Firstly, the military capabilities of both sides have changed: the balance has shifted in Ukraine’s favour. This has given Kyiv the confidence that the threat from the northern border is not as great as previously thought — and therefore no longer precludes it from pursuing a proactive policy on the Belarusian track.

Secondly, the dialogue between Minsk and Washington has come to be seen in Kyiv as a problem, as it risks legitimising a co-aggressor. This precedent could later be used in relation to Russia as well. Therefore, as the dialogue between Minsk and the US gained momentum, Ukraine made its position much tougher, demonstrating to Washington that it would neither assist in the legitimisation of Lukashenka nor allow it to happen.

Thirdly, Kyiv is preparing for the post-war configuration of the region and wants to be an active author of how this region will look. Therefore, Ukrainian policy is becoming bolder not only in relation to Belarus, but also towards other neighbours, such as Poland and Hungary. Ukraine sees itself, if not as a regional superpower, then as one of the region’s most powerful states, with the right to write the rules for the post-war configuration. And that means influencing the situation in Belarus as well.

Three constants that have not disappeared

These changes are not enough to speak of a genuine strategic shift, as much has remained unchanged.

Preventing Belarus from being drawn into the war remains an unchanged priority since 2022. Only the means of achieving this goal are changing, not the goal itself.

The demarcation between Belarus and Russia also remains. Contrary to popular interpretations of Lukashenka as a subordinate vassal, Kyiv believes in his limited, but real, agency. This is precisely why ultimatums are issued to him: there is no point in trying to influence the governor of the Belgorod region, but there is a point in trying to influence Lukashenka, including his military autonomy. For this very reason, secret contacts with him through the security services have also been maintained: technical channels for logistical operations (the transfer of political prisoners, the exchange of prisoners of war and the bodies of the dead), and sometimes communication at a higher level. If Lukashenka is to be believed, after the ultimatum over the relay transmitters such communication did take place, and Kyiv did not deny it. Kyiv is not counting on regime change in Minsk, but it is trying to shape its behaviour through pressure and reduce its own risks, rather than working to overthrow it.

Public toughness and private channels here do not contradict one another — they serve different purposes. Publicly, Kyiv can deny Lukashenka’s legitimacy and meet with Tsikhanouskaya; behind the scenes, it can maintain a working channel with the same authorities when necessary on matters of war and security.

And the third constant is the distinction between the Belarusian regime and the Belarusian people. This has always been present in Zelenskyy’s rhetoric, which has emphasised Belarus’s European prospects and the fact that the Belarusian people are not the same as the Russian people or the Belarusian regime. Many Belarusians remained in Ukraine after 2020 and 2022 under a certain political protection, and the fact that so many Belarusian volunteers went to fight for Ukraine played no small part in this.

What the democratic forces can do in the new circumstances

To take advantage of the open window of opportunity, it is important to remember: what we call the structures of the Belarusian democratic forces are not all of the democratic forces. There is a faction which, on the contrary, lobbies for dialogue with official Minsk and believes that ultimatums only get in the way. In general, I would describe all Belarusian democratic forces, including those that have made contact with Kyiv, as a network of advocacy organisations rather than fully-fledged political actors — they are not competing for power in Belarus at present.

Their mission at this stage is to improve the image of Belarusians in Ukraine and to separate the people from the regime, as well as to provide support at international forums and to enter structures such as the Lublin Triangle. The next step could be the institutionalisation of relations through working groups and an official representation in Kyiv. All this, incidentally, contradicts the narrative that Tsikhanouskaya is supposedly losing her influence: she has found a powerful partner in the Ukrainian authorities.

One should also be cautious about comparisons of the number of Belarusians on either side of the front. Yes, there is information about thousands of Belarusians on Russia’s side, but it is important to understand the difference: often these are people who are incarcerated or have been living in Russia for decades, never having changed their Belarusian passport for a Russian one. These groups cannot be directly compared with those who consciously went to fight for Ukraine.

Conclusions

What is happening today between Kyiv and Minsk is not a change of course, but the same course of action, only pursued more boldly and openly. The three priorities — to prevent war, to distinguish between Belarus and Russia, and to distinguish between the regime and the Belarusian people — were what defined Ukrainian policy both two and four years ago. The only thing that has changed is how confidently and publicly Kyiv is prepared to defend these priorities. That is why it is more accurate to speak not of a strategic pivot, but of a reassessment of one’s own strength. It is this very difference that will determine how long the current window of opportunity remains open.

Ukraine is now implementing an Air-Land-Economy defence strategy. The goals of this strategy are:

• to achieve maximum attrition of Russian air targets;
• to completely halt the advance of Russian forces and push them back on certain sections of the front;
• to inflict maximum economic damage so that Russia cannot finance the war (primarily the oil refining sector, and more recently, the logistics centres of the Wildberries marketplace).

In addition to pressuring Russia, Kyiv is also trying to pressure Moscow’s closest ally. Therefore, Zelenskyy’s ultimatum, as well as his statements directed at Lukashenka, concerned at least two of the three components of this strategy: increasing the efficiency of striking aerial targets (the issue of relay transmitters) and creating problems in the oil sector (the operation of Belarusian oil refineries for Russia’s needs). Kyiv aims to adjust the behaviour of the Lukashenka regime in a direction favourable to Ukraine, to create conditions for pressure on the Russians, and to enter into serious dialogue with Moscow before the end of the year.

Preparing the groundwork for the post-war period and a warning to Lukashenka

At the same time, the pressure on Lukashenka also has a political dimension. It is necessary to create the prerequisites for speaking from a position of strength about a new format of coexistence with Belarus after the war. It is also an opportunity to assert itself as a political actor in the context of the Belarusian question. For in recent years, Ukraine has adopted a passive stance, and negotiations between Minsk and Washington, as well as the growing likelihood of concessions from some EU countries, could have left Ukraine on the sidelines of the wider political processes surrounding Belarus.

Furthermore, the pressure serves as a means of deterring any further involvement of Belarus in the war against Ukraine. Although Lukashenka is not interested in getting involved in any adventures at this stage, and Russia and Belarus have generally divided roles regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, a mobilisation scenario in Russia could create additional risks. Russia could, for example, as it did in 2022, transfer recently mobilised citizens to Belarus for training and preparation. Consequently, an increase in the Russian contingent in Belarus will compel Ukraine to respond by allocating more resources to cover its northern border and to monitor the situation in Belarus more closely, fearing the most negative scenarios.

In this situation, contacts with Belarusian democratic forces serve as an irritant and are one of the elements of pressure on Lukashenka. However, it is doubtful that Ukraine has a coherent and long-term vision for its work on the Belarusian track. The current changes are more tactical in nature, as there has been little progress on issues requiring systematic and consistent work — in particular, the legalisation of Belarusians in Ukraine.

This discrepancy between high-profile diplomatic activity and a lack of progress on day-to-day issues may be the main indicator that we are not looking at a new policy, but a new set of tools for an old, fundamentally reactive, line of conduct.

How will Ukrainian-Belarusian relations develop further

In the near term, Ukraine will most likely continue its roughly the same line of conduct: periodic contacts with Belarusian democratic forces, multiplied by pointed statements directed at official Minsk. However, as winter approaches, if the war does not stop and Russia does not announce a mobilisation and attempt to secure greater support from Minsk, the tone of the rhetoric and the frequency of actions may diminish, as the country’s leadership will be focused on foreign policy matters, as well as on preparing for the winter period and responding to new challenges.

If Russia announces a mobilisation and proceeds with a serious escalation without excessive use of threats from Belarus, the Belarusian issue may be pushed entirely into the background in the information space. In that case, the entire focus of the Ukrainian leadership will shift to strengthening the manpower capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, attracting additional resources from Western partners, and defending cities from strikes on critical infrastructure. This is yet another sign that today’s activity on the Belarusian track is not a standalone priority, but a function of other, far more urgent tasks.

Furthermore, it is unclear what the recent reshuffles in the Cabinet will bring. One question is the further work with the democratic forces, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bears more or less primary responsibility for contacts with them. Whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the formation of the new government and the updating of its priorities, will continue to maintain contacts with the democratic forces is an open question. And it is this very uncertainty that best describes the current state of the Belarusian track in Ukrainian policy: not a strategy, but a set of tactical reactions, the content of which can change with the change of the people responsible for it, or with a change of priorities on the front.

These developments could create the impression of a fundamental transformation in Ukraine’s policy towards Belarus. However, both the tactic of “not annoying the (Belarusian) grandad,” who dreams of capturing Kyiv in three days, and the harsh ultimatums issued to him are built upon longer-term and more stable underlying components on which this tactic depends.

There are only three of them.

The first is security. The long border between the two countries can be both a source of existential threats and a means of reducing tensions and more effectively distributing limited military resources.

The second is the question of who is in charge of Belarus. Who actually controls Belarus, whose decisions determine the balance of risks and opportunities on the common border, and with whom dialogue must be held, even if only at a remove.

The third is the international context. To what extent the position of foreign partners on Belarus aligns with Ukrainian interests.

Everything else we observe — from the relay transmitters to negotiations with Belarusian democratic forces — is a derivative of these three factors.

From de-escalation to ultimatums

In the spring and summer of 2022, Kyiv seriously prepared for the Belarusian army to enter the war. Such a scenario would have spread Ukraine’s already limited resources thin, increased the threat to the capital, and forced it to defend distant north-western sections of the border. Over time, this threat gave way to another — a renewed Russian assault from Belarusian territory. Later, this too was minimised: Russia still lacks the resources to repeat the February 2022 attack. And as these threats weakened, Ukraine was building up its military potential and inflicting increasingly damaging blows on the Russian army and its infrastructure. Burnt oil refineries, sunken ships of the shadow fleet, a deficit in the Russian budget, and minimal advances for the occupiers on the front line: all this clearly demonstrates that Ukraine is not just capable of defending itself. It is returning the war to its original address.

The awareness of both the power and the vulnerability of Belarusian military and civilian infrastructure to Ukrainian drones allowed Ukraine to shift from a tactic of de-escalation to public ultimatums that humiliate Lukashenka.

However, this reassessment began long before the relay transmitter incident. As early as January 2023, Ukraine introduced its first major package of sanctions against Belarusian enterprises. At that time, the restrictions affected Belaruskali, Belarusian Railways (BR), and Belarusian banks. In February of the same year, Ukrainian special services carried out a successful attack on a Russian A-50 long-range radar aircraft at Machulishchy. In April 2023, Ukraine requested digital topographic maps of Belarus from France, necessary for aviation and drones flying at low altitude. And in 2026, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is already making sarcastic jokes about Lukashenka from a high podium. To a proposal to meet “the President of Belarus,” he replies that he is already meeting one — Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Who is the master in Minsk?

After 2020, Ukraine refused to recognise the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, while, of course, contacts between the countries were maintained — and maintained at an official level. With regard to Belarus’s democratic forces, Kyiv’s position was noticeably different from that of its Western allies: Ukraine consistently avoided engaging with Tsikhanouskaya.

The full-scale invasion shifted the dialogue to a different plane. Since then, a communication channel between the countries’ intelligence services and military has been established and is operating. All this time, these channels have operated quietly and behind the scenes, but during the most tense days and months following the invasion, they were what allowed both sides to assess each other’s actions soberly, weigh the associated risks, and exchange warnings.

In the autumn of 2022, for example, via this channel Ukraine passed a warning to Minsk: any Russian missile launches from Belarusian territory would be met with a military response. The last missile strike on Ukraine from Belarusian territory was recorded in October 2022. Similar negotiations were held regarding Russian aircraft taking off from Belarus to bomb Ukraine, and later regarding Russian drone launches from Belarus. Both practices also eventually ceased. Ukraine also maintained a political channel with Lukashenka himself, via Ukrainian MP Yevhen Shevchenko.

Contacts with the democratic forces, which reached their highest level in December 2025, pursue different objectives. The reason for this is prosaic: decisions that affect the war are made in Minsk, and the influence of the democratic forces from Warsaw and Vilnius on those decisions is zero.

But the question of “who is really in charge here” is also relevant to the democratic forces themselves — only in a different, internal sense. For their policy of institutionalising relations with Kyiv to be successful, it must be aimed at solving problems that affect people’s real interests, not be merely a symbolic gesture. High-level meetings and joint photographs are good, but they are only a tactic. Thousands of Belarusians live in Ukraine without the same support as their compatriots in Poland or Lithuania: many are on the brink of survival and face difficulties obtaining citizenship after decades of living in the country, while the families of fallen volunteers are being denied payments and medical assistance. It is the resolution of these specific issues — rather than just the rhetoric at meetings with Zelenskyy — that will be the true test of whether the democratic forces have transformed from a tool of pressure on Minsk into an independent actor.

The Trump factor

With Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House, the American strategy on the Belarusian track underwent significant changes. The US recognised Lukashenka’s legitimacy, lifted sanctions on a number of Belarusian enterprises and banks, held direct talks at the level of the two presidents, and even began to pressure its European allies to lift some of the restrictions against Belarus.

In Kyiv, this U-turn is viewed with scepticism, with more threats seen in it than benefits. Firstly, lifting sanctions on Belarus opens up avenues for Russia to circumvent them. Secondly, the sudden transformation of an “aggressor state” into a “full-fledged partner” paves the way for a similar change in attitude towards Russia and Putin personally in the future. Hostile actions against Ukraine, including war crimes, would no longer serve as a constraint for Washington on the path to restoring cooperation.

Before Trump’s return to the White House, such risks were absent, and Ukraine could afford to ignore the Belarusian democratic forces and, when necessary, tactically use the communication channel with Lukashenka while avoiding public criticism of him. Now, however, that previous balance has been disrupted: Lukashenka has gained direct access to the US President and is able to negotiate with him directly, including on deals unfavourable to Ukraine. The increase in Ukraine’s contacts with Belarusian pro-democratic forces was a response to the strengthening of the Belarusian authorities’ international position and an additional resource in the dialogue with Lukashenka and in the political game against the Belarusian authorities as a whole.

Therefore, when it comes to a “fundamental transformation” of Kyiv’s policy towards Minsk, it is worth remembering that it could just as quickly and radically change in the opposite direction, should Ukraine’s assessment of the three basic elements that shape it change.

Tsikhanouskaya’s visit to Ukraine should be seen as a calibrated, elegant asymmetrical gesture from Kyiv in response to Lukashenka’s crude remarks towards Zelenskyy. This gesture was calculated precisely to appeal to Lukashenka’s emotional vulnerability to such contacts. For Tsikhanouskaya, this is undoubtedly a significant political achievement and additional visibility.

As for the ultimatum itself: buoyed by successes in strikes on Russian oil refineries, Ukraine decided to test just how independent Lukashenka really is. It is a sort of “pass” to him: prove you are not a Kremlin puppet. And this, surprisingly, benefits both parties — Ukraine and Lukashenka himself. In essence, it is de-escalation through escalation. Zelenskyy has simply returned to Minsk the same approach that Minsk has long used against its neighbours through migrants and smuggling.

What Lukashenka gained

A question that is rarely asked in this discussion: what did Lukashenka himself gain? According to Ukrainian claims, the relay transmitters have stopped operating — a benefit for Ukraine, though this is difficult to verify independently. In return, however, Lukashenka received several things of considerable value to him:

• a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry supporting Belarus’s sovereignty;
• very cautious, euphemistic phrasing from EU countries regarding Belarus at the UN Security Council meeting;
• the opportunity to send conciliatory signals to Washington;
• a basis for his own conciliatory rhetoric.

In recent weeks, Lukashenka has indeed been sending the message “don’t drag us into the war” — addressed simultaneously to Putin, China, the West, and his own domestic audience. It is telling that Kyrylo Budanov also stated that Belarus should not be made into yet another enemy.

Thus, for a relatively minor technical concession, Lukashenka demonstrated two things at once: he is capable of acting at odds with Moscow on certain issues, and he is able to adjust his own rhetoric swiftly when it suits him.

The West’s old test

The West traditionally views Belarus through the prism of two factors: Minsk’s ability to make independent foreign policy decisions and the domestic political situation in the country. In 2008, this meant the non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the release of political prisoners. In 2014–2015, it meant the non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea and, once again, the release of political prisoners. This led to the 2014–2020 period — a time of flourishing relations with the West and the gradual lifting of sanctions.

After 2022, applying these same two criteria, the West reassessed Belarus in the opposite direction: Lukashenka failed to distance himself from complicity in Russia’s aggression, and his prisons still hold hundreds of political prisoners. These two criteria remain relevant for the West today, but Belarusian-Ukrainian relations alone are unlikely to significantly influence them.

Why real change is hard to expect

There are no qualitative changes in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations from Ukraine’s side, nor should any be expected: selective, closed contacts through embassies and intelligence services will continue, as will the use of Belarusian territory for prisoner exchanges. The very existence of such contacts is risk management, not normalisation: Minsk can remain for Kyiv simultaneously a source of threat and a technical partner on certain, narrowly defined issues — and one does not preclude the other.

For Ukraine, a prerequisite for genuine qualitative change in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations appears to be the cessation of the Lukashenka regime’s support for the Russian military machine. This, however, seems remote.

Even without this critical step, Lukashenka could alter the EU’s stance towards him through an obvious and relatively low-cost move — the release of political prisoners. Why he is not doing this is difficult to say. Perhaps his contacts with Washington are already irritating Moscow, and Lukashenka has already been told the price for playing games with Trump — a price he is not yet prepared to pay. If so, both the release of political prisoners and any further demonstration of independence from the Kremlin will remain as measured and symbolic as the dismantling of the relay transmitters.

Conclusions

The past few months have shown that both Kyiv and Minsk are adept at an exchange of gestures that allows each side to gain its own advantage without changing the basic rules of the game. As long as Lukashenka is not prepared to pay the price for greater independence from Moscow, and the West continues to assess Belarus by the same two criteria as in 2008 and 2014, any talk of a genuine, qualitative transformation in Belarus’s relations with the West or Ukraine will remain premature — no matter how many conciliatory signals Minsk sends to Washington or Kyiv.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s visit to Kyiv is an important step in the intensification of Ukrainian-Belarusian relations. However, it remains primarily symbolic and should not be overestimated. There were no written agreements — a key criterion for the effectiveness of meetings at the international level — between the parties. This does not necessarily imply a lack of trust. Rather, it reflects the objective difference in the international legal weight of the Ukrainian state and the Office of Tsikhanouskaya, rather than any reluctance on the part of the parties.

Kyiv’s change of approach is largely linked to personnel factors: the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov to a new post (in January 2026, he became the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine) played its part. This therefore primarily reflects his own views on relations with Belarus, rather than a full-scale, systemic review of the approach to the country. It was he, for example, who met the next group of released political prisoners in December 2025.

Russia is reacting to the intensification of Ukrainian-Belarusian dialogue in its customary fashion: by striking Belarusian buses with drones, for instance. These provocations are reminiscent of the methods of Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, official Minsk, through State Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Volfovich, publicly states that it will not allow Belarus to be drawn into the war. And this, it must be admitted, is a rather interesting signal.

Ukraine’s lack of a long-term strategy towards Belarus

For Ukraine, the key task remains to prevent Belarus from being drawn into the war on Russia’s side. But what is important to acknowledge openly is this: a clearly formulated, long-term Ukrainian strategy towards Belarus is absent. Strategy is not, in general, a strong point of Ukrainian politics. Therefore, what we are seeing is reactive politics, not a systematic course of action.

One must also be prepared for a hypothetical scenario of escalation. And here I want to issue a warning: military escalation would not be in the interests of the democratic forces in Belarus. In the event of actual combat on Belarusian territory, there will inevitably be a consolidation of society around the authorities — the so-called “rally around the flag” effect — as was the case in Ukraine after 2022. It will then be even harder for the democratic forces to reach people inside the country.

A hypothetical war scenario might be capable of shaking Lukashenka’s position within Belarus, but there is no guarantee that power would then be seized by the democratic forces, rather than by those who remain physically in Minsk and control the security structures.

To change the status quo of a lack of clear strategic vision regarding Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania — which formed the so-called Lublin Triangle in July 2020 — must form a joint position on Lukashenka. This is the most effective format for regional security, for which the Lublin Triangle was created. The Belarusian issue simply does not carry the same weight for countries such as Spain or Greece. It should be noted, however, that following the release of Andrzej Poczobut, the European Union’s overall position has become less clear-cut. Poland satisfied its own ambitions with the release of Poczobut. The Americans might have wished to gain something from the current situation surrounding Belarus, but they have other priorities at the moment. It is therefore most likely that this issue will be put on the back burner for Washington.

What can and should be done today

In the current circumstances, it makes sense to advance systematically along specific, narrow tracks rather than limiting oneself to one-off decisions from Kyiv. My concrete advice to the Ukrainian authorities: ensure that in regulatory acts, Belarusians and Russians appear in separate paragraphs and clauses, not in a single category. If this is not done, the problems will only worsen.

In the first months of the full-scale invasion, there was a reflexive, emotional response towards all people from the aggressor states — but 1,600 days of war have now passed, and the time has come for a more precise, legally grounded policy. This is all the more relevant given that, regrettably, there are today more Belarusians serving in the Russian army than in Ukraine’s defence forces. But this fact must not blur the legal distinction between citizens of the aggressor state and those Belarusians who are consciously fighting on Ukraine’s side or suffering for their support of it.

Belarus as a transit territory for prisoner exchanges is also today’s reality, and this opportunity must be used. But Ukraine must demand more actively the release of all those convicted in Belarus specifically for supporting Ukraine — the so-called “rail partisans” and fighters of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, who have been in captivity for four years and are, regrettably, at risk of the death penalty if extradited to Belarus. The agency of the Belarusian democratic forces on this issue must be supported consistently, not only when it is politically convenient.

Conclusions

Turning Belarus into an instrument of its own foreign policy is an entirely rational and even useful step for Ukraine. But it will bear long-term fruit only if Kyiv finally supplements its sparring with Lukashenka and its symbolic partnership with Tsikhanouskaya with a strategy of its own — one that is consistent, with a clear legal framework, coordination with Warsaw and Vilnius, and genuine concern, not merely rhetoric, for the fate of those Belarusians who have already made their choice on the side of Ukraine. Otherwise, the window of opportunity will close just as quickly as it opened.