belarus really matters to you, it might be time to go beyond press releases and show Lukashenko that he can be slapped on the wrist—or harder.

After all, he actually believes in all that NATO invasion stuff. The nuclear weapons deployment—that’s fear for his own skin. The ground is already fertile for fear, it just needs more convincing threats.

R.A.: Everyone’s afraid to scare him.

M.S.: If you’re afraid to scare him, maybe you shouldn’t be involved in the issue at all?

R.A.: That’s probably how they see it. We still haven’t said the word “Trump,” and yet at this stage of the war, he’s probably the most important figure. How does he see this war?

M.S.: I can’t read his mind, but from the looks of it, he sees a country of 35 million going up against a country of 150 million. He compares their armies, their mobilization and economic potential, their weapons production, and concludes that Ukraine is a losing bet.

His main objective is not to be associated with the war. If he starts helping Ukraine, it becomes his war. But if he doesn’t, then he has a chance to bail out and say, “I did everything I could for peace,” and in any case, this is Biden’s war. He keeps repeating that to make sure no one associates him with Ukraine’s defeats. His top priority is to avoid being sucked into the war.

Not in the sense of direct American military involvement, but reputationally. He doesn’t want the war to drag on long enough to become “his war.” These are primitive, but rational, priorities. If it can’t be stopped, then he wants to distance himself as far and as quickly as possible.

R.A.: Judging by where we are now, could the war drag on for years and end in Ukraine’s defeat?

M.S.: I don’t think it will last for years—that’s too long. It’s hard to keep fighting without a plan for victory.

If real aid doesn’t come, it will have a fatal effect on Ukrainian society, the elite, and the military. It’s one thing to fight when you feel the entire power of the West is behind you. And the enemy is just some kleptocratic regime that’s bound to collapse if you can hold on a little longer.

It’s another thing entirely when you’re told, “Your war doesn’t interest us—we have other matters.” And the Europeans? They just hold Zoom meetings. At first, they promise tens of thousands of peacekeepers along the front lines. Then it’s no longer tens of thousands—just thousands, and not on the front lines but somewhere in the rear. Then it’s just a no-fly zone. Then probably not even that—maybe they’ll just help you build drones together.

And Putin hasn’t even done anything to force this backslide—they’re sliding downhill all on their own. Who knows where they’ll end up?

R.A.: So what does the endgame of the war look like for Russia?

M.S.: This is “Frontline  Plus” for Putin. And the “plus” is not just Ukraine staying out of NATO  —NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table for now—it means something more concrete. He wants the fighting to stop along the current front line and to gain some additional concessions.

R.A.: And who is supposed to offer this “plus”—the West or Ukraine?

M.S.: Depends on how it unfolds. From Ukraine’s side, it could be an agreement to hold elections. The Kremlin still seems to believe that if elections are held the way it wants them, it can bring a pro-Russian government to power. At 75, convictions rarely change. Putin has always believed that if you hold “real” elections in Ukraine, Medvedchuk would win. Everyone else understands how insane that is—but there’s one person who doesn’t. And his opinion matters more than anyone else’s.

Other concessions might include military restrictions—bans on buying or receiving Western weapons. What I fear is that Ukraine may end up negotiating one-on-one. The U.S. is already stepping away from this “coalition of the willing,” and Europe may simply respond with symbolic gestures, like a tweet.

And if it does come down to serious one-on-one negotiations in a grim military situation for Ukraine, it could be another Minsk, like in 2015. You could imagine a scenario where the Ukrainian leadership simply has no choice but to sign a ceasefire agreement under conditions such as granting special status to the Russian language, reinstating the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, holding new elections, and so on. Not because they plan to implement it all—but because there’s no other option. And then the entire agreement would begin to unravel once more.