This translation was generated using artificial intelligence. We strive for accuracy and quality, but automated translations may contain errors. You can read the original text here.
Our chances of becoming a successful country — at least to some extent — depend on whether we can find the right answers to the questions of the new era.
Five years ago, the concept of a “New Belarus” was seen by a significant part of society as an achievable goal. Later, it became a dream that gradually faded, and now here we are: the likelihood that Belarus will soon embark on the path of democratization due to public pressure is extremely low.
The problem is not just the failure of 2020. The world has changed — or, more precisely, our neighbors and our relationships with them have. We have changed as well: the state of society and the internal balance of power within Belarus have shifted. The questions we once asked ourselves to shape the vision of a democratic Belarus have already lost their relevance.
The landscape in which we and Belarus must move forward has undergone tectonic shifts and continues to do so. In this article, we aim not only to highlight these changes but also to formulate the questions we must consider in this new era.
A Different West
Our generation has become accustomed to seeing the West as a constant: it has always prided itself on democracy and promoted a market economy.
However, in today’s world, we are witnessing an ideological crisis of democracy. Democratic aspirations in Second and Third World countries no longer evoke widespread emotional enthusiasm. The Belarusian attempt at a democratic revolution in 2020 may have been the last for a long time to receive broad moral support from the free world.
Today, the prevailing reaction is more along the lines of: “Strange people — they are fighting for something that doesn’t even work well for us anymore.” The free world is unlikely to support the expansion of democracy abroad — at least not until it revitalizes democracy within its own borders. Against this backdrop, the space for humanitarianism and emotional solidarity, where Belarusian pro-democratic actors once operated, is shrinking.
Should democracy remain the primary banner of Belarusian democratic forces? Should we continue to rely on emotions and build a demand for solidarity? Or should we instead adopt a cold, calculated approach that allows us to transition into the “world of deals”? If so, how do we enter that space, and what exactly would be up for negotiation?
The ideological and value crisis of democracy is accelerating the onset of an era dominated by new mercantilism, with technological nationalism as its central doctrine.
Hyper-globalization and liberal techno-globalism were expected to generate stable and inclusive growth (growth benefiting the poor). However, over the past 15 years, both have failed. Since the Great Recession, growth — especially in developed countries — has significantly slowed and ceased to be sustainable.
Inequality has also changed. While cross-country inequality continues to decrease due to inertia (though not always and not everywhere), the rate of this decline has slowed markedly. This is a bad scenario for both wealthy and poor countries. The former — particularly their middle class — see prolonged convergence as a challenge to their position. For the latter, the slowdown in convergence symbolizes that catching up with developed nations is nearly impossible without altering the fundamental rules of the game.
Moreover, internal inequality within countries has significantly increased. Across the world, the existence of a super-rich class has become increasingly evident. These elites are now more inclined to lobby for not only economic but also political interests. Terms like “Aristocracy 2.0” and “New Oligarchy” are becoming more common.
Against this backdrop, the demand for changing global rules has increased. The dominant paradigm of technological nationalism is becoming evident, likely shaping an era of new mercantilism. In many major countries — China, Russia, India, Iran — this model has already become mainstream. The return of Donald Trump to power in the U.S. is likely to be the final catalyst that cements the era of new mercantilism.
The fundamental principle of this new era is that prosperity depends on controlling key technologies (within specific geographic boundaries). The core principles of the liberal techno-globalist era — efficiency, cost reduction, competition, and international cooperation — are losing relevance. For advanced sectors of the economy, they are being replaced by isolationism and the creation of barriers.
The concepts of the nation-state, sovereignty, people, territories, resources, and big data are acquiring new significance — everything must be accumulated within controlled boundaries. Accordingly, political approaches are also shifting. The old network of allies and partnerships no longer exists — only competitors and those willing to accept the patronage of a stronger power remain.
How should Belarus and democratic forces respond to this shift in the historical epoch? Should we try to find our place in such a world? What could that place be, and should we seek a strong patron? What could make Belarus an attractive prospect for potential backers? Or should we fight — relying on support from certain European countries — to ensure that the era of new mercantilism ends as soon as possible?
Northwestern Edge 2.0
The second fundamental change that has taken place in recent years is the transformation of Belarus’s relationship with Russia. In the previous era, the Kremlin deprived Belarus of the right to leave Russia’s sphere of influence. Over the past few years, however, it seems to have stripped Belarus of even the ability to do so.
Belarus has fallen into total economic dependence on Russia, which has encompassed almost the entire spectrum of critically important sectors. In recent years, this dependence has grown and taken root in the trade, energy, financial, and industrial-technological sectors of the Belarusian economy.
In addition to this, new areas of dependence have emerged: transport and logistics, the fiscal sector, monetary policy, and cyberspace. In each of these sectors, Russia — its markets, companies, and government — has become a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of the Belarusian economy.
The regime has accepted this situation as inevitable, abandoning the strategy of geographical diversification. The course toward rapprochement with Russia is acquiring the characteristics of a deliberately medium-term strategy. For the sake of economic survival, the regime is deepening integration projects — this process follows a spiral and is expanding into the military sphere, politics, historiography, and almost every sphere except Lukashenko’s direct governance.
If we imagine almost any scenario of a power transition in Belarus under such a status quo, the new government will find itself in an extremely weak position with minimal room for maneuver. By controlling the existing levers, the Russian government, if it wishes, can easily ensure a partial or complete collapse of the Belarusian economy.
How and how quickly can dependence on Russia be weakened? Is it possible — and under what conditions — to count on external support in a rapidly changing world? How will different scenarios of Russia’s development affect Belarus — its economic state, the degree of dependence, and the chances of breaking out of this closed cycle? Are radical changes in Russia a necessary prerequisite for altering the existing status quo?
At the same time, Belarus’s presence in Russia’s sphere of influence is becoming for the West not just an unpleasant but also an acceptable fact. To some extent, it guarantees the West peace of mind that another war will not begin or that the ongoing war will not escalate further.
However, the ongoing war is already becoming clearer in terms of its outcome. Ukraine, which has spent three years fighting in blood to secure its place in the free world, will likely remain — at least in the short term — without part of its territories, security guarantees, and economic future. It has not received the level of support from the Western world that it had expected.
The post-war world (or the world under an armistice) is likely to be worse than the pre-war one. In this world, Russia will not only retain all the instruments of control over Belarus but also receive tacit recognition of Belarus being under its protectorate.
In this sense, analogies arise with the de facto division of the world after the First World War. In 1918-1921, regarding Belarus’s future, various scenarios for the development of events were entirely possible. During this period, internal demand could have had a significant influence on the course of events. In the period from 1921-1924 — after the Treaty of Riga and the recognition of the USSR by Western countries — the course of history for Belarus entered a track from which it was practically impossible to escape through internal demand alone.
Does Belarus have any strategic advantages in military-strategic terms to formulate an alternative to remaining in Russia’s sphere of influence? To whom, and why, might such an alternative be of interest?
Different Us
The state of key pro-democratic actors is deteriorating across all major indicators — almost from every perspective: potential, public support, and financial security. This is an expected and stable phenomenon.
Significant changes have taken place in society over the past few years.
The concepts of identity and visions of the future in Belarusian society have traditionally been polarized. The distribution of value preferences exhibits “long tails,” deeply rooted in cultural, civilizational, and even religious traditions. This does not mean that Belarus lacks a dominant “center.” It exists and is significant. Moreover, in recent years, it has likely expanded somewhat, while the “tails” have become lighter. However, this central group remains numerically weakened, while the polarized groups have become stronger. This means that political consolidation around centrist positions in Belarusian society is inherently a difficult task.
Today, public and political consolidation around the center seems neither realistic nor promising. Firstly, such consolidation does not ideologically align with the realities of the modern world. For the central segment of society, the concept of “Belarus as Switzerland” can still serve as a unifying idea. However, unlike before 2022, this concept is increasingly perceived as unrealistic.
Secondly, everyday rejection of one another among polarized groups has intensified, reinforced by starkly opposing accumulated experiences in recent years. Long-term repression, forced migration, and family separations have directly affected hundreds of thousands of Belarusians — some as victims, others as orchestrators and enforcers of this scenario. Even in the most optimistic scenario, it will take a considerable amount of time to dismantle these entrenched mental barriers.
Thirdly, in recent years, the divide between opposing political camps has significantly deepened — largely due to the first two reasons. As a result, the gap between the political class and society has also widened.
The paradoxical outcome is that the largest segment of society still wants — or at least would agree to — the idea of a “Swiss-style Belarus,” but due to its perceived lack of viability, almost no political actors can or want to represent this position. Political figures are increasingly shifting toward representing extreme positions.
So, is it possible to “stitch” Belarusian society together? Or should we acknowledge that this is not feasible at present and instead focus on strengthening our own base of supporters?
Another fundamental shift concerns the private sector of the economy — perhaps the only collective bearer of pro-democratic values that remains inside the country. While the private sector still serves as a “pillar” of democratization, it has weakened: it has become more dependent on the state and Russia, and it has lost its role as a driver of new economic and cultural practices.
The 2020 revolution is sometimes referred to as the “revolution of the private sector” for a reason. The cultural and everyday practices inherent in the private sector expand the boundaries of daily freedoms and create a demand for further iterations of their expansion. These mechanisms function independently of the will of business owners — they can form even in enterprises that are loyal to the regime.
However, the regime understands the existence of these mechanisms and the role of the private sector. For economic reasons, it cannot eliminate the private sector entirely as a hostile element. Instead, it is attempting to establish state control over it following the Chinese model. Basic economic mechanisms of the private sector remain, but at the same time, it is being maximally integrated with the state — both economically and administratively.
On this path, the regime has likely achieved some success.
The private sector is likely stagnating in terms of volume. Some enterprises have closed or relocated, while others — facing sanctions, reputational toxicity, enormous risks, and administrative pressure — view business as a “suitcase without a handle.” As a result, many companies opt for a cautious strategy, refusing expansion. In some industries, the private sector is losing ground because the state sector, driven by wartime conditions, has received more incentives for growth.
Before 2020, there was no doubt that the private and state sectors in Belarus were two entirely different worlds. The corporate culture of Belarusian private companies was fundamentally different from that of Russian firms. Today, these differences are gradually fading.
Is the Belarusian private sector still a collective pro-democratic entity? What functions can it perform, and what effects can it generate? How can it resist state control and assimilation into the Russian model? How can its development be supported, and how can engagement with it be strengthened?
The Way Forward
After outlining such fundamental problems, it is difficult to conclude on an optimistic note. Moreover, even if some of the “bolts” we have described loosen, it does not necessarily mean that Belarus’s situation will improve significantly.
For example, if we imagine a scenario where the West becomes stronger, will that change Belarus? If we become stronger, how will that substantially alter the situation if Russia remains the same? Even if we finally imagine a Russia different from what it is today, under conditions of a “mercantile West” and a “weak us,” Belarus’s situation might remain unchanged.
We cannot dismiss the existence of positive scenarios — they are theoretically possible, but we cannot rely on them. The truth is that for real change to occur, the “bolts” must loosen everywhere — in Belarus, in the West, and in Russia.
Most likely, this will not happen. Those who seek democratic change must therefore formulate the right answers to today’s difficult situation in order to increase future chances for positive transformation.
We hope that the questions we have posed will contribute to this effort.
